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Abstract
This thesis is an empirical investigation of whether traditional sex-based 
specialisation within marriage, wherein the wife takes responsibility for unpaid 
work in the home and the husband focuses on paid work, causes married men to 
earn more than unmarried men. The analysis is undertaken with three waves of 
Australian, Canadian and US cross-sectional data, spanning the 1980s and early 
1990s.
The theoretical underpinning for the causal link between specialisation and men’s 
wages is Becker’s theory' of the family (Becker, 1985). He views the family as a 
small firm; its members consuming what they produce from the combination of 
goods and services purchased in the market and their time. A motivation to 
specialise traditionally is that women, in general, are paid less than men.
Chapter Two reviews the predominantly US literature that has set out to uncover 
the cause of the marriage premium (see Gray, 1997 for a survey). Convinced that 
married men are more productive than unmarried men, recent analysis uses panel 
data to determine whether marriage makes men more productive or more 
productive men get married. The consensus is that specialisation played a role in 
determining the US marriage premium in the late 1970s, but Gray (1997) claims it 
played no role in the early 1990s.
I commenced the empirical analysis by estimating marriage premiums. The US 
premium was largest in every wave and the Australian premium smallest. 
Australia exhibits the least amount of sex-based pay discrimination. Between the 
first and third waves the sizes of the Canadian and Australian premiums shrank, 
but the US premium remained much the same size.
In the rest of the empirical analysis I assumed that wives’ labour supply varied 
inversely with the couple’s degree of specialisation.
In analysis presented in Chapter Five, the Juhn et al. technique was used to 
decompose dynamics (between the second and third waves) in the cross-country
wage gaps between never married men and currently married men (grouped by 
whether their wives worked full-time, worked part-time or did not work). 
Assuming that unobserved human capital was specialisation based this technique 
allowed me to identify cross-country and over-time differences in the amount of 
specialisation and the return to specialisation. Over the early 1990s the US 
marriage premium decreased in size. Consistent with this the amount of 
specialisation and the return to that specialisation also fell. Movements in the 
relative amounts of specialisation and return to specialisation explained the US- 
Australian dynamics, but could not explain the US-Canadian dynamics.
Finally, in Chapter Six I estimate a simultaneous model of wives’ labour supply 
(measured by continuous hours of paid work) and husbands’ wage using the third 
wave of data. I find that wives’ hours were endogenous for Australian couples 
without dependents and Canadian and US couples, regardless of whether they 
were parents. With wives’ labour supply endogenised I only found evidence of 
specialisation amongst couples with dependent children in each of the countries.
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Chapter One
Introduction
“Is your family wrecking your career?” asked Betsy Morris in a recent Fortune 
magazine cover story. “Once upon a time, a family was a corporate prerequisite”, she 
continued. Having a wife and children was important to a man’s career. However, 
“families are no longer a big plus for a corporation; they are a big problem” (Morris, 
1997). She went on to identify the stresses associated with maintaining a career and 
family, especially when both a husband and wife are working in the paid labour 
market.
Married men tend to earn more than similar unmarried men. This empirical finding 
persists over time and across industrialised countries (Goldin, 1990; Schoeni 1990). 
One explanation for this earnings gap is that traditional sex based specialisation 
within marriage, whereby wives take responsibilities for work within the home 
(including child-care), allows men to devote more time and energy to their careers 
once married (Becker, 1985). Explicit in Becker’s theory of the family is the belief 
that what goes on inside the family home impacts on the parents’ productivity in the 
paid labour market.
Traditional specialisation within marriage is buoyed by discrimination against women 
in the paid labour market and contributes to the gender pay gap. Although men 
continue to earn more than women do in industrialised countries, we have 
experienced dramatic reductions in pay discrimination against women since the 1950s 
(Blau and Kahn, 1996a). Concurrently married women and mothers are increasingly 
likely to work in the paid labour market. For example, in Australia, the participation 
rate of married women rose from 29 per cent to just over 55 percent in the thirty years 
from 1966 to 1996 (Mitchell, 1998: 20). At the same time the size of the marriage 
premium received by American men has fallen over the 1970s and 1980s (Blackburn 
and Korenman, 1994; Gray, 1997). The marriage premium is the name given to the 
gap in earnings between married and unmarried men with similar holdings of 
observed human capital, such as education and work experience.
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Despite the temptation to interpret these trends as indication of a causal relationship 
from specialisation, as measured by wives’ labour supply, to husband’s earnings, 
labour economists are not convinced that the male marriage premium is caused by 
specialisation. An alternative argument is that marriage does not make men more 
productive. Instead the men most likely to marry possess characteristics attractive to 
both prospective employers and prospective wives, like reliability and commitment. 
The most reliable and committed men will be more productive and most likely to 
select into marriage, hence its description as the selection hypothesis. A small 
literature has developed to determine the empirical importance of specialisation and 
selection as explanations for the male marriage premium (see Gray, 1997 for a 
review).
The primary intention of this thesis is to add to the specialisation versus selection 
debate. The focus of the thesis’ empirical analysis is to determine the robustness of 
the specialisation hypothesis as an explanation for; cross-national differences in the 
size of male marriage premiums, and the dynamics of those cross-national 
differences. To this end I used three waves of cross section data from the Australian, 
Canadian and US data sets housed in the Luxembourg Income Study. Those waves 
spanned the 1980s and first half of the 1990s. Becker’s theory of the family evolved 
to explain American family life in the 1960s and 1970s. Most empirical studies of 
the male marriage premium have been undertaken with US data from the 1970s and 
early 1980s. This thesis represents the first in depth cross-country analysis of the 
male marriage premium.
This test of the robustness of the specialisation hypothesis has important implications 
for women too. If the specialisation hypothesis holds, wives cannot expect to match 
their husbands’ productivity in the paid labour market while having responsibility for 
work undertaken within the home. Despite wives’ increased participation in the paid 
labour market, analysts of time-use data, such as Michael Bittman (cited in Bittman 
and Pixley, 1997), do not find an accompanying increase in work undertaken by 
husbands in the home. Rather, it seems that couples are consuming less home
2
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produced goods, although working wives still spend substantial amounts of time in 
household work.
Analyses of the sex pay gap have paid explicit attention to the implications of the 
male marriage premium. Neumark (1988) noted that about one-third of the estimated 
sex-based pay discrimination in the USA was explained by the male marriage 
premium. Gregory et al. ’s (1989) analysis shows that in Australia in 1981 the return 
to men’s weekly earnings from having a spouse present was 17 per cent compared 
with 5 per cent for a female (19 per cent and 3 per cent respectively in USA 1982).
The countries under analysis are very similar. They each fall into Esping-Anderson’s 
(1990) Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American regime, having liberal welfare states. Hence 
this cross-national analysis can be described as a ‘most similar’ strategy (Przeworski 
and Teune, 1970). If able to locate a facet, in which otherwise similar countries 
differ, it can be attributed to one of the few distinguishing factors. In the period under 
scrutiny Australia had the most centralised wage determination process, and 
consequently the least amount of wage inequality. At the other extreme, in terms of 
wage inequality, lay the USA.
Theoretical explanations o f the male marriage premium
Chapter Two introduces the current thinking about the male marriage premium. It 
surveys the theoretical explanations for the male marriage premium proposed by 
economists and summarises empirical evidence relating to the relevance of the 
theoretical explanations. The general consensus among economists is that married 
men are more productive than unmarried men are. Little empirical evidence has been 
found to support the theories that married men experience positive discrimination in 
the paid labour market or that married men take on more unpleasant jobs to receive 
earnings compensation, for example.
The predominantly US literature is preoccupied with determining whether married 
men are more productive before they marry, or whether marriage makes them more 
productive. The major innovation in recent years has been the use of panel data to
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track men’s earnings over time as they move in and out of marriage. Analysts use the 
panel data to isolate the effect of marriage on men’s earnings from any life-long 
earnings differential unrelated to observed human capital. Most analysts have found 
that specialisation has played a role in determining the male marriage premium. Gray 
(1997) concludes that the reduction in the size of the US marriage premium over the 
1980s was associated with a reduction in the importance of specialisation in the 
determination of men’s wages.
Chapter Two also contains a discussion of the theory underlying specialisation, 
Becker’s theory of the family. Becker’s theoretical acknowledgment that work was 
also undertaken inside families enabled economists to turn their attention to the 
family. The family was constructed as a small firm producing goods and services, a 
combination of goods purchased from the market and the time of family members, 
valued by all members of the family. The family’s utility, dependent on consumption 
of those home produced goods and services, was maximised by the household head, 
and himself constructed as ‘benevolent dictator’.
Becker argued that, to maximise utility, a husband and wife should specialise in home 
production or work in the paid labour market and trade home produced goods and 
services for market purchased goods and services. Abstracting from gender power 
relations within the family and institutional pressures from outside the family, 
Becker’s theory sheds no light on why women should have traditionally specialised in 
home production and men in market work. Indeed his side-lining of institutional and 
societal effects is the source of much criticism of his theory. Furthermore, Becker 
does not question the need for the specialisation in home production. In some 
households it is possible to employ someone at lower wages than can be earned by 
the wife, to produce household services. However, his theory shows how the relative 
wages of a husband and wife impinge on their specialisation decision, just as the 
specialisation decision affects their market wage outcomes.
4
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The data: Australia 1981, 1989, 1994; Canada 1981, 1991, 1994; USA 1974, 1991, 
1994.
Chapter Three summarises the data to be used in the more complex empirical analysis 
of the remaining chapters. The data surveys used were developed by the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS). LIS harmonises the data to make it suitable for cross-national 
analysis. Personal and wage and salary based income data for men and the wives of 
married men were extracted from the LIS data sets for each of the six surveys.
The population of men under analysis comprised males who worked for wages and 
salaries (not in the agricultural sector) aged from 20 to 65. When able to, I compared 
the wages of currently married men, including men in de-facto relationships, with 
those of never married men. Divorced, widowed and separated men were excluded 
from the analysis. The data was analysed on an income unit basis. The income unit, 
comprising a single male or couple with and without dependent children, was chosen 
because it corresponds to the relevant economic theories.
Preliminary analysis undertaken in Chapter Three compared the wage age profiles of 
unmarried men with those of married men grouped by whether their wife was 
working. According to the specialisation theory the wage gap between married and 
married men should grow with each year of marriage. Since the data surveys do not 
contain measures of years spent married I approximated this by the age of the male. 
The couple’s degree of specialisation is assumed to be characterised by the age of 
married men, the wife’s degree of attachment to the paid labour market, and the 
presence of dependent children.
Chapter Three sets out several hypotheses about the extent of specialisation in the 
countries under investigation and how cross-national differences in the extent of 
specialisation might have changed over the 1980s and early 1990s. Cross-national 
comparison was undertaken with the second wave of data sets since they enabled me 
to construct the most comparable samples and set of variables, Australia 1989, 
Canada 1991 and the USA 1991. Over time comparisons were made with the first
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and third waves. Samples and variables were comparable over time within a country, 
but not between countries.
Despite the simple nature of this analysis it provided some interesting insights, 
suggesting, for example, the need to relax the assumption that wives’ labour supply 
was a direct mapping of the degree of specialisation within the couple. It highlighted 
the importance of; isolating the amount of specialisation from the return to 
specialisation, and being alert to factors that might alter the amount of specialisation 
undertaken for a given labour supply. The focus of Chapter Five was to separate the 
return from specialisation related human capital from the amount of specialisation.
Specialisation and marriage premiums across countries and over time
Chapter Four presents a through unpacking of the marriage premium in each of the 
countries. Cross-country and over-time comparisons were made with the data sets 
outlined in Chapter Three. Marriage premiums were constructed from human capital 
theory based log hourly wage equations for men. Estimated by Ordinary Least 
Squares, the equations included controls for education, age, ethnicity, location and 
marital status. This analysis confirmed Schoeni’s (1990) finding that the US marriage 
premiums were largest in size and the Australian premiums smallest in size. The 
marriage premium proves to be relatively important in the wage equations. For 
example, in Australia 1989 it represented twice the addition to the hourly wage than a 
male would receive from living in a capital city. Over time I found that the size of 
the marriage premium fell in Australia and Canada. The US premium was much the 
same size in 1979 and 1994.
Characterising specialisation as an increment to the return to age (where age proxies 
time spent married as well as work experience) I considered the extent to which the 
marriage premium was explained by differences in the return to age of married and 
unmarried men. I further decomposed the marriage premium by allowing it to vary 
with the wives’ attachment to the paid labour market and investigated whether the 
presence of dependent children played a role.
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This unravelling of the marriage premium produced some interesting results. The 
cross-country comparison suggested that, consistent with the specialisation 
hypothesis, human capital appeared to accrue over the course of the marriage. And 
married men with wives who worked in the paid labour market received lower 
premiums than other married men.
Over time it appeared that there had been a reduction in specialisation in Australia 
and Canada, evidenced by smaller differences in the returns to age of married and 
unmarried men, and smaller penalties for having a working wife. In fact there was no 
evidence of specialisation in the third wave of Australian data. While the US 
marriage premium was much the same size in the first and third waves the gap 
between the premiums of husbands with and without working wives had shrunk.
Unfortunately I was unable to determine over-time changes in the relationship 
between dependent children and the marriage premium. The chapter discusses the 
difficulties associated with formulating a hypothesis for over-time changes in the 
effect of dependent children on specialisation, and 1 was keen to see what the data 
could tell me. Data limitations in the first wave meant that divorced, widowed and 
separated men were coded as unmarried in the over time comparisons. Furthermore 
in the US first wave men in de-facto relationships were coded as unmarried. Hence 
the presence of children served primarily to identify those amongst the unmarried 
men who were in de-facto relationships or who had been married. Nonetheless, in 
estimations of the relationship between wives’ labour supply and husband’s earnings 
in the third wave of data sets, undertaken for Chapter Six, I grouped the couples by 
the presence of dependent children.
In chapters five and six specialisation was characterised by the wife’s degree of 
attachment to the paid labour market. I was concerned that proxying the years of 
marriage by age was problematic given the trends to delay marriage, live in de-facto 
relationships rather than marry and the increased tendency to divorce and re-partner.
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What does decomposing the dynamics o f cross-country differences in the estimated 
wage equations for males grouped by degree o f specialisation tell us about the 
relationship between specialisation and the male marriage premium?
Chapter Five begins by determining whether the male marriage premium varies with 
the wife’s attachment to the paid labour market in the second and third waves of data. 
Here I was able to include men in de-facto relationships with men in de-jure 
marriages. I compared them with never married men. Estimation of log wage 
equations for males, including as an explanatory variable a set of three indicator 
variables for married men with; non-working wives, wives who work part-time, and 
wives who work full-time, suggested that the men with wives who did not work had 
the largest premiums, followed by men whose wives worked part-time and then men 
whose wives worked full-time. However the differences in the sizes of the premiums 
disaggregated by the wives’ employment status were not always significant.
There is concern in the literature that wives’ labour supply may be endogenous in the 
husband’s earnings equation. It is possible that wives adjust desired hours of work in 
the paid labour market to their husband’s earnings. The more a husband earns there is 
less financial need, from a family perspective, for a wife to work in the paid labour 
market. It is also possible that men and women sort into marriage on the basis of 
complementarity in their desire for a career. Both of these effects would appear as an 
inverse relationship between wives’ hours and husband s earnings. I used the 
instrumental variables technique to test for the endogeneity of wives’ labour supply. 
Unfortunately the instrument had difficulty predicting wives who worked part-time in 
Canada and the USA.
Cross-country comparison of the size of the marriage premiums grouped by 
employment status of the wives reveals that the US premiums are the largest and the 
Australian premiums the smallest. Over the early 1990s the size of each of the 
disaggregated marriage premiums fell in Canada and the USA, while only the 
Australian premium for men whose wives worked full-time reduced in size.
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Using the Juhn et al. (1991; 1993) approach, I decomposed; the cross-country gap in 
estimated wage equations for males grouped by marital status and employment status 
of wives, and the cross-country differences in these gaps. The Juhn et al. approach 
allowed me to isolate that part of the cross-country differences in wages attributable 
to specialisation and the return to that specialisation. This approach to isolating the 
amount of specialisation from the return to specialisation is unique in the literature. 
Gray (1997) claims that any differences in the size of the effect of wives’ labour 
supply on husband’s earnings are attributable to differences in the return to 
specialisation. He assumes a fixed correspondence between the wives’ labour supply 
and the extent of specialisation. This assumption is too strong for dynamic and cross­
country analysis.
The decompositions showed that the US premium was the largest in size because US 
married males specialised more than Australian and Canadian males. The US return 
to specialisation was larger than the Australian return and much the same size as the 
Canadian return.
Over the early 1990s I found that the US premium fell in size because the return to 
specialisation related human capital fell, as did the amount of specialisation related 
human capital. Specialisation went somewhere towards explaining the dynamics of 
the US-Australian relative premiums but had little to say about the US-Canadian 
dynamics.
Modelling the relationship between the wages o f married men and their wives ’ 
labour supply in more detail
Concerned about the adequacy of the test for the endogeneity of wives’ labour supply 
undertaken for the analysis presented in Chapter Five, the focus of Chapter Six was to 
unravel the relationship between wives’ hours of work in the paid labour market and 
husband’s wages. Wives’ labour supply was measured by continuous hours of paid 
work. It was anticipated that it would be easier to model continuous hours than the 
indicator variable of labour supply used in Chapter Five. Rather than forcing breaks 
in labour supply at pre-determined hours, the modelling process could do this itself.
9
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Furthermore couples were grouped into those with dependent children and those 
without. The nature of the household decision making process within families is 
often assumed to depend on the presence of children. So it is also possible that the 
mechanics of the specialisation decision also differs with the presence of children. 
Taking care of children is a demanding and time-consuming task that makes the need 
to specialise all the more pressing.
A model is developed to describe the effect of the wives’ labour supply on husbands’ 
wages, and vice versa. It contains structural equations for the husband’s wage and the 
number of hours worked by the wife and reduced form equations for the wife’s 
potential wage (which feeds into the wife’s hours equation) and the husband’s hours. 
The wife’s hours equation is estimated by the Tobit procedure while all other 
equations are estimated by OLS.
Estimation of the model is undertaken using the instrumental variables technique 
whereby the predicted wage of the husband, from reduced form estimation of the 
married male’s wage equation, is included as a regressor in the wife’s hours equation. 
Similarly the predicted hours of the wife, from estimation of the reduced form wife’s 
hours equation, are included as a regressor in the husband’s wage equation.
The results of estimation using the data sets from the most recent wave, confirm that 
increases in a husband’s wage encourage his wife to decrease the hours she works in 
the paid labour market for all Canadian and US couples and Australian couples with 
dependents. However the male wage proves to be endogenous, suggesting that 
couples exhibit assortative mating in attributes which jointly increase the husband s 
wage and the wife’s attachment to the paid labour market. Once endogenisation is 
accounted for the negative impact of increases in the husband’s wage on his wife s 
hours increases.
Estimation of the male wage equation shows that the wife’s labour supply, in its 
exogenous form, is inversely related to the husband’s wage for all couples. However 
the wives’ labour supply is endogenous for both sets of US and Canadian couples and 
Australian couples without dependents. Once the endogeneity was accounted for,
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only couples with dependents exhibited specialisation. In couples with dependents, in 
which the wife works full-time for 35 hours per week, her decision to increase her 
desired hours of work by 10 percent, causes her husband’s annual earnings to fall by 
$Ausl66, $Can270 and $US187 in Australia, Canada and the USA respectively.
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Explaining the Male Marriage Premium
2.1 Introduction
The notion of the male marriage premium emerged from empirical observations 
that including a dummy variable for marriage in human capital theory based 
earnings equations for men improved the explanatory power of the model. 
Human capital theory itself provides no basis for the marriage premium, so 
theoretical justifications for its existence post-dated the empirical findings. The 
theories tend to be drawn from observations, within economics, of the 
machinations of the labour market and married couple relations in the US in the 
late 1970's and early 1980's.
This chapter introduces the theoretical justifications for the male marriage 
premium focussing on the proposition of interest in this thesis - that marriage 
raises male productivity through traditional sex based specialisation. I summarise 
the main empirical findings on the source of the male marriage. Much of the 
empirical analysis surrounding the marriage premium has concentrated on 
distinguishing between two theories, both of which build on the presumption that 
married men are more productive than are unmarried men. The specialisation 
hypothesis rests on the assumption that marriage increases men's productivity in 
the paid labour market while the selection hypothesis claims that men are selected 
into marriage on the basis of their labour market productivity. To differentiate 
between the two theories analysts tend to use longitudinal data, data that is 
unavailable in Australia. Rather than pose one theory against the other, this thesis 
rigorously tests the claims of the specialisation theory.
Section 2.2 briefly outlines the economic theories of the male marriage premium, 
focusing on specialisation. Section 2.3 discusses in some detail the theoretical 
source of specialisation, Gary Becker’s theory of the family. Although this 
approach does not claim to explain the ultimate source of sex based specialisation 
within couples, it shows how the sex based differences in comparative advantage
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can reinforce sex based specialisation and how they feed through to labour market 
outcomes. This approach assumes that, acting as a benevolent dictator, the head 
of the family maximise his utility. By so doing the utility of each and every 
family member is also maximised. This section also includes a brief critique of 
Becker’s model of household behaviour.
In section 2.4 I use the empirical findings of others to show that, amongst other 
things, the male marriage premium has existed for some time in the USA and that 
the premium is not only a US phenomenon. I also illustrate why researchers 
currently believe that the two most likely explanations for the premium are 
specialisation and selection into marriage, both based on the belief that married 
men are more productive than single men. Also summarised, is the current debate 
about the relative importance of specialisation and selection as explanations of the 
marriage premium.
In much of the empirical analysis presented in this thesis the extent of 
specialisation within the couple is approximated by the wife’s degree of 
attachment to the paid labour market. Section 2.5 is a discussion of the 
appropriateness of this assumption. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Economic Theories of the Male Marriage Premium
This section outlines the main economic explanations of the male marriage 
premium; specialisation, selection into marriage, wife’s investment, perceived 
need, compensating wage differentials and discrimination1. Each explanation 
relates to either the demand side or the supply side of the labour market. Suppose 
male wages follow the linear model:
Wj = ao + a/Marj + a2X  * + a3 A\ + gj (2.1)
1 Daniel (1995) notes that there are some features of marriage that could tend to lower not raise, 
wages. For example, he suggests that it is more difficult for a married man to change jobs for 
career advancement when doing so requires physical relocation of his family. In the same vein 
Daniel also claims that employers have the opportunity to exploit the relative immobility of 
married men by paying them a smaller share of the return to their firm-specific human capital.
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where w is the (log) wage; Mar* is a marital status dummy set to one if the male is 
married; X; is a vector of observable wage-related (productivity related) 
characteristics; Aj is a vector of productivity related characteristics, related to 
marital status (Mar) and the wage (w) but unrelated to X;; and Si is an error term. 
Aj may be observable to employers, the male and/or (potential) spouses, but is 
unobservable to empirical researchers.
As Blackburn and Korenman (1994) explain, the supply side theories rely on the 
idea that the marital status effect in the conventional wage equation reflects the 
higher unobserved productivity of married men in general. In terms of 
econometric theory estimates of the wage equation omit a variable that describes 
an element of productivity, A. Married men tend to have more of this element of 
productivity; so there is correlation between the omitted productivity and the 
married indicator variable. Marital status is endogenous. Eestimation of equation 
2.1 by OLS leads to inconsistent estimates of Mar is related to the error term 
since A is related to the error term, being a factor that directly affects wages but is 
not included in the analysis.
The demand side explanations assume that marital status has a direct effect on 
wages that commences on the day of marriage. Hence Aj does not exist and 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression coefficient estimates from equation 2.1 
are unbiased.
Supply side explanations
Specialisation
According to this theory marriage allows male workers to be more productive in 
the paid labour market (Becker, 1981, 1985; Kenny, 1983; Greenhalgh 1980). 
Becker (1985) provides a useful summary of the parts of his theory of family 
relations relevant to the link between sex specialisation in marriage and the 
husbands’ productivity enhancement. Becker conceptualises marriage as 
analogous to a firm producing output valued by both the husband and the wife. 
Just as two countries producing the two same goods can benefit from 
specialisation in production and trade, the husband and wife (who may be
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identical in their wage earning ability) benefit from specialisation in activities and 
trade.
Becker extended the neoclassical paradigm to add time to the resource constraint 
faced by households. Crucial to there being any benefit from specialisation and 
trade is Becker’s assumption that there are increasing returns to total time 
allocated to a specific activity2. Earnings from a specific job or the output 
produced in a specific home based activity, Becker argues, increase 
proportionately with the product of the time spent in that activity and the time 
spent accruing human capital relevant to that activity. Earnings (productivity in 
the paid labour market), or output from a home based activity, is maximised when 
the time spent working in that activity equals the time spent accruing human 
capital specific to the job or activity, and when all one’s time is spent in just one 
activity.
Furthermore, Becker (1985) argued that a husband and wife, identical in 
characteristics associated with their wage earning ability and working the same 
number of hours in the paid labour market, could benefit from specialisation. An 
individual’s productivity in a task or job depends on the number of other activities 
undertaken and the type of activities undertaken, as well as the length of time 
spent in those activities. Individuals have limited energy and work, both at home 
and in the paid labour market, needs and use up different amounts of energy. The 
husband could be more productive in the paid labour market than the wife if she 
exerted more energy on home based work than he did. Even if the husband and 
wife both spent time working at home, she could exert more energy at home by 
spending more time on the same activities. Or she could take responsibility for 
the more energy intensive activities like child-care.
Becker (1981: 21-25) argued that husbands tended to specialise in paid market 
work and wives in home production because women had a comparative advantage 
in home production, especially the care of children. Following criticism of this 
biological essentialism based claim, Becker (1985) explained that his theory of the
2 This is due to the independence between the cost of accumulating human capital and the amount 
of time spent using that capital.
16
Explaining the Male Marriage Premium
relationship between specialisation and labour market outcomes could not be used 
to explain the existence of sex based specialisation within marriage. However, he 
asserted that, given the current tendency for women to specialise in home 
production, his theory explains a motivation for the magnification of sex based 
specialisation within marriage.
Specialisation models suggest that oq is biased upward because unmeasured 
human capital characteristics cause A and M to be positively correlated. The 
marriage premium literature argues that A increases with years married. It has 
found a quadratic relationship (for example Blackburn and Korenman, 1994; 
Korenman and Neumark, 1991; Gray, 1997). This finding fits with Becker (1985) 
since investment in specialisation related human capital is akin to on-the-job 
investment.
Selection into marriage
Causality does not necessarily proceed from marital status to earnings, as it does 
in the specialisation hypothesis. Some analysts have theorised that men with 
unobserved productivity are more likely to get married because the same desirable 
and unmeasured characteristics that lead to higher earnings also increase the 
probability of a male worker being married (Becker, 1981; Kenny, 1983; Cohen 
and Haberfield, 1991). Cornwell and Rupert (1995: 10-11) suggest that some of 
those characteristics might be honesty, loyalty, dependability and determination.
Selection models suggest that cq in equation 2.1 is biased upward because of the 
omission of A, since individuals with wage enhancing characteristics are more 
likely to be married. A is a fixed factor not directly affected by marriage, but 
related to it. Men will hold different amounts of A and the more of A a man has 
the more likely he is to be married.
Wife's investment
This differs from specialisation in a subtle but important way. Whereas 
specialisation is about the husband being allowed to specialise in work related 
activities because the wife specialises in home based activities, the wife’s
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investment theory argues that the wife undertakes activities that will directly 
increase her husband’s wage earning ability.
It could be argued that specialisation and wives’ investment are different names 
for the same things, since wives who invest in their husbands’ careers may be 
more likely to be specialised. But the wives best placed to assist their husband’s 
career directly will probably be those with the most experience in the paid labour 
market. On the other hand women most likely to specialise would tend to be the 
least experienced in the paid labour market.
The activities in the home that married women tend to specialise in often lead to, 
as Grossbard-Schechtman (1993) explains, improvements in human capital; for 
instance, through better nutrition and physical or mental health. Indirect evidence 
for such an investment process has been found in the effect of wife's schooling on 
husband's earnings by Benham (1974) and health (Grossman 1976), that is the 
more educated the wife the higher is the husband’s earnings, both directly and via 
his health.
A wife might also augment her husband’s productivity by assisting her husband in 
his work. For example she may act as a ‘sounding board’, or organise work- 
related activities. Hertz’s (1986) study of dual career marriages described the 
advantages accruing to professionals married to other professionals. Epstein’s 
(1971) study of lawyers provided examples of the ability of one spouse to 
augment the other’s productivity. Pfeffer and Ross (1982) suggested that wives 
can contribute to their husband’s career by providing advice and emotional 
support or building social relations that all combine to improve the husband’s 
standing with superiors.
Demand side
Perceived Need
This explanation theorises that employers pay married male workers more 
because such workers need to support a family. Pay scales often reflect such a 
policy (Bartlett and Callahan, 1984). Australia’s experience is a case in point,
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Australia was one of the few countries to institutionalise the concept of the ‘family 
wage’ (though it was widespread in most English-speaking countries). In 1907, Justice 
Higgins, Chair of the First Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, 
handed down his famous Harvester Judgement which effectively established the idea 
of the family wage to be set by arbitration rather than the ‘unequal’ contest on the 
labour market ... The family wage was conceived as a minimum or living wage 
sufficient for a man to support himself, his wife and children in 'frugal comfort'. 
(Bittman and Pixley, 1997: 215)
Female public servants were barred from working once they married. Male 
workers were also protected from female competition by general agreements that 
female wages could not be less than half the male ‘family’ wage, and only equal 
to it where women worked in ‘men’s work’ (Ryan and Conlan, 1975: 90-103).
Gregory and Daly (1990) explain how the institutionalised family wage was 
eroded. Important changes included the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
ruling for equal pay for men and women in 1969 and, in 1986, the federal 
government passing Equal Employment Opportunity/Affirmative Action 
legislation.
Statistical discrimination
According to this theory employers discriminate against single men and married 
women because of past statistics relating average productivity and marital status 
(Siebert and Sloane, 1981). Pfeffer and Ross (1982) suggested that married men 
might be better rewarded because they conform to social expectations that men 
should be married and support their families. Since unmarried men differ from 
the social “norm” they are penalised.
Compensating wage differentials
Workers receive compensation in many forms, for example money, quality of 
work environment and the nature of the work itself. If, economic theory argues, 
non-monetary features of a job make it more unpleasant than the average job 
workers in that job will receive higher wages as compensation. Reed and Harford 
(1989) argued that married men might be more willing than single men to trade 
pleasant work for higher wages, motivated by financial need.
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2.3 The Source of Specialisation: Becker’s Theory of the Family
According to Oppenheimer (1997) Becker’s specialisation theory was a relatively 
recent addition to the long tradition in the social science literature emphasizing the 
importance of differentiated sex roles for marriage stability and social integration. 
Both marriage partners gain from mutual dependence, trading the fruits of 
specialisation in particular roles.
Becker’s view of the family
Integral to Becker’s theory of the family (for example Becker, 1965; 1974; 1981; 
1985), was his conceptualisation of the family as a site of production. Becker 
extended microeconomic theory to encompass a slice of the world previously 
beyond the reach of economists, thus making it easier for economists and other 
social scientists to formulate testable hypotheses about families. Hannan (1982) 
and Ben-Porath (1982), in their commentaries on the release of Becker’s (1981) A 
Treatise on the Family1, both mentioned the pressing need to make it easier for 
economists to conceptualise what was happening in families, because of what 
Hannan called the ‘perceived crisis in the family’ (Hannan, 1982: 65). It seems 
that within the economics profession Becker’s theory of the family was regarded 
as timely and welcome. The demography of family life had changed greatly over 
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s in all western societies. For example, the average age 
at marriage had increased, divorce had increased and birth rates had fallen 
sharply. One response to this perceived crisis in the family was the flood of new 
empirical data, like the US panel surveys.
Becker’s primary innovation was the introduction of time into the resource 
constraint faced by households. As Ben-Porath (1982) and Hannan (1982) 
explained, Becker adhered strictly to the standard micro-economic analysis of 
household behaviour. His theory was based on the maximisation of stable utility 
functions, implying fixed underlying preferences, and assumed equilibrium. He
3 A Treatise on the Family (Becker, 1981). This book was a compendium of Becker’s writing over 
the previous years.
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conceptualised the family as the site of production of goods and services such as 
conversation, quantity and quality of children, quality of meals, love and health 
status (Becker, 1974: 301, 320)4. These goods and services are produced from the 
combination of productive activity within the home, activity that takes time, and 
goods and services purchased in the market. The family maximises the 
consumption of these goods and services given time and income constraints. 
Schultz (1974) explained Becker’s view of the family as one that encompassed 
both consumer choice and household production decisions.
According to Hannan (1982), Becker derived the motivation for the traditional sex 
based division of labour between husbands and wives by applying the theory of 
comparative advantage to the allocation of productive activity within the 
household. Within Becker’s theory the consequence of even small differences in 
production capacities result in very different allocations of time to market work 
and work within the home in equilibrium. The assumption of increasing returns to 
scale in production means that one will specialise completely in market work and 
the other in household production. Specialisation (and trade) is advantageous 
because the family is assumed to pool resources and transfer resources within the 
family. In a sense the husband and wife behave like barterers. They are 
considered to have a double coincidence of wants. In contrast we work for money 
in the paid labour market because that only requires a single coincidence of wants.
Becker’s departure from standard neoclassical economics arises because family 
utility, rather than individual utility, is maximised. To overcome this problem he 
assumed that the head of the family maximises his utility, but his utility reflects 
family utility. The family head is considered to be altruistic, so that by 
maximising his utility he does the best thing by the other members of the family. 
Becker even argues that the children in the family can act selfishly, and the family 
still ends up in the ideal position for all.
4 Cigno (1991) assumes in his analysis o f division of work within the family that both the husband 
and wife should be involved in household production of joint goods like companionship, 
familiarity, love and children. This rules out the possibility that either of the spouses specialise 
completely in the market. But his model does not rule out the possibility that the spouse with the
lower wage specialises completely in household production.___________________________________
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Feminist economists, such as Gardiner (1993) point out that the specialisation and 
trade approach rests crucially on the presumption that skills and expertise 
developed within the household are not transferable to the paid labour market. 
Furthermore, Oppenheimer (1997) argues that extreme sex-role specialisation 
within marriage can be a high-risk and inflexible family strategy. For example, the 
temporary or permanent loss of one specialist can mean that functions vital to the 
well being of the complementary specialist and children are not undertaken. Two 
employed spouses buffer households against economic uncertainty, job loss and 
financial strain.
Folbre (1986) explained that Becker resorted to the concept of the benevolent 
dictator to rationalise the fact that individuals do not “free ride” on the 
benevolence of others inside their family. The household head uses his economic 
power to ensure that every family member acts in the interest of the family as a 
whole. Those with power in the household are altruists. Only the children, who 
are powerless in the family decision-making process, can behave selfishly. The 
assumption that altruism dominates actions within the family has been questioned 
by Folbre and Hartmann (1988) and England (1993). Furthermore, Berk and Berk 
(1983) explain that this model of altruism requires that the altruist have complete 
and accurate information about each member’s on-going welfare. They noted that 
altruism might have been a genuine alternative to individual utility maximisation, 
but that it was a relatively new concept theoretically.
Until Becker’s revolutionary conceptualisation of the family, economic theory had 
focused on the market economy and regarded the family as a passive object. 
Sociologists, Bittman and Pixley (1997) and Berk (1985), stress the value of this 
theoretical recognition that the household produces valuable goods and services 
that never reach the market. In the industrialised era women have primarily 
undertaken this work, and hence their role within economic theory had been 
reduced to one of passivity.
Becker’s acknowledgment that work was also undertaken in the home had 
sizeable implications for the neoclassical understanding of labour supply, 
especially the labour supply of women. Until Becker advanced his new theory the
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labour supply decision was modelled as a choice between work in the paid labour 
market and leisure in the home. Becker introduced a third arm of the decision­
making process: work within the home.
Initially Becker’s theory of the family attempted to provide an economic 
theoretical basis for the sex based division of labour within the family. Becker 
(1981: 21-25) suggested that men and women are intrinsically different in terms 
of their comparative advantages in the production of children, their contribution to 
childcare and other household work. This, he claimed, was the driving force 
behind sex based specialisation within marriage. The depiction of the sexual 
division of labour as a consequence of biological essentialism has received 
substantial criticism from feminist economists and other social scientists. Becker 
(1985: S41) acknowledges these criticisms, and their counter-argument that 
“exploitation” of women is a more important determinant of the sexual division of 
labour. Becker (1985) reminded these critics that his theoretical depiction of 
specialisation within marriage did not rely on there being a known source of the 
comparative advantage of women in household activities. It made no difference 
to the implications of his theory whether discrimination or other factors caused the 
comparative advantage.
However, this relegation of comparative advantage to exogeneity is problematic. 
Like neoclassical economics in general, Becker’s theory ignores the roles of 
institutions and power relations within families, hence bypassing the need to adapt 
the theory to accommodate for example, institutional or societal change change. 
As Berk and Berk (1983) explain, the sexual division of household labour can also 
be explained by socialisation, arrangements of social institutions, or male 
domination. Economist Ben-Porath (1982) reminds us that Becker did not attempt 
a systematic treatment of the transition from traditional to modem types of family. 
Nor can his theory tell us what determines the economic functions and social roles 
of families compared with firms and governments. These are institutional 
questions. As a basis of a theoretical explanation of cross-country and over-time 
differences in the size of the male marriage premium, Becker’s theory would 
benefit from easing the exogeneity assumption and allowing institutional and 
societal factors to play roles.
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Hannan (1982: 70) claims that Becker understates and overstates the role of 
culture and institutional arrangements. They are understated because Becker 
denies that institutions have any independent effect on behaviour. They are 
overstated because the theory leaves moot the questions of origins, for example, 
the tendency for blacks and white Americans to differ in their tendency to invest 
in their offspring. As Hannan explains, it is important to know whether the 
ethnicity difference is due to different preferences, or because the structure of 
marriage markets, labour markets and other social arrangements differentially 
affect families by ethnicity. Hannan claims that any theory of the family should 
work towards the coupling of individual decision making and institutional change.
Folbre (1986) was concerned that the theory was silent on the issue of inequality 
within the home. She provides examples of inequality within households, many 
of which are along gender lines (Folbre, 1986: 248-249). These examples of 
inequality cast doubt on joint utility, but are not irreconcilable with it. They could 
be explained by “taste” for altruism or voluntary sacrifice by wives. Because 
altruism is taken as a given, any changes in the distribution of resources between 
family members can be attributed to changes in prices and income. The power 
differential between a husband and wife does not enter the debate. But if the 
wages of women rise relative to men it could be argued that so too would the 
bargaining power of women.
Competing theories within economics
There is a stream of economic literature concerned to break down the assumption 
of a unitary utility function for the family. Concerns that power relations within 
the family had been ignored prompted the development of the bargaining theory 
approach to family decision-making (for example, Manser and Brown, 1980; 
Homey and McElroy, 1988; Schultz, 1990). Alderman et al. (1995) identified 
two limitations of the unitary model. Firstly it allows prices to differ for the 
various household members (for example, the wife’s wages and husband’s wages) 
while assuming that household resources from wage earnings, for example, are 
pooled. This implies that at least one member of the household must be able to 
monitor the other members and sanction those who do not follow household rules.
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Furthermore it fails to incorporate the process by which resources are distributed 
within the household.
The bargaining approaches closely resemble neoclassical theory in their emphasis 
on individual decision making. But, instead of family decisions being made by 
one person, the household head, they are the result of bargaining between the 
husband and wife. The objective functions of the husband and wife are different 
from the usual economic ones. The husband and wife maximise the product of 
their individual gains from marriage. The threat point is the individual’s economic 
position outside marriage. Furthermore the objective functions are partially 
endogenised.
Household decisions are a function of relative economic bargaining power 
because the threat points are largely determined by the individual’s potential 
economic position outside the household. But, the bargaining literature does not 
analyse the genesis, reproduction or modification of these inequalities in rigorous 
terms.
Some cooperative models impose structure by representing household decisions 
as the outcome of a specific bargaining process and applying the tools of game 
theory to this framework. Then the division of the gains from marriage depend on 
the “fall-back” or “threat point” position of each member. McElroy and Homey 
(1981), Homey and McElroy (1988) and Manser and Brown (1980) propose a 
cooperative Nash bargaining model of household behaviour. Each household 
member has a utility function and a threat point (maximum utility level if 
agreement is not reached). The greater the threat point, the more strongly that 
member's relative valuation of goods is reflected in the household demands. The 
definition of the threat point is still an open question. In McElroy and Homey 
(1981) the threat points are determined by the options outside the family, for 
example the assets of each partner. In this model changes in demand result not 
only from shifts in the budget constraint but also from changes in the objective 
function due to the relative changes in power.
Others, like Chiappori (1988), Apps and Rees (1994) and Apps (1994) approach 
the household decision making process from the perspective that household
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members employ a sharing rule to distribute resources in a Pareto optimal way. 
Folbre (1986: 251) neatly describes the appeal of these models:
The suggestion that women and female children “voluntarily relinquish leisure, 
education, and food would be somewhat more persuasive if they were in a position to 
demand their fair share. It is the juxtaposition of women’s lack of economic power 
with the unequal allocation of household resources that lends the bargaining power 
[collective model] approach much of its persuasive appeal.
A few studies have attempted to empirically test the assumption of one decision­
maker versus the more general bargaining framework. Kapteyn and Kooreman 
(1992) argue that on the basis of the data generally available for empirical tests 
(for example, household non-labour income and consumption and wages and 
hours worked by family members) the two theoretical approaches can not be 
compared. Since the data is collected as if the household is a homogeneous unit it 
is inadequate to test whether or not the household is homogeneous.
These models, known as cooperative solution models, assume, like the unitary 
models, that individuals form households when it is more beneficial to them than 
remaining alone. The underlying assumption common to them is that the 
household is a more efficient way to produce household goods and services and/or 
that some goods, like “love” and “companionship”, can only be produced by 
couples.
In contrast, non-cooperative relations models, such as the one portrayed in 
Lundberg and Poliak (1993), assume that individuals cannot enter into binding 
and enforceable contracts with each other. Each spouse makes decisions in 
his/her own sphere and responds to the decisions of the other by altering his/her 
level of voluntary contribution to the shared goods.
This brief description of the alternative approaches to theorising the household 
highlight the analytical complexity associated with not viewing the household as a 
homogeneous decision making unit. In this thesis we take the view that the net 
gains from the additional insight achieved by modelling the individual utility of 
the husband and wife would be very small. We assume that specialisation is 
undertaken with the implicit agreement that the husband and wife, regardless of
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the source of family income, share family income equally. Even if the outcome 
were an unequal sharing of income we would have to be satisfied that both 
husband and wife anticipated the unequal sharing when specialisation decisions 
were made.
Some empirical tests of specialisation theory: marriage, housework and 
earnings
A simplistic version of the specialisation hypothesis could focus on time, arguing 
that traditional sex-based specialisation in marriage is evidenced by the wife 
spending more time in household work than her husband, and her husband 
spending more time in paid work than her.
In terms of household production Bittman and Pixley (1997) reported evidence 
showing that the effect of marriage, at least for Australian men, reduced the 
amount of time they spend in cooking, cleaning and laundry activities. This 
suggests that married women take over at least some of their husband’s 
housework responsibilities. Indeed Bittman and Pixley (1997) also found that 
married women spent more time cooking, cleaning and doing laundry than their 
unmarried counterparts did.
Hersch and Stratton (1994) modelled the total amount of time couples spent on 
housework and the division of that time between working spouses. Using US 
panel data from the PSID they found that the husband’s share of housework time 
fell when he contributed a greater share of labour income. He decreased the 
amount of time he spent working at home and his wife increased the amount of 
time she spent working at home.
A number of studies have explored the direct effect of time spent in household 
labour and earnings. For men, the cross-section analysis that assumed housework 
was exogenous had mixed results. Using US data from the 1970s and 1980s, 
Coverman (1983), Chandler et al. (1994) and Hersch and Stratton (1997) 
estimated a negative relationship between the time married men spent in 
housework and their earnings. However, Shelton and Fireston (1988) and Hersch 
(1991a) found no relationship. Hersch and Stratton (1997) argued that the
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conflicting findings were due to differences in the measurement of housework 
between the data sets. However they did not suggest which data would be more 
reliable. Herself s (1991b) simultaneous equation estimates recognised that 
housework is jointly determined with wages. She found no evidence of a negative 
relationship. When Hersch and Stratton (1997) corrected for the endogeneity of 
housework using instrumental variables, the negative relationship between 
housework and men’s earnings became insignificant. It also proved insignificant 
for their fixed effects estimates. The authors cast doubt on these findings, stating 
that they had not found an adequate instrument for housework for the instrumental 
variables technique and were anxious about the effect of low intra-personal 
variance in housework time on the measurement error of their fixed effects 
analysis.
Estimates of the effect of time spent in housework on the wages of wives were 
negative regardless of the data source or estimation approach (Hersch; 1991a, 
1991b; Hersch and Stratton, 1993; Chandler et al. 1994).
2.4 Empirical Findings
Differences in the wages and/or annual earnings of married and unmarried males 
are well documented in the USA. In cross-sectional human capital based 
wage/eamings equations for males, with controls including at least education and 
labour market experience, the estimated male marriage premium5 has ranged from 
four to 45 per cent. Empirical analysis of the source of the male marriage 
premium has focused on the relative importance of two supply-side theories, the 
specialisation and selection hypotheses. The empirical evidence generally favours 
the productivity enhancing or supply side theories. Discrimination in favour of 
married men is a difficult to prove hypothesis given the available data. To 
distinguish between the selection and specialisation hypotheses the studies
5 This is the difference between the wages of currently married men (can also include de-facto 
couples) and never married men.
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generally use longitudinal data to show when the increased productivity was first 
observed and/or whether marital status is related to unobserved characteristics that 
are constant over time and also correlated with their earnings. In terms of the 
timing question, a finding that extra productivity was observed before marriage 
supports the selection hypothesis while a finding that it occurred after marriage 
supports the selection hypothesis.
In this section I summarise the critical findings from the empirical studies. Table
2.1 lists the major studies discussed in this sub-section, the samples they used and 
the age of the men. Age is crucial in an analysis of the effects of specialisation on 
wage outcomes. The effect of specialisation on the wages of married men is not 
instantaneous. Specialisation related human capital accrues over the life of the 
marriage, so it is important to ensure that the sample includes men, sufficiently 
old enough to have married and benefited from specialisation. Furthermore, since 
those that marry younger might differ from others in unobservable ways the 
sample should contain men who marry later rather than sooner. The ages of the 
sampled men in the empirical analysis undertaken with longitudinal data tend to 
be less than 40, suggesting that men who marry later may well be excluded from 
the analysis.
2.4.1 Is the marriage premium universal?
The marriage premium is not just a US phenomenon, although it varies in size 
across countries
The male marriage premium is not restricted to the USA. Schoeni (1990) found 
evidence of male marriage premiums in cross section data from the twelve 
industrialised countries then included in the Luxembourg Income Study6. He 
estimated premiums of between four per cent and 31 per cent for currently 
married men, compared with unmarried men, in annual earnings equations. 
Greenhalgh (1980) analysed cross sections of British workers for 1971 and 1975
6 Those countries were Australia, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the USA.______________________________
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and found premiums of between 10 and 14 percent. Siebert and Sloane (1981) 
surveyed three English establishments and estimated premiums for each, ranging 
from 11 to 27 percent. Duncan and Holmund (1983) found a premium in Swedish 
data from 1968 and 1974.
Table 2.1: Summary of major studies of source of male marriage premium
Study Sam ple A ge o f  m en
H ill (1979) U S Panel study  o f  Incom e D ynam ics 
( P S ID ) -  1976 w ave
18-64
K enny  (1983) U S C olem an-R ossi R etrospective 
L ife H isto ries S tudy -  1969
30-40
B artle tt and  C allahan  (1984) U S N ational L ong itud inal Survey o f  
O lder M en  (N L SO M ) - 1977 w ave
55-64
K orenm an  and N eum ark U S N ational L ong itud inal Survey o f 2 4 - 3 4  in 1976 to
(1991) Y oung  M en (N L S) - 1976, 1978, 
1980 w aves
28 - 3 8  in 1980
B lackbu rn  and K orenm an U S M arch  C urren t P opulation  Survey 2 6 - 5 3
(1994) -  1 9 6 8 -  1989
U S C ensus -  1970, 1980 2 6 - 5 3
C ornw ell and R upert (1995) N L S - 1971, 1976 w aves 1 9 - 2 9  in 1971 to 
2 4 - 3 4  in 1976
L oh (1996) U S N ational L ong itud inal Survey o f 
Y outh  (N L S Y ) -  1990 w ave
25 - 32
G ray  (1997) N L S - 1976, 1978, 1980 w aves 2 4 - 3 1  in 1976 to 
2 8 - 3 5  in 1980
N L SY  - 1989, 1991, 1993 w aves 2 4 - 3 1  in 1989 to 
28 - 3 5  in 1993
C ornw ell and R upert (1997) N L S - 1971, 1976, 1978, 1980 w aves 1 9 - 2 9  in 1971 to 
28 - 3 8  in 1980
The marriage premium is not time specific.
The premium is not restricted to the second half of the twentieth century. Goldin 
(1990) documented the US male marriage premium back to the nineteenth 
century. Loh’s (1996) analysis of cross-section US census data from 1939, 1949, 
1959, 1969 and 1979 found a premium for white men in each of the years. Loh 
did not find a sustained trend over time in the size of the premium. In 1939, 1949 
and 1969 the premium was around 26 per cent. In 1959 and 1979 it was closer to 
12 per cent.
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Other analysts have confirmed that the size of the US premium has been falling in 
recent years. Using annual CPS data Blackburn and Korenman (1994) found that 
the size of the premium for white Americans fell by ten percentage points to 18.5 
per cent over the period 1967 to 1988. Gray (1997) estimated that the premium 
fell from 11 per cent in the late 1970s to 6 per cent in the early 1990s.
Black Americans do not receive as large a premium as white Americans do
Many of the American studies have restricted their analysis to white Americans. 
Two studies that specifically considered whether white Americans received a 
different sized premium from black Americans are Loh (1996) and Blackburn and 
Korenman (1994). Loh’s estimates of movements in the size of the US premium 
over time shows that the black premium was substantially smaller than the white 
premium in 1939 and 1949. From then on the black premium increased in size to 
be substantially bigger than the white premium in 1979. In contrast Blackburn 
and Korenman (1994) estimated that the black premium was slightly lower than 
the white premium from 1967 to 1988 and, like the white premium, the size of the 
black premium was trending lower with time.
Divorced and separated men tend to receive a lower premium than currently 
married men do
These studies consider currently married men apart from divorced and separated 
men. Widowed men were mostly excluded from the analyses. While divorced and 
separated men receive a premium it has tended to be smaller than the premium for 
currently married men. For example, Bartlett and Callahan (1984) found that 
married men earned 19.5 per cent more each year than divorced or widowed or 
separated males and 32 per cent more than unmarried men as a whole did. Hill 
(1979) estimated a premium of 34 per cent for currently married men and 31 per 
cent for widowed, divorced or separated men. Cornwell and Rupert’s (1997) 
cross section premium for currently married men was 8.7 per cent compared with 
a premium of 6.6 per cent for divorced men. Gray’s (1997) cross section 
premium for the late 1970s was 11 per cent and the premium for divorced or 
separated men was 10 per cent. In the early 1990s he found no premium for 
divorced and separated men.
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Men with dependent children may or may not receive a larger premium
Korenman and Neumark (1991) and Cornwell and Rupert (1997) found, in cross- 
section analysis, that men with dependent children earned a higher premium than 
men without children did in the late 1970s. Cornwell’s and Rupert estimated that 
children added 5.7 percentage points to the premium. In Cornwell’s and Rupert’s 
analysis the effect of dependents was robust. It remained about five percentage 
points when they used fixed effects estimation and even when they controlled for 
marriage duration. Korenman and Neumark’s dependents effect was not as 
robust, becoming smaller and insignificant in their fixed effects regressions.
However, Loh (1996) using the 1990 wave of the NLSY, found that the presence 
of dependent children had no effect on the wages of married men. My analysis, 
presented in Chapter Four, supports Loh’s findings for US men. It is also 
suggests that, when men in de-facto relationships and/or divorced, widowed and 
separated men are included in the unmarried category, the presence of children 
effect is a pseudo marriage premium since it identifies fathers caring for 
dependent children amongst unmarried men.
Women do not receive a marriage premium
A number of analyses of the relationship between marital status and women’s 
wages using US and UK cross-section data suggested that married women tended 
to earn less than unmarried women did (Moore and Wilson, 1982; Goldin and 
Polachek, 1987; Greenhalgh, 1980 and Siebert and Sloane, 1981). However 
studies that used more accurate measures of work experience, such as Dolton and 
Makepeace (1987) and Hill (1979) found no relationship between the marital 
status and wages of women.
More recent analyses, using panel data from the US NLS, supported the finding 
that marital status had no effect on women’s earnings. Kilboume et al. (1994) 
focused on the experiences of people aged 14 to 24 in 1968 over the twelve years 
to 1980. Their analysis suggested that neither white women nor black women 
experienced a reduction in wages upon getting married. Korenman and Neumark 
(1992) reached the same conclusion using the 1980 and 1982 waves of the NLS.
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2.4.2 Married men appear to be more productive than unmarried men
Researchers have reached a consensus that married men are more productive than 
unmarried men are. In general, the other hypothesised causes of the marriage 
premium, including discrimination and compensating wage differentials are now 
ignored.
Using payroll records for white male managers and professionals, from a large US 
manufacturing firm, Korenman and Neumark (1991) found that most of the return 
to marriage could be explained by the fact that married workers tended to be in 
higher paying job grades within the company. They did not receive higher pay for 
a given performance level within a job grade, as one would expect to see if they 
were being treated differently by employers. Marriage was associated with a 
substantially higher probability of promotion and a slightly lower probability of 
separation from the company. Married workers were more likely to win high 
performance ratings and higher performance ratings were positively related to 
their probability of promotion
Hill (1979) reported that married men spent more time in training on the current 
job than unmarried men did. Lynch’s (1993) more detailed analysis of different 
types of private-sector training confirmed that married men received more on-the- 
job training than unmarried men did. Bartel and Sicherman (1993) also found that 
married men received more on-the-job training.
Daniel (1995) observed that the marriage premium declined as husbands neared 
divorce. Hersch (1991b) and Duncan and Holmund (1983) found little support for 
the theory that married men might be more willing to trade job attributes for 
higher pay.
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2.4.3 The marriage premium is caused by specialisation and selection into 
marriage
Much of the recent literature has used panel data to distinguish between the two 
explanations for the extra productivity of married men, the selection and 
specialisation hypotheses. Two methods have been used. One approach is to 
determine the timing of the wage increase that accrues to married men. If 
specialisation is the cause the wage increase will occur once the man is married. 
If selection is the cause the wage increase will have taken place before marriage. 
Another approach is to compare the results of generalised least squared estimation 
(or “between” estimation) with those from fixed effects (or “within” estimation) 
to see whether marital status is correlated with unobserved characteristics of men 
that are constant over time and correlated with their wages. The fixed effects 
estimator applies OLS to data that has been transformed into deviations from 
individual means, and is consistent if the unobserved characteristics and marital 
status are correlated. Generalised least squares estimation is consistent if 
unobserved characteristics and marital status are uncorrelated. It only exploits the 
cross-section dimension of the panel and applies OLS to individual means. I call 
this cross-section analysis in the rest of this section. A researcher who finds a 
marriage premium in cross-section analysis that disappears in fixed-effects 
analysis could conclude that the marriage premium reflected selection into 
marriage, rather than specialisation. If the marriage premium exists in fixed 
effects analysis, but is smaller in size than the cross-section premium, selection 
into marriage and specialisation could be said to both play roles. The validity of 
the findings from the second approach relies on the assumption that the man’s 
unobserved productivity, other than the component related to marriage, remains 
constant over his working life.
Another approach to controlling for the endogeneity of marriage is to model the 
process governing marital status. Two methods have been used, instrumental 
variables (IV) and the inverse Mills ratio. In the first method the probability of 
being married is estimated. The instrumental variable for marriage, the model’s 
prediction, is purged of correlation with the unobserved characteristics. This
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instrument enters earnings equations for men instead of observed marital status, 
and its estimated coefficient measures the effect of marriage on wages. The 
inverse Mills ratio approach corrects for the self-selection of men into marriage, 
accounting for differences between married men and unmarried men. The ratio 
appears as a regressor on the men’s wage equation. Its significance tests for the 
exogeneity of marriage, and the estimated coefficient on observed marital status 
measures the effect of marriage on wages.
Another test is to compare the wives’ degree of attachment to the paid labour 
market with her husband’s earnings. Findings from analysis that used this 
approach are discussed in section 2.5.
The timing o f the wage increase
Kenny (1983) used retrospective employment history data for a sample of 30-40 
year old males surveyed in 1969. He calculated the average monthly rates of 
growth in hourly wages before and after marriage. Then he regressed the before 
and after marriage growth rates on the difference in average age between the two 
periods and on the gap in the average annual rate of growth of the general level of 
manufacturing wages between the two periods. The intercept was positive and 
significant suggesting that wage growth was higher in the married months. Kenny 
added controls for race, education, age at marriage, verbal ability and wife's 
education. He found none of these variables significant so concluded that the 
difference in the rate of increase in human capital between the married years and 
single years was unrelated to the initial stock of observed human capital.
Using the 1971 wave of panel data, Cornwell and Rupert (1997) defined an 
indicator variable “to-be-married”. They set this to one for men who had married 
by 1980 (when they were aged 28-38). Then they estimated the effect of this 
dummy in a cross-section wage equation for all men in 1971 (aged 19-29), 
including the usual human capital control variables. They found that the wages of 
the men who married after 1971 were at least as high as those already married in 
1971.
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Cornwell’s and Rupert’s (1997) findings are in direct conflict with Kenny’s 
(1983). I would be cautious of Cornwell and Rupert’s results because they 
compare pre-marriage wages of one group of men with post-marriage wages of 
another group without acknowledging that the groups could represent very 
different men. It is possible that men who married by the age of 29 might be less 
career-oriented than men who married by the age of 38.
Nakosteen and Zimmer (1997) performed a more sophisticated analysis based on 
these principles. Using data from the 1979 wave of the PSID they estimated a 
standard earnings equation for unmarried men. They then estimated two probits 
for the likelihood of marriage by the 1982 wave and the 1984 wave. Predicted 
earnings and the standardised residual from the estimated earnings equation for 
single men in 1979 were included as regressors in the probits. They argued that 
the standardised residual reflected unobserved productivity. They found that in 
both probits the estimated ceofficients on the standardised earnings residual were 
positive and significant, suggesting that men who marry tend to hold higher levels 
of unobserved productivity prior to marriage. The authors concluded, however, 
that these findings were preliminary. They suggested that further analysis should 
model the marriage-earnings connection using a simultaneous equation approach 
that accounted for the joint occurrence of marital behaviour and other decisions 
like schooling.
Fixed effects analysis
Several fixed effects analyses of the same US panel data, the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLS), have been undertaken. The consensus 
view seems to be that both specialisation and selection contributed to the marriage 
premium in the late 1970s. Only Gray (1997) has analysed more recent panel 
data. He concluded that specialisation played no role in determining the marriage 
premium in the early 1990s.
Including years of marriage in the list of regressors in the men’s wage equation,
Korenman and Neumark (1991) found that the marriage premium increased with
years of marriage. In cross section analysis for the late 1970s they estimated a
marriage premium of 17 per cent at the mean years of marriage. They found that
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80 to 90 per cent of the estimated cross-sectional impact of survived fixed-effects 
estimation.
Gray (1997) used the same data, except he restricted his cohort to men aged 14 to 
21 in 1966. His findings corroborated Korenman and Neumark’s (1991). He then 
undertook similar analysis on men of the same age in the early 1990s. He found 
that the marriage premium was washed out entirely by fixed-effects analysis, and 
that unobserved ability was correlated with men’s accumulated years of marriage. 
Gray concluded that there had been such a large decline in the specialisation effect 
of marriage over the period that the productivity of married men was no longer 
increased through marriage. He argued that the selection into marriage process 
had changed dramatically in little over a decade. In the late 1970s, he claimed, 
men selected into marriage on the basis of unobserved ability that provided a one- 
off boost to their productivity. However men selected into marriage in the early 
1990s on the basis of unobserved ability that added to their productivity in each 
year of marriage.
Cornwell and Rupert (1997) criticised the two previous studies because of the age 
of the men when sampled. Marital status changes represented a relatively small 
proportion of the late 1970s samples in both studies, only 25 per cent in the case 
of Korenman and Neumark (1991). More importantly, Cornwell and Rupert 
argued that because over 80 per cent of those who changed marital status in 
Korenman and Neumark’s sample divorced and married for a second time, the
n
analysis was problematic . In response Cornwell and Rupert added the 1971 
wave of the NLS. In 1971 the cohort was aged 19 to 29, so they picked up more 
first marriages. In their sample 34 per cent of the men changed marital status and 
only 52 per cent of the status changes were the result of divorces and second 
marriages. The inclusion of younger men reduced the size of the estimated 
marriage premiums only slightly. Their cross section premium (without years of 
marriage as a regressor) was 8.3 per cent compared with Korenman and 
Neumark’s corresponding premium of 10.6 per cent. The estimated marriage
7Identification in fixed-effects analysis is obtained through variation within men over time so the 
divorces and second marriages would be identifying the model.________________________________
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premium in their fixed effects analysis fell to 5.8 per cent, which is close to 
Korenman and Neumark’s result of 6.1 per cent. The difference between their 
fixed-effects and cross-section estimated were statistically significant, rejecting 
the cross-section estimates.
Cornwell and Rupert (1997) then added tenure in the current job and its square to 
the list of regressors. Korenman and Neumark (1991) had not included tenure in 
their published analysis. Tenure proved to be a statistically significant explanator 
and the size of the marriage premium fell slightly. However, the subsequent 
inclusion of years married in the analysis revealed that men’s wages were 
unaffected by years married. Cornwell and Rupert claim that this shows that 
marriage is not productivity enhancing. Despite this claim, they also estimate a 
hazard rate model explaining tenure. This shows that marriage has the largest 
statistically significant positive impact on tenure, reminding us of the productivity 
enhancement effects of marriage.
Modelling the marriage process
Neither study using this approach found strong evidence for the endogeneity of 
marriage in men’s earnings equations.
Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987) firstly estimated, by probit, a reduced form
equation for the probability of marriage and constructed a marriage selectivity
variable (inverse Mill’s ratio) from the coefficient estimates. They assumed that
family background variables would affect selection into marriage, but would not
affect wages. They included the marriage selectivity variable as an explanatory
variable in an equation explaining male earnings. The list of explanatory
variables also included a marital status dummy, education and years of work
experience. Although the estimated coefficient on the marital status dummy was
insignificant the coefficient on the marriage selectivity variable was also
insignificant and negative. Although the authors concluded that the marriage
premium was a result of endogenous selection others have argued that this
conclusion is unjustified (Korenman and Neumark, 1991; Cornwell and Rupert,
1995; and Ginther and Zavodny, 1997). Cornwell and Rupert (1995), using the
1971 wave of the NLSYM, endogenised marital status by the IV technique and
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the inverse Mill’s ratio approach. In cross-section analysis they found weak 
supporting evidence for endogeneity using the IV approach. When marital status 
was assumed to be endogenous it had a negative, but insignificant effect on men’s 
earnings, although the instruments for marital status did not have much 
explanatory power. Their inverse Mill’s ratio was not statistically significant in 
the men’s earnings equation, corroborating Nakosteen and Zimmer’s (1987) 
finding.
2.5 Using Wives’ Labour Supply as an Indicator of the Degree of 
Specialisation
In the analysis undertaken for chapters three and four I consider whether the 
degree of specialisation could be proxied by the age of the men, reflecting the 
time spent married, the presence of dependent children, reflecting the need to 
specialise, and the wives’ labour supply, reflecting the result of specialisation. In 
the more complex empirical analysis undertaken in chapters five and six I use the 
wife’s degree of attachment to the paid labour market as a guide to the degree of 
specialisation of the couple. I acknowledge that the relationship between wives’ 
labour supply and husband’s wages can also be affected by the return to 
specialisation. Furthermore, in over-time and cross-national analysis one needs to 
be aware that the mapping between the extent of specialisation and wives’ labour 
supply is not perfect. Attitudes to gender roles continue to evolve and women are 
increasingly likely to be career focused. While this change has been reflected in 
women's increased participation in the paid labour market, it could also be 
reflected in falls in the extent of specialisation in home production for given 
degrees of labour market participation. Similarly, there may be differences 
between women, working full-time for example, in the extent of their 
specialisation in home production.
Empirical evidence suggests that there could be relationships between the 
amounts of time women spend in the paid labour market and the amount of time 
they spend in household work. Married women who work full-time spend less
39
Chapter Two
time working at home than other married women do. But the husbands of women 
who work full-time do not seem to be taking up the slack (Bittman and Pixley, 
1997, Baxter, 1989). Instead the dual working couple spend less combined hours 
working within the home. However, Becker (1985) argued that different activities 
require different levels of effort. He claimed that many home based activities 
require less intense effort than the average paid work activity. Child-care is the 
exception to the rule. Married men may switch the home based activities they 
undertake to more demanding ones, as their wife increases her level of activity in 
the paid labour market. For example, Bittman and Pixley (1997) found that 
amongst couples with children, men with wives who work full-time spend more 
time caring for children.
The marriage premium literature tends also to describe the couple’s degree of 
specialisation by the wife’s degree of attachment to the labour supply (Blackburn 
and Korenman, 1994; Daniel, 1995; Loh 1996). A growing literature, distinct 
from the marriage premium literature, has canvassed the possibility that amongst 
men working in management and/or professional jobs, the labour supply of wives 
directly impacts on their husband’s earnings. Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) 
summarise the justifications for the observed negative relationship between 
wives’ hours and husbands’ earnings, common to this literature. One of those 
explanations is analogous to specialisation. Henceforth I describe this literature as 
the management literature.
Proxying the household’s degree of traditional gender based specialisation by the 
number of hours the wife spends in the paid labour market at a point in time is 
open to criticism on a number of grounds. There may be wives working part-time 
who earn more and/or are more attached to their careers than full-time workers. 
Hence their husbands might be more willing to help with household chores. 
Similarly not all full-time jobs are the same for women. Shift workers have more 
flexible hours. The husband of a woman who works full-time at night might be 
more able to invest in his career than one whose wife works full-time in a nine-to- 
five job. The shift-working wife might be more able to combine unpaid work 
(like caring for her own children) with her paid work, thus reducing her husband’s 
need to take up the slack.
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Both the marriage premium and management literatures identify a number of 
factors that may make single equation cross-sectional estimation of the effect of 
wives’ labour supply on husbands’ earnings problematic. An observed negative 
relationship between wives’ labour supply and husbands’ earnings is also 
consistent with the theory that the wife bases her labour supply decision on her 
husband’s earnings. The more the husband earns the less financial pressure on the 
wife to earn money in the paid labour market. Another possibility is that marriage 
occurs as a matching process, in which high labour market-productivity men tend 
to marry women who are keen not to work in the paid labour market. This 
scenario reflects a specific sort of selection into marriage. The observed negative 
relationship between wives’ hours and husbands’ earnings could reflect matching 
of husbands and wives on the basis that he desires a career and the wife desires 
not to have a career.
Furthermore the wives’ cross-sectional labour supply may not reflect the couple’s 
long-term specialisation commitment. Using US longitudinal data Loh (1996) 
accumulated the total number of weeks worked by wives over the duration of 
marriage (from 1978 to 1989). He created a set of dummy variables from this 
labour force participation information and regressed the men’s wages in 1990 on 
the dummy variables with the usual controls for observed human capital and the 
number of years married. Inconsistent with the specialisation hypothesis he found 
that men whose wives had devoted more time to paid work received a higher 
marriage premium than those whose wives had not worked. I have concerns with 
Loh’s approach. As far as can be told the labour force participation variable treats 
a woman who worked part-time for 20 hours per week for five years identically to 
a woman who worked full-time for 40 hours a week for 2.5 years and either did 
not work for the other 2.5 years, or was not married for the other 2.5 years. 
Because there is no interaction with years married this variable is problematic. It 
confuses times of non-marriage with times when the wife was not working. 
Furthermore, the difference in intensity of specialisation between a woman 
working part-time and a woman working full-time, is regarded identical to the 
difference in intensity of specialisation between a woman not working and one 
working part-time.
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Gray (1997) focused on the relationship between the wives’ current continuous 
hours and men’s wages. In the 1970s he found that the marriage wage differential 
was 1.8 percentage points lower for each extra ten hours per week a wife worked 
in the labour market. In fixed effects analysis that increased to 1.3 percentage 
points. In the 1990s those effects were 1.2 percentage points and nil. After 
correcting for endogeneity he found that the return to specialisation increased over 
the 1990s in cross-sectional analysis. However endogenised wives’ labour supply 
had no effect on men’s wages in fixed-effects analysis.
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) summarised the management literature findings from 
cross-sectional regression analysis that did not attempt to control for endogeneity 
of wives’ labour supply. The literature found evidence of a wage premium for 
husbands whose wives were not working. This wage premium was observed 
amongst men working as managers and professionals.
Although Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) attempted to disentangle the effect of 
wives’ continuous labour supply on husbands’ earnings from the endogeneity and 
selection effects, I ignore their findings. They did not report on their tests to 
determine if wives’ labour supply was endogenous. Nor did they report on tests 
to show that the fixed effects analysis was more appropriate than cross-sectional. 
Cross-section estimation suggested that there was a negative relationship between 
wives’ hours and husbands’ earnings if the husbands worked as managers or 
professionals. This effect persisted for some of the non-management and 
professional occupations.
Hotchkiss and Moore (1999), using cross-section data from the US March 1993 
Current Population Survey, estimated that wives’ labour supply was exogenous in 
the earnings equation of men working as managers, but endogenous in the 
earnings equation of other men. Men working as managers experienced a 
working wife penalty, while other men in many cases experienced a working wife 
bonus. The authors concluded that as the earnings of non-managers increased 
their wives worked less. Furthermore access to the human capital of wives seems 
to have been more important to the careers of men working in management. But
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men in non-management positions may feel freer to take risky, career advancing 
decisions when their wives are working.
Blackaby et al. (1998) undertook similar analysis using US cross-section data 
from the 1983 UK General Household Survey. The authors extended Hotchkiss’ 
and Moore’s analysis by endogenising the occupation decision. They concluded 
that wives’ hours were exogenous for three of the six occupations. Wives hours 
were endogenous for managers. In all but two occupations wives’ hours had a 
negative effect on husbands’ earnings. However the effect was statistically 
significant in only three occupations, those in which wives’ hours were 
endogenous. The authors conclude that their findings support the existence of 
specialisation amongst couples headed by a manager. In couples headed by a less 
highly skilled worker they argued that these findings supported the effects of 
discrimination towards traditional marriages.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the economics based theoretical justifications for the male 
marriage premium. It contains a more detailed description and critique of the 
specialisation within marriage theory, since this is the topic of this thesis. 
Marriage premium researchers believe that married men earn more than 
unmarried men because they are more productive. Empirical evidence suggests 
that the tendency of wives to specialise in work inside the home, thus allowing 
husbands to focus their attention on paid work, is one of the causes of the earnings 
differential between married and unmarried men. There is a suggestion that the 
tendency for couples to specialise has decreased over time in the USA.
In a brief critique of the source of the specialisation hypothesis, Becker’s theory 
of the family, I highlight the value in theorising a link between behaviour inside 
the family and labour market outcomes. An important criticism of this theory is 
that, by ignoring the sharing system among family members, it ignores the power 
relations between the husband and wife, and men and women.
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In the empirical analysis I follow the marriage premium literature and tend to use 
the wives’ labour supply as an indicator of the couple’s degree of specialisation. 
As wives increase their labour supply the couple’s degree of specialisation falls. 
Empirical analysts have used this approach with some success, although they 
stress the importance of correcting for the potential endogeneity of wives’ labour 
supply in husband’s earnings equations. Since the degree of specialisation has yet 
to be measured there are no empirical tests of this assumption. However time-use 
analysts have shown that married women spend more time in housework than 
unmarried women and that married women who work full-time spend less time in 
housework than other married women. There does not seem to be a direct 
translation between the labour supply of wives and the housework time of their 
husbands.
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How Is Specialisation Manifested In Male Wages?: 
A Preliminary Analysis.
3.1 Introduction
Amongst other things, Chapter Two outlined the theory that sex based 
specialisation within marriage was the impetus for the male marriage premium. 
Results from regression analysis, reported in chapters four, five and six help to 
determine the usefulness of the specialisation hypothesis as an explanation for the 
male marriage premium. As an introduction to the data used in those chapters, 
this chapter details the data sets used and explores how the raw wages of males 
vary with the degree of specialisation across countries and over time.
According to Becker (1985), specialisation within marriage gives males the 
incentive to and/or allows males the opportunity to acquire human capital, not 
measured by standard human capital controls, such as education and years of 
work experience, more rapidly than if they were unmarried. If specialisation 
within marriage occurs, and males acquire specialisation related human capital we 
would expect male wages to rise faster with the degree of specialisation in the 
marriage. This chapter examines the relationship between specialisation and the 
rate of increase in male wages over the male working life, using cross-sectional 
data from Australia, Canada and the USA at different points in time from the late 
1970s to the mid 1990s.
Section 3.2 describes the data surveys used in the analysis and illustrates the 
observed differences between married and unmarried men across countries using 
the three most comparable data sets, Australia 1989, Canada 1991 and the USA 
1991.
Section 3.3 describes the methodology used to compare specialisation with men’s 
wages. Briefly, for each data set I graphed the hourly wage of men over their 
working lives, their age-wage profiles. Men were grouped by their supposed
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degree of specialisation; unmarried, married with a working wife and married 
with a wife who was not working. Comparison of these age-wage profiles 
provides some guide as to the veracity of the prediction that hourly wages 
increase with the degree of specialisation within marriage. The specialisation 
theory suggests that the net increase in a male’s wage over his working life should 
be greatest for men whose wives do not work. Next in size should be the wage 
increase of married males whose wives work, with the wage increase of never 
married males being the smallest.
I hypothesised three reasons why there might be cross-country and over-time 
differences in the extent of specialisation and hence the sizes of the gaps between 
the age-wage profiles. Firstly, there might be differences in the length of time the 
average male spends married. The length of time in marriage has implications for 
the opportunity and motivation to specialise. Secondly, there could be differences 
in the continuity of the labour supply of wives. So the wife’s attachment to the 
paid labour market at a point in time might be differentially representative of the 
longer-term specialisation commitment of her marriage. Thirdly, the extent of sex 
discrimination in the paid labour market might differ between countries and over 
time, providing different impetus for couples to specialise.
Section 3.4.1 illustrates how the progression of male wages over the male’s 
working life varies with the male’s supposed degree of specialisation in Australia 
1989, Canada 1991 and USA 1991. Section 3.4.2 considers how changes over 
time in specialisation might affect the course of the male wage by comparing data 
from Australia 1981 and 1994, Canada 1981 and 1994 and USA 1979 and 1994.
Conclusions are offered in section 3.5. The preliminary analysis reported in this 
chapter proved to be a reasonably powerful test of the relevance of specialisation. 
It also illustrated the importance of the further analysis undertaken for this thesis, 
for example the need to consider the effects of the return to specialisation, as well 
as the degree of that specialisation.
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3.2 The Data 
3.2.1 The data sets
This thesis draws on the international data sets developed by the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) (de Tombeur, 1998); that is Australia 1981, 1989, 1994; 
Canada 1981, 1991, 1994; and the USA 1974, 1991, 1994. For over a decade LIS 
has been involved in harmonising national survey data on household incomes, 
income components (for example, earnings) and demographics with a common 
conceptual framework so as to facilitate cross-country comparisons. LIS has 
established a framework of data consistency that permits ready comparability of 
results from analyses that employ the LIS data. Table 3.1 is a summary of the 
main facets of the source surveys used by LIS to construct the data sets analysed 
for this thesis.
Australia
The Australian surveys were conducted throughout Australia as a multi-stage area 
sample of private dwellings (houses, flats, etc.) and a listed sample of non-private 
dwellings (hotels, motels, etc.). Military establishments were not surveyed. 
Sampling probabilities were based on population estimates from the census and 
other data sources.
In the first two surveys, approximately 15,000 households were interviewed 
between mid-September and mid-December in 1982 and 1990 respectively. 
Annual income related to the financial years, that was the year commencing June 
1981 and June 1989 respectively. Current income related to income in the 
reference week, that was the week preceding the interview. The interviewing 
period, mid-September to mid-December, was chosen as a period that was not 
particularly associated with seasonal bias. In the 1994 survey 7 500 households 
were interviewed at a uniform rate over the year commencing June 1994. The 
annual data refers to the 1993-94 financial year. The current income relates to the 
reference week.
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Table 3.1: The source surveys for the LIS data sets
A u str a lia
(1981, 1989, 1994)
C a n a d a
(1981, 1991, 1994)
U S A
(1 9 7 9 ,1 9 9 1 ,1 9 9 4 )
N am e o f  Survey 1981 - Incom e and 
H ousing  Survey 
1989 -  Survey o f  
Incom e and H ousing  
C osts and A m enities 
1994 -  Survey o f  
Incom e and H ousing 
C osts (SIH C )
Survey o f  C onsum er 
F inances
M arch  C urren t 
Popu lation  Survey
S urveying  B ody A ustralian  B ureau  o f  
S tatistics
S tatistics C anada B ureau  o f  the C ensus -  
C entral S tatistical 
O ffice
Survey  S tatus 1981, 1989 S tand alone 
su rvey
1994 M onth ly  
P opu la tion  Survey 
S upplem ent
L abour F orce Survey 
S upplem ent
S tand alone survey
Sam ple Sam ple o f  p rivate 
dw ellings and non­
private  dw ellings -  
one-th ird  o f  1 %  o f  
popu la tion  in 1981 
Selection  probab ilities 
based  on popu la tion  
estim ated  from  the 
census and other data  
sources
Sam ple o f  private 
dw ellings, w ith  the 
exception  o f  
househo lds on N ative 
A m erican  reserves and 
househo lds in the 
Y ukon  and N orthw est 
T errito ries
Sam ple o f  all housing  
units
D em ograph ic
sta tistics
A t su rvey  date: 
S ep tem ber to 
N o v em b er o f  1982 for 
1981 survey, for 
exam ple
A t su rvey  data: 
F ebruary  through M ay 
1982 fo r 1981 survey, 
for exam ple
A t su rvey  date: M arch 
1980 for 1979 survey, 
fo r exam ple.
W age and  salary  
incom e
T he financial year 
(June to June) 
p reced ing  the survey  
T he 1981 and 1994 LIS 
data  sets also inc lude 
incom e from  reference 
w eek
T he financial year 
p reced ing  the survey 
T he 1981 LIS data set 
also inc ludes incom e 
from  reference w eek
T he financial year 
p reced ing  the survey 
T he 1979 LIS data set 
also includes incom e 
from  reference w eek
When the SIHC was introduced in 1994-95 to replace the previous surveys, there
were some alterations to the methodology. The change from the interview period
of three months to twelve months could have worsened the reliability of the
income data. For some respondents, a longer time period had elapsed between the
completion of tax returns and the survey date. Others would not have completed
their tax returns. This could have implications for the respondents’ ability to
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recall correctly their income data for the previous year. Furthermore the change 
from stand-alone survey to one attached to another survey may have made the 
income measures less reliable. Because of this there was less reference to records, 
such as income tax forms, in the 1994 survey.
In each survey, effort was made to identify income units that had undergone major 
demographic and labour force changes between the previous financial year and 
the time of interview. These income units were flagged and it was suggested that 
analysts exclude them from analysis of income data on the basis that the annual 
data did not refer to the full year. For example, for the 1989 survey, the ABS 
flagged persons who changed marital status in the year commencing June 1989. 
However, LIS chose to include these income units in their data sets.
Canada
The Canadian data was generated from the relevant Canadian Surveys of 
Consumer Finances. A stratified cluster probability sample design is employed in 
the Survey of Consumer Finances. The final stage sampling-frame comprises a 
list of all private dwellings in the ten Canadian provinces. This sampling frame 
includes the total population of private household heads, with the exception of 
households on Native American reserves, and households in the Yukon and 
Northwest Territories.
The Canadian surveys are conducted following the end of the tax year (February 
through May), thereby minimising errors in reporting annual income.
USA
The Current Population Survey is conducted throughout the USA. The sampling 
frame for the survey consists of a list of all housing units compiled from the most 
recent decennial census of population and housing, supplemented by lists of 
newly constructed dwellings. The sample design is a multistage stratified 
probability sample of the population from the entire geographic area of the US, 
including Hawaii and Alaska. Puerto Rico and other territories are not included. 
For the 1979 survey approximately 62 000 households were interviewed.
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3.2.2 Important variables and the samples
The three most important variables in an analysis of the relationship between 
marital status and hourly wage and salary income are marital status and the 
income and hours of work variables used to construct the hourly wage. Table 3.2 
summarises information on the three variables for the three countries, facilitating 
a discussion of the cross-country and over-time comparability.
Table 3.2: Important variables for an analysis of the male marriage premium
A u str a lia C a n a d a U S A
W age and  sa lary 1981 and 1 9 9 4 - 1981 -  hourly  w age 1979 -  hourly  w age
Incom e hourly  w age from from  reference w eek from  reference w eek
reference  w eek 1991 and 1 9 9 4 - 1991 and 1 9 9 4 -
1989 annual earnings, annual earnings, not annual earn ings top-
n o t top -coded top-coded coded  at U S$100,000
H ours  w orked 1 9 8 1 N /A 1 9 8 1 N /A 1979 N /A
in reference 1989 -  ca tegorical and 1991 and 1994 - 1991 and 1994
w eek top-coded  at 50 con tinuous and top- con tinuous and top-
1994 -  con tinuous and 
top -coded  at 50
coded  at 65 coded  at 99
M arried H eterosexual couples H eterosexual couples 1979 -  legally  m arried
in de-facto in de-fac to coup les only
rela tionsh ips are coded relationsh ips are coded 1991 and 1994 -  de-
iden tically  to legally iden tically  to legally facto  couples also
m arried  couples m arried  couples identified .
N ev e r  m arried N ever m arried  are N ever m arried  are N ev er m arried  are
iden tified  in 1989 and iden tified  in 1991 and iden tified  in 1991 and
1994 1994 1994____________________
I concluded that cross-country comparison was best undertaken with the Australia 
1989, Canada 1991 and US 1991 data sets. I was able to construct the most 
similar samples, hourly wage and marital status variables with these data sets. 
Over-time comparisons were made with the oldest and most recent data set for 
each country. The samples and variables used were consistent within each 
country, but not over countries. Table 3.3 summarises the samples used for cross­
country comparison and over-time comparison.
In terms of marital status, each of the Australian and Canadian surveys treated 
legally married men and men in de-facto couples as married. In the 1979 US 
survey de-facto couples were not identified. Hence married men only included 
legally married men. In the two most recent US surveys de-facto couples were
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identified, so I was able to code men in de-facto couples as married. In the two 
most recent surveys for each country never married men were differentiated from 
divorced, widowed and separated men. In the oldest surveys they were included 
with divorced, widowed and separated men.
The cross-country comparisons included currently married men and never married 
men. Divorced, widowed and separated men were excluded from the analysis. 
Currently married men included men in heterosexual de-facto couples. In over­
time analysis I compared currently married men with unmarried men (never 
married, divorced, widowed and separated men). In the Canadian and Australian 
data sets men in heterosexual de-facto couples were recorded as married. In the 
US data sets men in heterosexual de-facto couples were recorded as unmarried.
To focus on employees, where possible I excluded self-employed men and men 
married to self-employed women from the analysis. Men were excluded if they 
worked in the agriculture industry or were married to women employed in the 
agriculture industry. Finally, because in the majority of data sets hourly income 
was calculated from annual income, I focussed on men working full-time full- 
year.
In all the data sets used for cross-country comparisons, Canada 1994 and USA 
1994, wages were calculated from the annual income data and the hours worked 
in the reference week. Analysing wage information calculated like this can be 
problematic since the wage information does not necessarily match the personal 
characteristics. Individuals who have changed jobs during the previous financial 
year or in the months preceding their interview will have inconsistent job 
characteristics such as industry, occupation and hours of work per week. 
Furthermore ,hours of work per week is collected for the reference week only.
LIS provided the hourly wage for wage and salary earners for the Australia 1981 
and 1994, and Canada 1981 and USA 1979 data sets, using information from the 
reference week.
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Table 3.3: Members of the samples by country and year
Australia 
1 Q 8 Q
A u str a lia C a n a d a U S A
Canada 1991
USA 1991
1981 1994 1981 1994 1979 1994S Men aged 20-65 S V V
V Currently married 
includes men in defacto
S y S
relationships 
Unmarried includes V y V y
divorced, widowed and 
separated
Unmarried includes men y
V
in defacto relationships 
Unmarried is never 
married. Divorced, 
widowed and separated 
excluded from analysis 
Men working in 
agriculture excluded
y sS
V Husbands of women 
working in agriculture 
excluded
s y s
V Self-employed men 
excluded
s s V
S Husbands of self- 
employed women 
excluded
V V s
V Working full-time V s V s s
V Working full-time full- v V s
year
Hourly wage based on 
weekly earnings* and 
hours worked in that 
week
V
V Hourly wage based on 
annual earnings* and 
annual hours worked
y s
* Earnings from wages and salaries
3.2.3 Who are never married men?
A not uncommon reaction to hearing that married men earn more than never 
married men is to think that indeed they should. Some would think that never 
married men are men who are yet to marry or men so “different” that they will 
never marry. Of course men who are yet to marry are generally younger than 
married men, and hence should earn less on those grounds. Furthermore, what
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makes the remaining never married men “different” could mean that they are less 
productive in the paid labour market.
Table 3.4 illustrates that, on average, amongst men working full-time full-year - 
currently married men were older than never married men in the three countries. 
However, never married men were significantly more likely to be tertiary 
educated and less likely not to have graduated from secondary school. It is 
possible that more educated men tended to delay marriage until they finished 
studying or established their careers.
Table 3.4: Age and education of men working full-time full-year by marital 
status and country
Australia 1989 Canada 1991 USA 1991
Married Never
married
Married Never
married
Married Never
married
Age (in years) 40.0 31.3 41.0 33.0 40.7 33.0
Tertiary educated (%) 15.4 22.1 16.1 25.7 27.4 36.9
Less than secondary 28.9 21.4 18.0 9.9 11.5 7.7
education (%)
Figures 3.1 to 3.3 illustrate the evolution of men’s marital status over the working 
life for each of the countries. In each age group currently married men comprised 
at least 60 per cent of the men. At least 80 per cent of men, aged over 40 were 
currently married. Indeed, never married men were proportionately more 
important in the younger age groups. However, there was a small, but significant, 
number of never married men in all age groups. Appendix 3.A details how many 
never married men there were in the older age groups to assure the reader that 
empirical analysis comparing married men with never married men can be 
undertaken.
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Figure 3.1: Marital status of men working full-time full-year over the 
working life: Australia 1989
Proportion 
of men 
(%)
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64
□  Currently married 
BH Never married
Ei Diverced, widowed, separated
Figure 3.2: Marital status of men working full-time full-year over the 
working life: Canada 1991
Proportion 
of men 
(%)
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64
Age
□  Currently married 
Hi Never married 
Diverced, widowed, separated
Figure 3.3: Marital status of men working full-time full-year over the 
working life: USA 1991
Proportion 
of men
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64
□  Currently married 
m Never married
1̂ Diverced, widowed, separated
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But is it true that the more educated never married men tend to be in the younger 
age groups and that older never married men less educated and potentially less 
productive in the paid labour market? For each country Table 3.5 shows how the 
marital status and education of men evolves over the working life. Canadian and 
the US never married men were more likely to be tertiary educated at any age, and 
more likely to have graduated from secondary school. This was only the case for 
Australian men younger than 40. Amongst Australian men aged 50 or more, 
never married men were less likely to be tertiary educated. Amongst Australian 
men older than 40 never married men were less likely to have graduated from 
secondary school. These observations imply that Canadian and US never married 
men were potentially more productive, in terms of education, in all age groups. 
Amongst Australian men however, it is possible to argue that there were two 
groups of never married men; the group of relatively young, more educated men 
delaying marriage to establish a career and the group with relatively little 
education spread across all age groups.
Table 3.5: How does education vary with marital status over the working 
life?
Australia 1989 Canada 1991 USA 1991
Age and marital Tertiary Less than Tertiary Less than Tertiary Less than
status education secondary education secondary education secondary
education education education
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
20-29
Currently married 9.9 27.5 11.0 13.0 16.6 13.8
Never married 17.2 17.8 18.9 7.6 35.1 6.5
30-39
Currently married 18.8 23.7 15.2 12.3 28.1 8.8
Never married 32.2 19.9 22.9 10.6 36.5 6.6
40-49
Currently married 17.5 28.7 17.9 18.7 32.6 9.0
Never married 28.3 32.6 38.1 14.3 41.9 10.8
50 +
Currently married 10.6 39.5 13.7 36.1 26.8 17.4
Never married 8.1 43.2 22.9 22.9 41.0 15.4
However, married men earned more than unmarried men, after education and age 
had been controlled for. Labour market earnings are not only affected by age 
(experience in the labour market) and education. There may be unobserved 
characteristics that leave unmarried men less productive in the paid labour market. 
This thesis focuses on the earnings outcomes of a select group of men, those who
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worked full-time for the entire surveyed year. Earnings are but one labour market 
outcome. Another key one is employment. Figures 3.4 to 3.6 detail the marital 
status breakdowns of unemployed men over the working life in each of the 
countries. Comparison of the proportions of never married unemployed men in 
these figures with the proportions of never married employed men working full­
time full-year tells us the propensity for never married men to be unemployed. It 
appears that never married men aged in their 20s were significantly more likely to 
be unemployed than currently married men in all countries. While this tendency 
continues over the working lives of men in all countries it was significantly more 
marked in the USA.
Figure 3.4: Marital status of unemployed men over the working life:
Australia 1989
Proportion 
of men
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64
□ Currently married 
Ü Never married 
Divorced, widowed, separated
Figure 3.5: Marital status of unemployed men over the working life: 
Canada 1991
Proportion 
of men 
(%)
Age □ Currently married 
m Never married 
Divorced, widowed, separated
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Figure 3.6: Marital status of unemployed men over the working life: 
USA 1991
Proportion 
of men 
(%)
80
60
40
20
0
1
_j
c
h A .i
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64
□  Currently married 
H Never married
^iDivarced, widowed, separated
3.3 Methodology: How was the Degree of Specialisation Reflected in the 
Progression of Male Wages over the Working Life?
In this section I describe the methodology upon which this chapter is based. I 
constructed age-wage profiles for men grouped by their degree of supposed 
specialisation; unmarried, married with a working wife and married with a wife 
who was not working. The age-wage profiles were graphed as the raw hourly 
wage by age brackets, over the working life. The hourly wage was indexed at one 
for unmarried men aged 20 to 24. I did not control for other measures of observed 
human capital like education, ethnicity or location.
Labour economists use cross-sectional age-earnings profiles to describe the course 
of eamings/wages over the working life of the average worker. Although, as 
Thornton et al. (1997) explained, a cross-sectional earnings profile fails to 
accurately portray a longitudinal earnings profile, it is the best tool available to 
uncover differences in the progression of wages between males with varying 
degrees of specialisation.
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As previously noted, the more specialised a male, the more rapidly his wages are 
expected to increase over his working life1 2. Never married males are less 
specialised than all married males. Following the reasoning outlined in Chapter 
Two it is assumed that a married couple in which the wife works in the paid 
labour market (henceforth a working wife”) will be less specialised than a couple 
in which the wife devotes her time to household responsibilities (henceforth a 
non-working wife ) . In this chapter the presence of a non-working wife 
indicates a male with the highest degree of specialisation. Figure 3.7 illustrates 
the expected relationship between the degree of specialisation and the course of 
wages over a man’s working life3. Because the data sets do not contain 
information on the number of years married I substitute age for years married. 
This is an approximation because married men will not have been married for the 
same number of years at any given age. The gap between the lines widens as the 
men age. This is consistent with the specialisation hypothesis, as long as the 
length of marriage increases proportionally with age.
1 In theory the hourly wage rate of a male might fall over the latter part of his working life, so 
working life-wage increase is a net wage increase.
2 A conventional wisdom in female labour supply literature is that the labour force attachment of a 
married woman varies markedly over her life with changing family, particularly child-care, 
responsibilities. However Nakamura and Nakamura’s (1994) analysis of Canadian data suggests 
that a married woman’s work history (for example, whether or not she was working last year) may 
be just as important a predictor of whether or not she is currently working as is the age and number 
of her children. This finding provides some confidence that the wife’s current employment status 
can act as a meaningful proxy for the long-term specialisation arrangement that she has with her 
husband.
3 The rate of increase in the wage rate tends to be largest in the early stages of the male’s working 
life, tapering off as he nears retirement. Hence the depiction of the wage age profile as a straight 
line is technically inaccurate, although easier to draw.
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Figure 3.7: Age earnings profiles for males working full-time by degree of 
specialisation in marriage
Hourly wage rate
Married: non-working wife
Married: working wife
Never Married
Age over working life
In this section I identify three factors that may cause differences, across countries 
and over-time within a country, in:
• the amount of specialisation undertaken; and/or
• the relationship between men’s age and the amount of specialisation 
undertaken; and/or
• the closeness of the mapping between the wives’ labour supply at a point in 
time and the longer-term specialisation commitment of the couples.
i) Number of years spent married: opportunity and motivation to specialise
As explained in Chapter Two, according to the specialisation hypothesis the 
increment in unobserved human capital resultant on specialisation increases with 
each year of marriage. Schoeni (1990), Korenman and Neumark (1991) and Gray 
(1997) found that the number of years that a man has been married, and its square, 
were more effective controls for marital status effects on wages than were marital 
status dummies. Unfortunately, the length of marriage is not recorded in the LIS 
data sets.
The number of years spent married by a representative married male, at a given 
age, could vary between countries and over time. The longer the representative 
male was married at a given age the more intense will be the effect of
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specialisation on age-wage profiles. Furthermore, the shorter is the time spent 
married the less time men have to accrue specialisation related human capital. 
This also means there will be less impetus to invest in unobserved human capital. 
Blinder and Weiss (1976) showed that investment is undertaken to the extent that 
investment costs can be recouped.
Chandler et al. (1994) undertook an analysis of the effect of delaying (de-jure) 
marriage on earnings using US data from the late 1980s. Contrary to the 
prediction outlined in the previous paragraph, they concluded that delaying 
marriage did not negatively affect the wages of married men. However they did 
not control for the possibility that the men who were prone to delay marriage may 
have been more career-oriented. Nor did they account for de-facto relationships.
I used the proportions of men currently married and never married (where 
available) as guides for the potential length of time spent married. As indicators 
of cross-country and over-time differences in the ‘time spent married’ these 
proportions will be less accurate if there are cross-country and over-time 
differences in the proclivity to divorce and re-marry.
Appendix 3.B lists these proportions by age group, for men in Australia 1989, 
Canada 1991 and the USA 1991. The samples of men used in the analysis were 
described in section 3.2. They only included men who had worked full-time for 
the entire surveyed year. I have also included divorced, widowed and separated 
men. By the age of 24 over half of the sampled men were currently married or in 
de-facto relationships in each of the countries. The proportions of currently 
married and never married Australian and Canadian men were fairly similar in 
each age bracket. The proportion of US currently married men aged 20-24 was 
much larger than the corresponding Australian and Canadian proportions; 67 per 
cent versus 56 percent and 52 per cent respectively. However amongst men aged 
30 or more there were relatively more US never married men than Australian and 
Canadian never married men.
From this information it appears that Australian and Canadian men would have 
spent, on average, a similar number of years married in each age group. However, 
it is difficult to hypothesise how US men would compare on these grounds.______
6Ö
Preliminary Analysis
Appendix 3.C contains the proportions of currently married and unmarried men 
for Australia 1981 and 1994, Canada 1981 and 1994 and the USA 1979 and 1994. 
As explained in section 3.2 the samples of men used are consistent within each 
country but not between countries. It is clear from these proportions that the over­
time trend for Australia and the USA, was for currently married men to have spent 
less time married for any given age. This conclusion is consistent with Blackburn 
and Korenman’s (1994) observations on US men. They had data on the length of 
marriage. There was little change in the Canadian proportions between 1981 and 
1994.
ii) Wives’ attachment to the paid labour market: mapping specialisation
The second factor refers to the tendency of married women’s attachment to the 
paid labour market to follow a pattem related to their stage in the life-course. 
That pattem can be described thus. In the early years of marriage the wife works 
full-time. When she has children she decreases the hours she works in the labour 
market, sometimes to the extent of exiting the labour market. This reduction in 
the hours worked by the wife generally coincides with the time in her husband’s 
career when he experiences the greatest wage increase. Often the wife returns to 
the labour market or increases the hours she works in the labour market when her 
children are old enough to be put in care. This return to the labour force depends 
on the cost and availability of child-care, factors that vary considerably across the 
countries and time.
Over-time and cross-country differences in the prevalence of this pattern have 
implications for observations on the specialisation hypothesis based on analysis of 
cross-sectional data. The couple’s degree of specialisation is approximated by the 
wife’s attachment to the paid labour market. The degree of specialisation is 
presumed to be a ‘long-term’ commitment. However, in cross-sectional analysis, 
this commitment is measured by the wife’s employment status at a point in time. 
The less pronounced is the wife’s life-course pattern of labour force attachment 
the more likely her labour supply at any point in time reflects her longer-term
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attachment and the degree of specialisation in the couple. Hence the gap between 
the age-wage profiles of married men should be more pronounced.
Figure 3.8 illustrates how the wives’ labour supply varies over the husbands’ 
working life for Australia 1989, Canada 1991 and the USA 1991. I have used 
cross-sectional data to approximate a longitudinal phenomenon. The figure 
illustrates that the wives of the oldest men were least likely to work and/or the 
wives of men in the oldest cohort were least likely to work. In Australia and the 
USA the wives most likely to exit the labour market were married to the men in 
the younger cohorts. The proclivity to work of Canadian wives was relatively 
constant until the husband turned 50. This is consistent with the findings of 
Nakamura and Nakamura (1994), that for a Canadian woman, her most recent 
year’s labour supply may be just as important a predictor of whether or not she is 
currently working as is the age and number of her children. It seems that 
Australian women were the most likely to exit the labour market around the birth 
of their children, and Canadian women the least likely.
I conclude that the labour supply of an Australian wife at any point in time would 
be the least accurate predictor of her long-term labour supply. However, it is 
difficult to distinguish between Canadian and US wives on this basis.
Figure 3.8: Wives’ labour supply over their husbands’ working lives
Proportion 
of wives I 
working (%)
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
Husband's age I —
Over time the tendency of wives to follow this pattern of attachment to the labour 
force decreased in Canada and the USA, but remained relatively constant in
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Figure 3.9: Wives’ labour supply over their husbands’ working lives: 
Australia
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Figure 3.10: Wives’ labour supply over their husbands’ working lives: 
Canada
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Figure 3.11: Wives’ labour supply over their husbands’ working lives: 
USA
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Australia . Figures 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 illustrate the over-time comparisons for 
Australia, Canada and the USA respectively. Although Australian women were 
more likely to be working in 1994, the figure suggests that there was little change 
in the tendency for women to exit the paid labour market around the birth of a 
child.
This implies that a wife s attachment to the labour force will be more constant 
over her working life in the more recent Canadian and US surveys4 5. Hence, we 
can assume that a wife who is working full-time at age 40 will have spent more 
years in lull-time employment in the more recent surveys. Similarly, a wife who 
is not working will have spent more years not working in the more recent surveys. 
So, in the more recent surveys, the wage-age profiles of married males with non­
working wives in the USA and Canada will be steeper and the similar profile for 
married males with working wives will be less steep in both countries. The 
difference between the two profiles should be more pronounced. It is also 
possible that the difference in the profiles of unmarried and married men with 
working wives will be less pronounced.
The sex wage gap: motivation to specialise
According to Becker (1985) one motivation to specialise is discrimination against 
women in the paid labour market, evidenced in the wage gap between the husband 
and wife. Even if a husband and wife had the same basic productivity, Becker 
claims that there would be motivation to specialise if the wife was discriminated 
against in the paid labour market in terms of her earnings. As Becker (1985) 
argues, if women’s earnings were ten per cent less than men’s due to 
discrimination, women would tend to specialise in the household and men in the 
labour market. As a result, earnings of the average woman would be considerably 
less than those of the average man. Let us hypothesise, for example, that the 
average woman earned 60 per cent of what the average man earned. Ten
4 See, for example, Mitchell (1998).
5 This conclusion is consistent with Lombard’s (1999) findings that the fraction of US women who 
worked a full year had increased from 1977-1981 to 1987-1991. She also found that there had been 
a decrease in the fraction of women who did not work at all over the same period. Between 1975 
and 1991 she observed a substantial decrease in the exit rate from employment; a finding which 
also held for women with young children.
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percentage points of the 40 per cent gap could be due to discrimination and 30 
percentage points due to differential investment in human capital, as women 
respond to discrimination by investing less in the paid labour market.
Hence, the component of the sex wage gap related to gender based discrimination 
has implications for the motivation to specialise. I assumed that the greater is the 
extent of sex discrimination in pay the more pronounced is specialisation. To be 
fully specialised in the paid labour market one needs to work full-time. Hence I 
compared the full-time wages of men and women as a guide to the relative wage 
earning ability of husbands and wives.
The traditional tool for decomposing sex wage gaps is the technique developed by 
Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). This decomposition technique splits the sex 
wage gap into that part resultant on differential holdings of observed human 
capital and that part resultant on the differential returns to observed human 
capital. Sex based discrimination has been interpreted as the second part. This 
tool has been used for making comparisons over time and between countries.
More recently, Juhn et al. (1991) developed a technique to decompose over-time 
changes in the wage gap between white and black Americans. They related a 
portion of the Blinder-Oaxaca “discrimination” part to the general trend of 
growing wage inequality. This, they argued, should not necessarily be seen as 
discrimination against blacks, since growing wage inequality affected all workers 
with relatively low levels of human capital. However, Juhn et al. (1991) do 
explain that when discrimination is present it is difficult to isolate the pure effect 
of wage inequality.
The Juhn et al. technique has been adopted by Blau and Kahn (1992, 1994, 1996a, 
1996b, 1997, 1999) to decompose the changes in the US gender wage gap over 
time and cross-national differences in the sex wage gap. Chapter Five contains a 
more detailed explanation of this decomposition technique in equation form. The 
first term of a standard Juhn et al. decomposition of a cross-country wage gap 
reflects cross-country differences in the gap in the amount of observed human 
capital held by men and women. The second term reflects the cross-country 
difference in the return to observed human capital received by men. The third
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term may reflect cross-country differences in the gap in unmeasured human 
capital held by men and women and/or cross-country differences in the extent of 
labour market discrimination against women. I assumed that this term describes 
discrimination. The fourth term implicitly reflects cross-country differences in 
the effect of discrimination. The conceptual basis of this term is that, if a group is 
discriminated against, members of the group are paid as if they have a skill level 
below their true level. So if the return to skill levels differs between countries, so 
too will the effect of discrimination. I also regarded this term as discrimination 
relevant to the specialisation decision. Blau and Kahn, on the other hand, would 
sum the second and fourth terms and consider the sum a reflection of cross­
country differences in the overall wage structure. They would argue that, since all 
those discriminated against suffer from the effects of a diverse wage structure, the 
fourth term is not specific to women.
Below I summarise the findings of studies that have decomposed the relevant 
cross-national gender wage gaps and over-time wage gaps.
Australia and Canada
Kidd and Shannon (1996) decomposed the sex wage gap between Australia and 
Canada using data from the 1989 Canadian Labour Market Activity Survey and 
the 1989-90 Australian Income Distribution Survey, the survey that the LIS 1989 
data set is derived from. On average women earned 33 per cent less than men in 
Canada and only 15 per cent less in Australia.
I considered the specification excluding occupation and industry. Using the Juhn 
et al. decomposition technique the authors found that much of the mean log wage 
difference in the gender wage gaps (0.1435) was explained by the third term. The 
sum of the third and fourth terms explained 86-123 per cent of the cross-country 
difference, depending on the specification of work experience. Hence 
discrimination explained almost all the sex wage gap difference. There was more 
sex-based pay discrimination in Canada than in Australia.
66
Preliminary Analysis
Australia and USA
Blau and Kahn (1992) decomposed the pair-wise comparisons of the sex wage 
gaps of the United States and nine other advanced countries, including Australia. 
They used data from the 1986 Income Distribution Survey for Australia and the 
1985-1988 International Social Survey Programme for the USA.
The cross-country difference in the log wage gap (between men and women) was 
0.0916 log points. The sex wage gap was larger in the US. The sum of the third 
and fourth terms of the Juhn et al. decomposition was 0.0814. The third term 
explained 0.0410. Hence the cross-country difference in the sex wage gap was 
explained primarily by the fact that there was more discrimination in terms of pay 
in the USA.
I found no recent published studies comparing the sex wage gaps of Canada and 
the USA. Hence I concluded that Australia exhibits the least amount of sex-based 
pay discrimination, suggesting that Australian couples would be least motivated to 
specialise.
Over time
Australia
The most recent decompositions of over-time changes in the Australian sex wage 
gaps focussed on changes over the 1980s (Preston, 1997; Kidd and Meng, 1995) 
and over the 1970s and 1980s (Spilsbury and Kidd, 1997). All used versions of 
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique. Spilsbury and Kidd also used the 
Juhn-Murphy technique. Preston compared log weekly wages of full-time workers 
from the 1981 and 1991 censuses. Kidd and Meng compared the log of weekly 
earnings of full-time workers from the 1981 and 1989 Income Distribution 
Surveys. Spilsbury and Kidd compared log hourly wages of full-time workers in 
the 1973 Social mobility Survey and the 1989 Income Distribution Survey.
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Preston6 concluded that the sex wage gap of full-time workers fell by 9.2 
percentage points and 60 per cent of this reduction (5.5 percentage points) was 
caused by decreased discrimination. Kidd and Meng concluded that the sex wage 
gap fell by 6.6 percentage points and 55 per cent of this reduction (3.6 percentage 
points) was due to decreased discrimination.
Using the Juhn et al. decomposition technique Spilsbury and Kidd concluded that 
labour market structure only made a small contribution to the convergence in 
wages over the 1970s and 1980s. Their finding was consistent with Borland and 
Wilkins (1994), who concluded that there had been little change in overall wage 
inequality over the 1980s.
Canada
Doiron and Riddell (1994) was the only Canadian published study to have 
considered changes in the sex wage gap since the early 1980s. The purpose of 
their analysis was to examine the impact of unionisation on the sex wage gap. 
They decomposed the sex gap in hourly earnings using data sets from 1981, 1984 
and 1988. The data sets were derived from different surveys, although each of the 
surveys was attached to the Labour Force Survey. While comparable data showed 
that the ratio of women’s average hourly earnings to men’s increased slightly 
from 54 per cent to 57 per cent over the period, the gap between the average log 
wages of men and women increased from 0.259 to 0.263 between the 1981 and 
1988 surveys. Their standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition suggested that the 
‘discrimination’ component of the wage gap increased from 0.180 log points to 
0.188 log points. The authors included occupation and industry as explanatory 
variables in the earnings equations.
USA
Blau and Kahn (1997) decomposed changes in the sex wage-gap for full-time 
workers using the 1980 and 1989 surveys from the PSID. Between these years the 
male-female pay gap narrowed by 0.1522 log points. In the specification 
excluding occupation and industry controls the component, the sum of the third
6 The list o f regressors included industry and occupation.____________________________________
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and fourth terms of the Juhn et al. decomposition contributed 0.1187 log points 
(nearly 80 per cent) to the narrowing sex wage gap.
Ahraf (1996) used the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique to decompose 
changes in the sex wage gap (for full-time workers) over the 1980s using the 
PSID. Ahraf provided two sets of earnings ratios, based on the predicted values 
from regressions. One was unadjusted, and the other included a Heckman 
correction. The unadjused ratio of women’s wages to men’s fell from 68.2 per 
cent to 63.1 percent while the adjusted rate increased from 60.2 per cent to 68.0 
percent. The results of his standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition suggest that 
the discrimination component of the sex wage gap fell from 32 to 37 per cent in 
1981 to 21 to 24 per cent in 1989.
So, it appears that the size of the discrimination component of the sex-wage gap 
fell over the 1980s in Australia and the USA. In Canada it did not fall. In fact it 
may have risen. I presumed that these trends were not reversed in the first half of 
the 1990s, although there were no studies to justify this view.
3.4 Empirical Observations
In this section I compare the predictions from section 3.3 with the age-wage 
profiles.
3.4.1 Australia 1989, Canada 1991 and USA 1991
Appendix 3.D reports the hourly wage rates, in index form, of married and never 
married men over their working life. The indexes were constructed by setting the 
average wage of unmarried men, aged 20 to 24, to unity in each data set. To 
monitor the effects of specialisation the married men were separated into two sub 
groups - married men with working wives and married men with non-working 
wives. Comparison of the progression of wages over the working years of males
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differentiated by their degree of specialisation is illustrated by graphing the wage 
indexes. These graphs appear in Figures 3.12 to 3.14.
In section 3.3 I made three sets of predictions of how the age wage profdes would 
compare across these countries.
i) In terms of the number of years that the average man would have been married I 
argued that Australian and Canadian men would have been much the same. As I 
was unsure how US men would compare, I did not predict differences in the 
relationship between the predicted degree of specialisation and the wage-age 
profiles on this basis.
ii) In terms of the wife’s attachment to the paid labour market I would expect that 
the cross-section labour supply of Australian wives would be least reflective of 
the couples’ long-term specialisation commitment. Hence we should observe that 
the gap between the age-wage profiles of Canadian men and US men should be 
wider than the corresponding Australian gap.
iii) In terms of sex based pay discrimination I argued that Australian wives would 
have suffered the least amount of pay discrimination. Hence, the Australian gap 
between the wage-age profiles of never married men and currently married men 
should be the smallest.
Figure 3.12: Wage-age profiles for men by degree of specialisation in 
marriage: Australia 1989
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Figure 3.13: Wage-age profiles for men by degree of specialisation in 
marriage: Canada 1991
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Figure 3.14: Wage-age profiles for men by degree of specialisation in
Hourly 
wage index
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Observation of the age wage profiles for the three most comparable data sets 
revealed that in each country the relationship between the age and wage rates of 
men tended to be concave. The hourly wage rate rose with age and peaked by the 
time the male was aged in his mid 50s . When interpreting the relationship 
between age and average wages, in these cross sectional surveys, as indicative of 
the wages received by the average male over his working life we need to bear in 
mind the following caveats summarised in Thornton et al. (1997). Firstly, the
7 These observations are consistent with human capital theory, which argues that as individuals age 
the amount of resources they devote to education and training falls. Eventually new human capital 
investment will no longer exceed the depreciation of existing human capital, and ultimately 
earnings tend to decline.
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cross-sectional data ignores the inflation rate and the rate of general productivity 
growth in the economy. This implied that the working life wage increase 
suggested by the cross-sectional data will under-estimate the increase that a male 
currently aged 20 could expect to see over his working life. Furthermore the 
cohort can affect earnings in a number of ways. Welch (1979) suggested that men 
who are part of a large cohort (such as baby boomers) may experience lower 
earnings growth relative to workers in other cohorts.
Consider the three groups of men. In Australia 1989 the average wage of never 
married men reached its first peak for men aged 30-34. The hourly wage of never 
married men fell to a trough for men aged 50-54. It then rose again across the 
remaining age groups, ending at a wage rate quite similar to the earlier peak. The 
average wage of never married males in the Canada 1991 survey also rose to a 
peak for men aged 30-34. It then flattened out and rose again to another peak for 
men aged 50-54 before tailing off substantially. The hourly wage rate of never 
married men in USA 1991 also peaked at age 30-34. The second peak occurred 
for men ten years older. Following that the hourly wage tailed off to be close to 
zero for men aged 60-64.
These patterns highlight another problem associated with using cross-sectional 
data to analyse the longitudinal behaviour of never married males. It appears that 
the demographic characteristics of never married males (at least those related to 
income earning potential) could vary substantially with their age. A very small 
number of males remain unmarried over their working lives8, and it seems that the 
probability of a male marrying could be related systematically to wage related 
characteristics. At least in the USA, males who marry in their early 30’s tend to 
have low wage earning potential. More educated men, with relatively high wage 
earning potential, tend to marry in their mid to late 30’s. In Chapter Four I 
construct age-wage profiles, controlling for human capital type demographics 
such as education, thus alleviating the problem.
8 Appendix 3.A describes the proportion of males in the various marriage states over the working 
life.
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The wage age profiles of married men were also concave. Hourly wages peaked 
earlier amongst married men without working wives. Their peak was achieved 
when men were aged in their 40s, whereas the peak for men with working wives 
occurred when the men were in their 50s.
The specialisation theory suggests that over their working lives married men 
should experience a larger net wage increase than that experienced by never 
married men. In terms of the figures the area between the graphed hourly wage 
lines for married men and never married men should be positive. In all countries 
that was definitely the case. While US and Australian married men without 
working wives tended to earn slightly less than never married men when they 
were aged less than 35, the reverse was true for older age groups9. In every age 
group Canadian married men earned more per hour than did never married men.
Furthermore specialisation suggests that the net wage increase of married males 
with working wives should exceed that of never married males. This also appears 
to be the case in the USA and Canada. Canadian men with working wives earned 
less than men with non-working wives in all age groups. American men older than 
34, with non-working wives, earned more than did men whose wives worked. In 
net terms the hourly wages of married Australian men did not appear to vary with 
the labour supply of the wives.
While the gaps between the curves did tend to increase with age for US men, as 
specialisation predicts, they did not for Australia and Canada.
Over the working life the earnings gap between never married men and married 
men with working wives appears to be largest in the USA. There appears to be 
little difference between the corresponding Australian and Canadian earnings
9 One explanation for this pattern is that the most specialised males forego earnings early in their 
careers for the opportunity to invest more heavily in human capital and/or receive more company 
specific training. Hill (1979) reported that married males spend more time in training on the 
current job than non-married males. More detailed analyses by Lynch (1992) confirmed that 
married males are statistically more likely to have received company or on-the-job training. A 
similar study by Bartel and Sicherman (1993) also found that marriage increased the likelihood of 
men receiving company and non-company training, holding constant other observable 
characteristics.
Another explanation is that the males have varying holdings of observed human capital such as 
education. I investigate this in Chapter Four.
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gaps. I predicted that the Australian gap should be the smallest, but did not 
foresee any difference between Canada and the USA.
The earnings gap between married men appeared also to be largest in the USA. 
There may not even have been a corresponding Australian gap. I predicted that the 
Australian gap would be the smallest, but again did not predict a difference 
between Canada and the USA.
3.4.2 How have changes over time in specialisation been reflected in the 
progression of male wages over the working life? Australia (1981- 
1994); Canada (1981-1994); USA (1979-1994)
Appendix 3.E reports the hourly wage rates, in index form, of married and never 
married men over the working life for each country and year. Recall that the 
indexes were constructed by setting the average wage of the relevant unmarried 
group of men aged 20 -  24 to unity, in each data set. Graphs of the wage-age 
profiles for men differentiated by their degree of specialisation appear in figures 
3.15 to 3.20. One cannot identify never married males in the Australia 1981, 
Canada 1981 and USA 1979 surveys. Unmarried males in these surveys include 
divorced, widowed and separated males. Since these males would have benefited 
from some years of specialisation whilst married it is reasonable to assume that 
never married males would experience a smaller net wage increase over their 
working life than that experienced by unmarried males as a whole. Indeed others 
have found that divorced, widowed and separated men earn a premium, but that it 
is smaller in size than the premium of currently married men (Hill, 1979; Bartlett 
and Callahan, 1984).
In section 3.3 I made three sets of predictions about changes to the wage-age 
profiles over time for each of the countries.
i) In terms of the number of years that the average man would have been married I 
argued that Australian and US men would have spent less time married, for a 
given age, in the more recent period. So I predicted that the gaps between all the
74
Preliminary Analysis
wage-age profiles for unmarried and married men would have decreased in size 
over time in both countries.
ii) In terms of the wife’s attachment to the paid labour market I would expect that 
the cross-sectional labour supply of Canadian and US wives would be 
substantially more reflective of the couples’ long-term specialisation commitment 
in the more recent period. Hence, we should observe that the gap between the 
age-wage profiles of married Canadian men and US men should have widened 
over time. But the gap between the profiles of unmarried men and married men 
with working wives should have diminished in size.
iii) In terms of sex based pay discrimination I argued that Australian and US 
wives would have experienced less discrimination in the more recent period. 
Canadian wives would have experienced much the same discrimination in both 
periods and may have experienced more in 1994. Hence, the Australian and US 
gaps between the wage-age profiles of never married men and currently married 
men should have decreased in size over time.
It is difficult to summarise the effects emanating from the three trends into one 
cogent prediction since we have no idea of the relative strengths of the effects 
caused by each of the trends. Assuming that the effect on specialisation, and 
hence wages, of each of the trends is identical in size enables one to add and 
subtract movements in age wage profiles. The only change for Canada should be 
a widening of the gap between the wage-age profiles of married men, and a 
shrinking of the gap between the profiles of unmarried men and married men with 
working wives. In Australia the gaps between each of the wage-age profiles 
should have diminished in size. For American men there should have been no 
change in the gap between the wage-age profiles of married men, but the gap 
between the profiles of unmarried men and married men should have decreased in 
size.
Firstly, consider changes over time in Australia. The Australian gap in the profiles 
of unmarried men and married men seems to have fallen in size, as did the gap 
between the profiles of married men. These observations are consistent with my 
predictions, in terms of the effects of specialisation.
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The Canadian gap between the profiles of unmarried men and married men seems 
to have grown in size, while the profile gap between married men appears to have 
fallen. Both observations are counter to my predictions.
In the USA the gaps between all profiles seem to have increased in size over time. 
I had predicted that the gap between the profiles of married men would have 
increased, while the gap between the profiles of unmarried men and married men 
with working wives would have fallen. So, the predictions based on the effects of 
specialisation were partly met.
The hypothesised trends focus on the amount of specialisation. But there could 
also be cross-country and over-time differences in the return to specialisation 
related human capital. Increases in the return to education and experiences during 
the 1970’s and 1980’s in the USA led Juhn et al. (1993) to hypothesise that the 
driving force behind these changes was an increase in the return to all skills, 
unobserved included. It is possible, for example, that while the amount of 
specialisation undertaken by US men with working wives fell over time, the 
return to specialisation rose enough to outweigh the fall. This possibility is 
investigated in Chapter Five.
Figure 3.15: Wage-age profiles for men by degree of specialisation in 
marriage: Australia 1981
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Figure 3.16: Wage-age profiles for men by degree of specialisation in 
marriage: Australia 1994
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Figure 3.17: Wage-age profiles for men by degree of specialisation in 
marriage: Canada 1981
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Figure 3.18: Wage-age profiles for men by degree of specialisation in 
marriage: Canada 1994
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Figure 3.19: Wage-age profiles for men by degree of specialisation in 
marriage: USA 1979
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Figure 3.20: Wage-age profiles for men by degree of specialisation in 
marriage: USA 1994
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I introduced the data sets to be used in regression analysis in the 
remaining three chapters. I then used raw data from each of the data sets to 
illustrate how the progression of male wages over the male’s working life varied 
with the male’s hypothesised degree of specialisation. The specialisation theory 
suggests that the net increase in a male’s wage over his working life should be 
greatest for men whose wives do not work. Next in size should be the wage 
increase of married males whose wives work with the wage increase of never 
married males being the smallest. This depiction of specialisation was found in 
the data for each country.
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Section 3.2 introduced the surveys behind the LIS data sets and explained the 
samples used in further analysis. Having hypothesised in section 3.3 how 
specialisation might be depicted in age-wage profiles, section 3.4.1 compared 
those predictions with the age-wage profiles of men from Australia 1989, Canada 
1991 and the USA 1991. Section 3.4.2 compared over-time predictions with 
actual profiles for Australia 1981 and 1994, Canada 1981 and 1994 and the USA 
1979 and 1994.
Between country comparison highlighted that the Australian gaps between the 
working life wage increases of men, grouped by their degree of specialisation, 
were the smallest. This finding was expected, in terms of specialisation, since 
Australia exhibits the least amount of sex-based wage discrimination and the 
cross-section labour supply of Australian women is least reflective of their longer- 
term labour supply. The corresponding US gaps were largest although I did not 
predict any difference in size between the Canadian and US gaps.
Over time I observed that the gaps between the working life wage increases of 
men, grouped by their degree of specialisation, decreased in size in Australia. 
This is consistent with my predictions since gender based pay discrimination has 
decreased over time, as has the average length of time spent married.
Over the same time the gap in the working-life wage increased between married 
men with working wives and unmarried men increased in Canada and the USA. 
This finding was inconsistent with my hypothesis that the continuity of the labour 
supply of working wives had increased over time, thus ensuring that the labour 
supply of wives, at any point in time, was more reflective of the longer-term 
specialisation commitment of the couple. Furthermore the extent of sex based pay 
discrimination fell over the same period in the USA, reducing the impetus for 
couples to specialise.
The gap between the working life wage increases of married men with working 
wives and those with non-working wives increased over time in the USA and 
decreased over time in Canada. The US observation was consistent with 
predictions, but the Canadian observation was inconsistent.
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One possible explanation for the counter-intuitive findings for the US and 
Canadian point in time comparison is that this analysis ignores the effect of the 
return to specialisation related human capital. That the US return to specialisation 
related human capital was higher than the Canadian return would explain why the 
US gaps in age-wage profiles were larger. Furthermore, the return to 
specialisation related human capital may have increased over time in the USA and 
decreased over time in Canada, thus explaining the over-time changes in the age- 
wage profiles. I considered these possibilities using more sophisticated empirical 
analysis. My findings are reported in Chapter Five. Before that, in Chapter Four, 
I consider whether controlling for observed human capital has any effect.
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Appendix 3.A: Number of unmarried men working full-time full-year by age 
and country
Age group
A ustra lia*
1981 1994
C anada*
1981 1994
U SA **
1979 1994
20-24 297 107 161 111 156 540
25-29 243 126 181 270 204 1016
30-34 168 116 114 315 154 903
35-39 125 63 87 288 119 819
40-44 79 59 45 261 86 635
45-49 62 41 53 208 66 564
50-54 60 27 55 117 69 345
55-59 81 23 42 84 50 220
60-64 39 9 28 34 26 123
Age group
A ustra lia
2939***
C anada
2991***
U SA
1991***
20-24 124 105 71
25-29 173 184 177
30-34 108 138 118
35-39 63 93 79
40-44 32 51 40
45-49 14 34 34
50-54 17 19 22
55-59 14 16 12
60-64 6 10 5
*Those not currently in a de-jure marriage or in a de-facto relationship.
**Those not currently in a de-jure marriage.
***Those not currently in a de-facto relationship who had never been in a de-jure marriage.
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Appendix 3.B: Marital Status by of Men Working Full-time Full-year by 
Age: Australia 1989, Canada 1991 and the USA 1991
Australia 1989
Age group Currently Never
married married
Canada 1991
Currently Never
married married
USA 1991
Currently Never
Married married
As a percent of all males As a percent of all males As a percent of all males 
in that age group (%)_____ in that age group (%)_____ in that age group (%)
20-24 55.7 44.6 52.4 46.7 66.8 29.8
25-29 72.6 23.8 73.6 24.9 68.0 26.0
30-34 82.8 12.3 87.8 11.8 78.2 14.1
35-39 87.3 7.6 85.7 8.0 82.0 9.1
40-44 88.8 4.2 88.4 4.7 82.3 4.8
45-49 89.2 2.4 89.0 3.5 82.6 5.4
50-54 88.7 3.7 90.4 3.0 85.4 4.6
55-59 86.5 4.4 89.4 3.6 88.9 3.4
60-64 86.2 3.6 87.9 4.8 84.9 2.4
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Appendix 3.C: Marital Status of Men Working Full-time Full-year by Age: 
Australia (1981, 1989), Canada (1981,1991) and USA 
(1974, 1991).
Australia Canada USA
1981 1994 1981 1994 1979 1994
A ge Currently Currently N ever C urrently C urrently N ever Currently C urrently N ever
group m arried m airied m arried m arried m arried m arried m arried M arried m an ied
A s a percen t o f  all m ales A s a percen t o f  all m ales A s a p ercen t o f  all m ales
in that age group (% ) in tha t age group  (% ) in tha t age group  (% )
20-24 51.9 32.3 67.1 61.4 63.5 36.5 63.0 45.8 50.3
25-29 76.5 61.5 35.5 77.5 76.4 22.3 75.4 58.5 35.4
30-34 85.4 74.5 20.4 87.8 83.1 13.8 82.6 73.7 17.0
35-39 87.6 84.3 10.5 89.2 86.1 8.3 84.5 76.5 12.1
40-44 90.0 85.6 5.9 92.5 86.1 6.9 86.4 79.4 7.2
45-49 90.5 90.8 3.6 90.0 87.6 5.3 88.4 79.5 5.3
50-54 90.5 89.7 2.7 90.1 89.7 3.2 87.6 83.3 4.2
55-59 86.2 86.1 5.4 90.9 89.2 2.6 89.5 83.5 3.1
60-64 85.1 85.9 3.1 91.2 89.2 4.8 90.9 83.8 2.8
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Chapter Four
The Male Marriage Premium Revisited
4.1 Introduction
This chapter reports on estimates of cross-country and over-time differences in the 
size of the marriage premium using cross-section data. I used the empirical 
findings of others, summarised in Chapter Two, and the empirical observations 
reported in Chapter Three to guide my construction of a set of hypotheses to be 
tested by empirical analysis. All the data sets described in Chapter Three were 
used in the analysis. Cross-country comparison was undertaken with Australia 
1989, Canada 1991 and the USA 1991. Over-time comparison was made with 
Australia (1981 and 1994), Canada (1981 and 1994) and the USA (1979 and 
1994).
The hypotheses tested by the empirical analysis presented here are listed below. 
Each of the hypotheses has implications for the relevance of sex based 
specialisation within marriage as an explanation for the marriage premium.
• the marriage premium was better described as the return to a quadratic in years 
married than the return to a marital status dummy;
• the return to marriage tended to be lower for men with working wives;
• the return to marriage was only lower for men with working wives if they were 
employed as management; and
• the return to marriage partly reflected the higher wages of fathers.
The empirical analysis involved the estimation of human capital based log wage 
equations, including indicator variables for married men, for men using the OLS 
technique. Once the existence of male marriage premiums was confirmed in each 
of the surveys, I tested the hypotheses by replacing the marital status indicator 
variable with explanatory variables relevant to the hypotheses.
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Section 4.2 details the estimated male marriage premiums of all working men in 
Australia 1989, Canada 1991 and USA 1991, from log hourly wage equations 
controlling for age, ethnicity, location and education. The data sets at these times 
are most comparable. It shows that the most comparable group of men, in terms 
of the marriage premium, are those working full-time full-year.
Focussing on these men, section 4.3 unpacks the wage gap between married and 
unmarried men using the listed hypotheses. Section 4.4 replicates the empirical 
approach of the section 4.3 using comparable data from the most recent and oldest 
data surveys for each country; Australia 1981 and 1994, Canada 1981 and 1994 
and the USA 1979 and 1994.
Conclusions are offered in section 4.5.
4.2 Comparing the Marriage Premiums of Australia 1989, Canada 1991 
and USA 1991
In this section 1 report the estimated male marriage premiums for Australia 1989, 
Canada 1991 and the USA 1991. Although not the most recent LIS data sets for 
each country, they provide the most comparable samples and variables of interest. 
The estimated premiums were constructed from the estimated coefficient from an 
indicator variable set to one for currently married men.
Men included in the samples for estimation were aged 20 to 64 years and worked 
for wages and salaries in the survey week. Self-employed men were excluded 
from the samples, as were men with self-employed wives. Men working in the 
agriculture industry and the husbands of women working in the agriculture 
industry were also excluded. Divorced, widowed and separated men were 
excluded. In terms of marital status, the included men were either currently 
married, living in a de-facto relationship or had never been married.
The dependent variable in the analysis was the log of each man’s hourly wage. As 
well as the indicator variable for currently married men the set of explanatory
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1 2variables included each man’s; age , education, location and ethnicity. Two 
indicator variables, describing attachment to the paid labour market, were also 
included. One was set to one for men who worked part-time in the reference week 
and the other set to one for men who worked full-time in the reference week, but 
did not work full-time for the entire year. A description of these variables appears 
in Appendix 4.A. Descriptive statistics are in Appendix 4.B.
The data sets did not include a measure of the hourly wage. To construct the 
hourly wage for men who worked full-time full-year I divided annual pre-tax 
earnings from wages and salaries by annual hours, basing annual hours on the 
number of hours worked in the reference week. For men who worked part-time in 
the reference week (less than 35 hours per week), or men who worked full-time in 
the reference week, but did not work full-time for the entire year the calculation 
was more complex and the resultant hourly wage less precise .
Regression results summarised in Table 4.1 confirm the existence of the male 
marriage premium in these countries and years. The estimated coefficients on 
age, education, ethnicity and location were as expected. The estimated return to 
age was quadratic and concave in all countries. The estimated return to education
1 The data surveys do not contain measures of labour force experience. Nor do they contain 
measures of years of education. Instead they contain measures of the highest level of education 
attained. I used age to proxy experience, rather than potential years of experience (age - years of 
education - age left school). Since inter-country comparisons are an important part of the analysis
1 considered it more appropriate to use age as a proxy rather than potential experience, given the 
difficulties associated with allocating appropriate years of education to qualification in each 
country. However I have run regressions which allow the return to age to vary with education 
qualification. There was no significant change to the coefficients on the marital status dummy.
2 The demographic controls for where the respondent lived were included to control for regional 
cost of living differences and other possible regional differences (such as discrimination).
3 For men working full-time in the reference week, but who did not work full-time for the entire 
year:
mwge = (inc/((hrshd * weekhdft))
where mwge is the hourly wage, inc is the annual income from wages and salaries, hrshd is the 
number of hours worked in the reference week and weekhdft is the number of weeks worked full­
time in the year relating to the income.
For men working part-time in the reference week:
mwge -  (inc/((hrshd * (52 - weekhdft)) + (35 * weekhdft)))______________________________
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tended to increased with qualifications, and compared with the return received by 
those without secondary education, was largest in the USA. Canadian and US men 
were rewarded financially for living in the largest urban areas, as were Australian 
men living in capital cities. Migrants, in both Canada and Australia, received 
wages significantly below non-migrants. The log wage of black American men 
was substantially lower than that of other men.
In each country, men working part-time in the reference week received 
significantly lower wages than did men working full-time full-year. Men who 
worked full-time in the reference week, but not for the entire year also earned less 
than men working full-time full-year, although this effect was insignificant at the 
ten per cent level in the USA. It is possible that the constructed measure of hourly 
wages under-estimates the true value for part-time workers or men working full­
time part-year. Although the data sets contain measures of annual earnings they 
do not contain measures of annual hours worked and my estimate of annual hours 
may be over-stated.
The estimated marriage premiums4 for Australia, Canada and the USA were 7.7 
per cent, 13.1 per cent and 15.8 per cent respectively. There are three things of 
note regarding these estimated marriage premiums. Firstly their estimated 
significance, sign and relative size are consistent with those of Schoeni (1990). 
For each country, he estimated log annual earnings equations for full and part- 
time waged and salaried workers controlling for age, education, location and full­
time employment for each country. His estimated marital status coefficients 
(between currently married males and never married, divorced, widowed and 
separated males) were 14.6 per cent (Australia, 1981), 15.1 per cent (Canada, 
1981), and 35.8 per cent (USA, 1979).
4 The premiums are calculated thus: - 1.
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Table 4.1: The coefficients from OLS estimation of the log hourly wages of 
currently married and never married men with t-statistics in 
brackets. #
A ustra lia  1989 C anad a 1991 U SA  1991
Constant 1.450 1.253 0.467
(1.300) (13.041) (4.666)
M arried 0.074 0.123 0 .147
(4.208) (5 .727) (6 .564)
Age 0.045 0.054 0.066
(11.343) (11.040) (12.985)
Age squared -4.907E-04 -5.522E-04 -6.478E-04
(-10.298) (-9.536) (-10.670)
Ethnicity -0.071 -0.069 -0.172
(-4.800) (-3.714) (-6.019)
Location 0.042 0.068 0.170
Education
(3.373) (4.973) (10.613)
Tertiary 0.358 0.407 0.642
(20.530) (17.904) (25.467)
Certificate/Diploma 0.204 0.218 0.448
(11.750) (11.212) (13.173)
Post-secondary 0.104 0.135 0.381
(7.030) (4.668) (14.385)
Secondary 0.116 0.133 0.304
(5.906) (6.617) (12.770)
Working full-time, -0.163 -0.112 -0.030
part-year (-7.382) (-5.138) (-1.550)
Working part-time -0.180 -0.625 -0.798
(-6.281) (-22.388) (-24.044)
Adjusted R squared 0.1485 0.1619 0.2889
N° of observations 5294 7480 6118
# The data used for estimation is summarised in Appendix 4.B.
Secondly the male marriage premium was a relatively important explanator of 
male wages. In the Australian regression the marriage premium represented 
nearly twice the addition to the hourly wage that a male would receive from living 
in a capital city. In the USA the return to being married almost corresponded in 
size to the penalty in the hourly wage experienced by black Americans. The 
Canadian marriage premium represented a slightly smaller addition to hourly 
wages than that accruing to a male with secondary education or post-secondary 
education over a male who had not graduated from secondary school.
Thirdly the size of the premium was remarkably consistent across countries when 
account was taken of the relative dispersion in wages. If married men were more 
productive than never married men were; international differences in the degree of 
wage dispersion may reflect differences in the wage structures or return to human
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capital. Variation in wage dispersion tends to be indicative of variations in the 
return to human capital5. Cross-country differences in the return to specialisation 
related human capital are explored further in Chapter Five. In the mean-time one 
measure of the dispersion in wages is the ratio of the standard deviation of the log 
wage to the mean of the log wage. This was 0.17, 0.23 and 0.27 in Australia, 
Canada and the USA respectively. The marriage premiums were re-weighted, 
assuming that this dispersion was caused entirely by international differences in 
the return to human capital, and that the return to marriage related human capital 
and other observed human capital (like eduction) follow the same trends. I 
assumed that the US wage dispersion was evident in Australia and Canada. The 
wage dispersion adjusted marriage premiums were 12.2 per cent, 15.4 per cent 
and 15.8 per cent in Australia, Canada and the USA respectively.
4.3 Unwrapping the Marriage Premium in Australia 1989, Canada 1991 
and USA 1991
Unwrapping the premium differences between countries may help with assessing 
the appropriateness of the specialisation supposition. In this section I summarise 
empirical analysis that considered whether:
• the premium of men working full-time full-year was larger than for men 
working part-time or full-time part year;
• the premium could be explained by years married;
• men with working wives received a lower premium;
• men who worked as managers received a higher premium and were penalised 
more by having a working wife; and
• the size of the premium differed with the presence of dependent children.
5 For example, Blau and Kahn (1996a) found that a significant proportion of cross country 
differences in that part of the male female wage gap apportioned to discrimination could be 
explained by international variations in the degree of wage dispersion due to wage structure.
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In each of the sections relating to these hypotheses I discuss their relationship 
with the specialisation supposition.
I firstly re-estimated the regressions discussed in the previous section, allowing 
the marriage premium to differ with the men’s attachment to the labour market. 
Then I restricted the samples to men who worked full-time for the entire year and 
estimated regressions controlling for the factors relating to the other listed 
hypotheses.
Did part-time workers earn a marriage premium?
Most empirical studies of the male marriage premium have analysed men working 
full-time. But, Schoeni’s (1990) analysis included part-time employees and 
assumed that the part-time premium would not differ from the full-time premium. 
The specialisation hypothesis suggests that the married male has more opportunity 
to invest in wage enhancing human capital and more energy with which to 
undertake his paid work. In terms of time availability it seems that men working 
part-time should receive a lower marriage premium, if one at all. Part-time 
workers would be less time constrained than full-time workers. In terms of 
energy available for work in the paid labour market, it also seems that the 
premium of part-time workers would be smaller. Married men who worked part- 
time would have time to do more tasks within the home and, if they did do more 
work within the home, would have less energy to use in their paid jobs than 
unmarried men working part-time. In addition, studies such as Wellington (1993) 
find that human capital skills appear to be acquired only in full-time positions so it 
would be difficult to make use of specialisation opportunities.
However, if two other explanations for the marriage premium, selection and 
discrimination were in operation part-time workers should receive the same sized 
premium as full-time workers. The selection argument claims that married men 
are more productive before they marry. Discrimination, on the other hand, derives 
from employer behaviour and there is no reason to believe that employers would 
maintain different pay relativities between married and unmarried men on the 
basis of the hours they worked.
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I re-estimated the regressions discussed in section 4.2, allowing the marriage 
premium to vary with the male’s employment status through interaction terms of 
the marital status and employment status dummies. The coefficient estimates 
from this specification appear in the first column of each country table of 
Appendix 4.C. The estimated premiums are reported in Table 4.2. Consistent with 
the above interpretation of the specialisation hypothesis, USA and Australian part- 
time workers do not receive a premium. In fact Australian part-time workers are 
penalised by marriage. However Canadian part-time workers receive the same 
premium as full-time full-year workers. Men working full-time part-year receive 
a substantially lower marriage premium in Canada, the same size premium in the 
USA and a substantially higher premium in Australia.
Table 4.2: Estimated marriage premiums for men grouped by their 
employment status
A u str a lia  198 9 C a n a d a  1991 U S A  1991
W ork in g  fu ll-tim e fu ll-year 7.6 14.7 17.6
W ork in g  part-tim e -13.0 14.7 0.3
W ork in g  fu ll-tim e part-year 20.8 1.9 17.6
However, these results suggests that, as a group men who do not work full-time 
full-year received a lower premium than did men working full-time full-year. I 
excluded part-time workers and those working full-time part-year from the 
remaining analysis and focused on the marriage premium for males working full­
time full-year.
The marriage premium for men working full-time full-year
Column two of each country table in Appendix 4.C summarises the results of OLS 
estimation of the full-time full-year sample including an indicator variable for 
currently married men - specification one. The marriage premiums for males 
working full-time full-year in Australia, Canada and the USA were 8.5 per cent, 
15.3 per cent and 17.1 per cent respectively.
Column three of each country table in Appendix 4.C lists the estimated 
coefficients from specification two, which allowed the age earnings profiles of 
married males and never married males to differ, and included dummy variables 
set to one for married males with working wives.
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Column four of each country table in Appendix 4.C reports the estimated 
coefficients from specification three, which allowed the premium to differ for 
married men by; age, whether their wife worked, whether they had dependent 
children, and whether they were employed as managers. I also tested whether the 
working wife penalty applied differently to managers. In each of the countries 
most of the men with dependent children were married, so I did not include 
dummy variables for all men with dependent children. However I did include a 
dummy variable for all managers. I also tested whether black Americans received 
a smaller premium than other American men.
The estimated premiums6 for each group of married men, calculated from 
specification three, are reported in Table 4.3 for men aged 30 and men aged 45. 
Figures 4.1 to 4.3 illustrate how the premiums evolved over the men’s working 
lives for Australia, Canada and the USA respectively. For men aged 35, the 
premiums were much the same size in each country. However, by age 45, the US 
premiums were by far the largest and the Australian premiums the smallest. This 
suggests that it takes time for the productivity effects to develop, as the 
specialisation hypothesis would have us believe.
Table 4.3: Estimated marriage premiums for men working full-time full-year 
depending on the employment status of wives, the presence of 
dependent children and the man’s occupation (%)*
Australia 1989 Canada 1991 USA 1991
aged 30 Aged 45 aged 30 aged 45 Aged 30 aged 45
With working wives 8.0 12.3 5.6 12.4 7.0 35.6
Managers 21.3 26.1 25.7 33.8 10.5 40.0
With non-working 
wives
8.0 12.3 13.3 20.6 7.0 35.6
With children aged < 6 8.0 12.3 17.0 24.5 7.0 35.6
With children aged 6+ 11.1 15.5 17.6 25.2 7.0 35.6
Managers 21.3 26.1 34.9 43.5 32.3 67.7
* Specification three, Appendix 4. C.
Did the wage-age profile differ by marital status?
In cross-section analysis on US data researchers, such as Schoeni (1990), 
Korenman and Neumark (1991) and Gray (1997), found that the number of years
6 The premiums are calculated from the exponential of the gap in the predicted log wages of 
married and unmarried men, using the estimated coefficients reported in Appendix 4.C. Only 
estimated coefficients significant at the ten per cent level are included in the calculations.________
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that a man has been married, and its square, were more effective controls for 
marital status effects on wages than were marital-status dummies. They found 
that married men experienced faster wage growth than unmarried men over their 
married lives. Such a finding is consistent with the specialisation hypothesis, 
which supposes that married men accrue human capital more rapidly, while 
married, than unmarried men. Men who selected into marriage on the basis of 
high levels of unobserved productivity should not experience productivity growth 
after marriage.
In the LIS data sets there was no measure of time spent married. I proxied the 
differential accrual rates of human capital effect as differential age earnings 
profiles. However I also used age also to proxy work experience. As explained in 
Chapter Three, cross- country comparison of the effects of specialisation will be 
problematic if the relationship between age and the length of marriage varied from 
country to country. In that case the return to age would absorb different 
proportions of the marriage premium in each country. Furthermore, the education 
qualification may well be related to the length of marriage for a given age (via age 
at first marriage or likelihood of divorce and re-marriage). This would be 
problematic if the education mix of males varied between the countries. 
Consequently return to age would absorb varying amounts of the return to 
specialisation depending on the country.
In all countries the estimated wage increment to age proved to be higher for 
married males in specifications two and three. In Australia and Canada it was a 
linear shift. In the USA it was a quadratic shift. These findings are consistent 
with the observations of raw wages discussed in Chapter Three.
Did married men with working wives earn less than did married men with wives 
who did not work?
As I explained in Chapter Two, researchers tend to assume that the amount of 
time the wife spends in the paid labour market is indicative of a couple’s degree 
of specialisation. The more time the wife spends in the paid labour market the 
less specialised is her marriage. Gray (1997), for example, found such a
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relationship between the wives’ labour supply and husbands’ earnings in US 
cross-section data covering the late 1970s and early 1990s.
In all countries the estimated coefficient on the working wife dummy in 
specification two was negative and significant at the ten per cent level. The 
percentage effect on men’s hourly wages was largest in Canada and smallest in 
Australia. The estimated coefficients were -0.022, -0.077 and -0.055 for Australia, 
Canada and the USA respectively. Again these findings are consistent with the 
raw wage observations of Chapter Three.
Figure 4.1: Marriage premiums over the working life: Australia 1989
Premiums (%)
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Figure 4.2: Marriage premiums over the working life: Canada 1991
Premiums (%)
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97
Chapter Four
Figure 4.3: Marriage premiums over the working life: USA 1991
Premiums (%)
175 -
155 -
135 -
115 -
20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53 56 59 62 65
W nw, manager 
W w , manager
Did married men with dependent children earn a larger premium?
Loh (1996) observed that an element of the US marriage premium, he estimated 
using 1990 cross-section data, was related to the presence of dependent children. 
Korenman and Neumark (1991) and Cornwell and Rupert (1997) confirmed this 
finding with US data from the 1970s.
In terms of specialisation the effect of the presence of dependent children is a 
complex issue. Wives’ labour supply, the measure of specialisation used in this 
thesis, depends on the presence of children. Knudsen and Peters (1994) showed, 
for Australia, Canada and the USA, that married mothers were less likely to work 
and worked fewer hours than childless wives did. Mothers with pre-school aged 
children were most likely to withdraw their labour.
Given the difficulties associated with combining employment, especially full-time 
employment, with the responsibility for dependent children, couples might be 
more inclined to specialise when they have children. One sign of increased 
specialisation is a reduction in the hours the wife spends in the paid labour 
market. By only considering couples in which the husband works full-time I do 
not allow for the possibility that the husband reduces his hours significantly in 
response to the arrival of a child. As the wife reduces her hours of paid work she
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might also take more responsibility for other household duties. Under this line of 
argument the presence of children would have no effect on the marriage premium, 
since the specialisation response was absorbed into the wife’s labour supply 
response. However it is also probable that the wife reduces her hours to take on 
the child-care responsibilities, but does not absorb responsibility for the other 
housework. In this case the presence of children would have a negative effect on 
men’s wages.
Consider also the option that the new mother maintains her degree of attachment 
to the paid labour market, in terms of the hours worked, but expends less energy 
on the job as she takes on the prime responsibility for the child. As she does this 
she might also take on more of the other housework. This means that the presence 
of children would have a positive effect on men’s wages. On the other hand, 
given her time constraints the husband might reduce his effort in the paid labour 
market to assist with the new demands of parenthood, so that parenthood had a 
negative effect of men’s wages,
I turn to the data analysis for an answer to which response to parenthood is most 
common. Adding dependent children as a regressor had little effect on the 
relationship between wives’ labour supply and husbands’ wages. In terms of the 
direct effect of children on the marriage premium I found that US men received 
the same premium regardless of the presence of dependent children. However 
Canadian husbands with dependent children earned a larger premium than married 
men without children did. So too did Australian husbands with school aged 
dependent children.
Because the effect of dependent children is nowhere negative it seems that fathers, 
who do not respond to parenthood by moving from full-time to part-time 
employment, do not expend any less energy in the paid labour market than 
married men without dependent children.
Knudsen and Peters (1994) concluded that the effect of dependent children on 
wives’ labour supply was smallest in the USA. Given my finding that dependent 
children have no effect on the US marriage premium, this suggests that wives are 
relatively unlikely to respond to the presence of children by reducing their labour
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supply. Those that maintain their attachment to the paid labour market do not 
tend to take on any more responsibility for other housework. But they take on as 
much of the remaining housework as wives without children.
Canadian and Australian women were more likely to exit the labour market on the 
birth of a child. Furthermore, all Canadian women with children seemed to take 
on more housework than wives without children did. This was also the case for 
Australian women with school-aged children.
Did men working in management jobs1 earn a larger premium?
A small US management theory literature has been researching the relationship 
between wives’ employment status and husband’s wage for men working in 
management (see Jacobsen and Rayack, 1996, for a survey). Some of the 
justifications expounded by these researchers for their observations of a negative 
relationship between husband’s wages and wives’ hours parallel the specialisation 
hypothesis. However they also argue that wives can make direct investment into 
their husbands’ careers. Furthermore, managers are seen to be more able to take 
advantage of specialisation and direct investment from their wives than are men in 
other occupations. This literature has spawned a number of economics based 
studies on whether the relationship between wives’ employment status and 
husband’s earnings is affected by the occupation of the husband.
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) found, in cross-section analysis, of the US PSID for 
the 1984 to 1989 waves that the relationship between wives’ working hours and 
husbands’ hourly earnings was significantly larger for men working as managers. 
Similarly Hotchkiss and Moore (1999), using a cross-section of families from the 
March 1993 US Current Population Survey, found that the negative relationship 
between wives’ hours and husbands’ hourly earnings was roughly three times the 
size of the relationship for non-managers.
I found that Australian managers in general earned more per hour than non­
managers. However Canadian and US men working as managers did not, in
71 use Hotchkiss and Moore’s (1999) definition of management jobs for the USA for consistency.
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) do not provide their definition.________________________________
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general, earn more than non-managers. In all countries the estimated marriage 
premium of managers was larger than the marriage premium of non-managers, but 
non-managers still received a sizeable premium. Canadian men suffered the same 
working wife-penalty, regardless of their occupation. However, in the USA the 
estimated working wife penalty was restricted to managers. Non-managers were 
not penalised by having a working wife. The Australian findings were 
inconclusive. The inclusion of the interaction term between married managers 
and husbands with working wives caused the estimated coefficient on the 
working-wife term to become insignificant at the ten per cent level. But, the 
estimated coefficient on the working wife and married manager interaction term 
was also insignificant at the ten per cent level.
Did black Americans earn a smaller premium?
American studies of the male marriage premium mostly restrict their analysis to 
non-black Americans. Black Americans supposedly receive a lower premium, 
although few studies have proven this. Blackburn and Korenman (1994) estimated 
that the black premium was slightly lower than the white premium over the period 
1976 to 1988. My estimations suggest that black Americans received the same 
size premium as the rest of American men.
Why was the US marriage premium the largest?
The US component premiums for men aged 45 are larger than are the Australian 
and Canadian equivalents. However, for men aged 30 this is not the case. Early 
in their marriages Australian and Canadian men tend to earn premiums larger than 
their US counterparts. It seems that the American premium advantage over 
Australia and Canada evolves over the men’s working and married lives. This 
also supports the specialisation argument.
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4.4 The Marriage Premium Over Time in Australia (1981-1994), 
Canada (1981-1994) and USA (1979-1994)
In this section I report on empirical analysis, identical to that presented in section 
4.3, of two data sets for each country: Australia (1981 and 1989), Canada (1981 
and 1991) and the USA (1974 and 1991). I used consistent samples and control 
variables in both years for each country. However the samples and control 
variables are not consistent across countries. Nor are the time periods; being 
twelve years for Australia8, thirteen years for Canada, and fifteen years for the 
USA. The point of this section is to make over time comparisons of the marriage 
premium within each country. Differences in over-time trends between countries 
may merely reflect differences in the samples used for estimation or in the 
variable definitions. The variable definitions are listed in Appendix 4.A and the 
summary statistics in Appendix 4.D.
Table 4.4 compares the country samples used in estimating log wage equations for 
males working full-time full-year in Canada and the USA and full-time for 
Australia. The American data sets are most close to the ones discussed in the 
previous section. In all countries the samples contain men aged 20 to 64 working 
full-time in the reference week. The Canadian and US samples are restricted to 
men working full-time full-year. Currently married men include men in de-facto 
couples in Australia and Canada. In all countries unmarried men include never 
married men and divorced, widowed and separated men. Research shows that 
divorced, widowed and separated men as a group receive a premium, but that 
premium is smaller than the premium received by currently married men 
(Blackburn and Korenman, 1994).
Loh (1996) noted that the wage rate used affected the size of the estimated 
marriage premium in the 1990 wave of the US NLSY. He found that the estimated 
marriage premium was higher when the wage was calculated as the rate of annual 
earnings to annual hours worked, than if the wage rate was based on hourly wage 
rates calculated from weekly data. This suggests I should be cautious of changes
8 The 1994 earnings data was collected over the calendar year 1994, while the 1981 earnings data
was collected from September to December 1982._________________________________________
102
The Male Marriage Premium Revisited
over time in Canada and the USA because the wage rates in the more recent 
surveys were based on annual earnings but the wage rates in the earlier surveys 
were based on weekly earnings.
Table 4.4: Members of the samples by country and year
Australia 1989 Australia Canada USA
Canada 1991 
USA 1991
1981 1994 1981 1994 1979 1994
V Men aged 20-65 V V V
V Currently married 
includes men in defacto
V V V S
relationships 
Unmarried includes V V S V
divorced, widowed and 
separated
Unmarried includes 
men in defacto 
relationships
V
V Unmarried is never 
married. Divorced, 
widowed and separated 
excluded from analysis
V Men working in 
agriculture excluded
V V V
V Husbands of women 
working in agriculture 
excluded
V V V V
V Self-employed men 
excluded
V V V V
V Husbands of self- 
employed women 
excluded
V S S S
V Working full-time V V S V S V
s Working full-time full- V S S S
year
Hourly wage based on 
weekly earnings* and 
hours worked in that 
week
V V V S
V Hourly wage based on 
annual earnings* and 
annual hours worked
V S
V Controlled for 
education and age
s S V S S V
V Controlled for ethnicity S V
V Controlled for location S V V
* Earnings from wages and salaries
The marriage premiums by country and year
The estimated coefficients from OLS regressions analogous to the three 
specifications discussed in the previous section are recorded in Appendix 4.E.
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Table 4.5 lists the estimated marriage premiums by year and country (first 
specification). The size of the Australian and Canadian premiums decreased 
between the early 1980s and mid 1990s. However the size of the US premium for 
currently married men compared with never married, divorced, widowed and 
separated men remained much the same. Gray (1997) found that the US premium 
for currently married men compared with never married men decreased in size 
from 10.6 per cent in the late 1970s to 5.8 per cent in the early 1990s. He also 
found that the premium for divorced, widowed and separated men was 9.5 percent 
in the late 1970s and only 2.9 per cent in the early 1990s. Unfortunately the wage 
rate measures were not consistent in the two US surveys. This may be the cause 
of my incompatible finding.
Table 4.5: Marriage premiums over time for male wage and salary earners
(% )
Australia Canada USA
_______________________ 1981 1994 1981 1994 1979 1994
Marriage premium 14.9_____ 65_______143______ 83 13.1 14.1
Did the wage-age profile differ by marital status?
In the second specification, the estimated coefficients on age and age squared 
interacted with marriage suggested that married men earned more per year of 
marriage in both time periods in Canada and the USA, and in the first Australian 
time period. The estimated relationships between marriage and age were 
quadratic and concave. There was no evidence of this form of specialisation in 
Australia 1994.
Was there a working wife penalty?
Estimation of the second specification also suggested that there was a working 
wife penalty for both time Canadian and US time periods and the first Australian 
time period, in the second specification. The estimated coefficients on the 
working wife indicator variable are reported in Table 4.6. Gray (1997) found that 
between the late 1970s and the early 1990s the US working wife penalty 
decreased in size. In all countries the working wife penalty decreased in size. In
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fact there was no working wife penalty in Australia 1994. Combined with the 
finding on the wage-age profiles this suggests that there is no evidence of 
specialisation in Australia in the mid-1990s. Between the early 1980s and the 
mid-1990s specialisation has disappeared.
Table 4.6: Estimated coefficients on the indicator variable for working wives 
(specification 2)
Australia Canada USA
1981______ 1994_______ 1981_________ 1994________1979______ 1994
-0.070* -0.020 -0.108* -0.037* -0,112* -0.071*
* significant at 5 per cent level
The estimated premiums for each group of married men (aged 45) calculated from 
the coefficient estimates for specification three, are reported in Table 4.7. Figures 
4.4 to 4.9 show, for each country and time period, the evolution of the premiums 
by age.
Managers received the same working wife penalty as non-managers in Canada in 
both periods. The working wife penalty was more substantial for US managers, 
but non-managers earned a lower premium if their wife worked. I was not able to 
identify managers in the Australia 1981 data set.
Table 4.7: Marriage premiums for men aged 45 (specification 3) (%)
Australia Canada USA
1981 1994 1981 1994 1979 1994
with working wives 10.9 5.8 12.7 6.7 11.2 14.0
managers N/A N/A 12.7 6.7 3.8 22.5
with non-working 
wives
18.5 5.8 25.3 10.0 23.1 19.1
with children aged < 6 18.5 5.8 25.3 10.0 23.1 19.1
with children aged 6+ 18.5 5.8 10.9 10.0 23.1 11.9
managers N/A N/A 25.3 10.0 23.1 49.4
Did married men with dependent children earn a larger premium?
Estimating the relationship between dependent children and the marriage 
premium proved to be problematic for these data sets. Divorced, widowed and 
separated men were included in the unmarried category and US men living in de- 
facto relationships were reported as unmarried. Some of these men had children 
so I included indicator variables for men with dependent children regardless of
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whether they were married, as well as the dependent children indicator variables 
for married men.
The presence of children did not have a significant effect on Australian men’s 
wages in general. Nor did the presence of children affect the size of the marriage 
premium. The same could be said for Canada 1994.
However, in both US data 1979 and US 1994, and Canada 1994, men living with 
dependent children earned significantly more than childless men, if the children 
were aged six or more. It seems that the dependent child dummy has identified 
US men living in de-facto relationships and divorced, separated and widowed 
men. These men should receive a marriage premium.
Logically the marriage premium of men with older dependent children must then 
be adjusted downward. And the effect of older dependent children on the 
marriage premium was negative for men in both US samples and the Canada 1994 
samples. However the size of the negative coefficients on the marriage premium 
for men with older dependent children tended to be smaller than the addition to 
wages received by all men with older dependent children. This could be 
interpreted two ways. Perhaps men with older dependent children were more 
likely to specialise. Or the premiums received by divorced, widowed and 
separated men (and US men living in de-facto relationships) were smaller than the 
premiums received by currently married men.
Data limitations meant that it was not possible to determine over-time changes in 
the effect of dependent children on the male marriage premium. This is 
disappointing because it would have been interesting to see whether couples with 
children have changed the way they arrange their lives. Bianchi (2000) tells us 
that American time-use data show that over time men have been spending more 
time with their children.
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Did men working in management jobs9 earn a larger premium?
I was not able to consider this issue for Australia because the Australia 1981 data 
set did not differentiate managers from other occupations. Canadian and 
American men working in management earned more than other men did in both 
time periods. Managers received larger marriage premiums in Canada 1981 and 
the USA 1994.
In both US data sets the estimation suggests that managers experienced a larger 
working wife penalty than non-managers did. However non-managers also 
experienced a working wife penalty. Canadian married men suffered the same 
working wife penalty regardless of whether they were managers. It is possible 
that my classification of Canadian managers was inappropriate. It would be 
interesting to undertake further analysis to determine whether the managers5 
working wife penalty is only a US phenomenon.
Black Americans and the premium
In both years the estimated premium received by black American men was the 
same size as that received by other American men. These findings suggest that 
the standard approach to remove black Americans from analyses of marriage 
premiums may be uncalled for.
Changes over time?
Recall that Table 4.5 shows that the reduction in the size of the Australian 
marriage premium, for all men, between the 1981 and 1994 data sets was 8.4 
percentage points. Table 4.7 illustrated that for Australian men aged 45 the 
premiums of those with working wives were 5.1 percentage points higher in 1981 
than in 1994. However, men with non-working wives received a premium 12.7 
percentage point higher in the 1981 sample than they did in the 1994 sample. In 
terms of the specialisation hypothesis one could argue that there was a reduction 
in the degree of specialisation amongst all married men, and/or a reduction in the
91 use Hotchkiss and Moore’s (1999) definition of management jobs for the USA for consistency. 
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) do not provide their definition.
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return to specialisation. Furthermore men in the 1994 sample did not benefit from 
the further specialisation opportunities afforded by having wives who do not work 
in the paid labour market. It could be argued that Australian couples in the mid- 
1990s did not undertake any form of specialisation. Not only was there no 
evidence of the working wife penalty, but the age-wage profiles of unmarried men 
were identical to those of married men. However the sample used for estimation 
included divorced, widowed and separated men in the unmarried category. 
Analysis presented in chapters five and six focused on the differences between 
currently married men and never married men.
The Canadian premium, for all men, reduced in size by six percentage points 
between 1981 and 1994. At age 45 the premium for men with working wives was 
six percentage points higher in 1981 than in 1994. However for men without 
working wives the fall in the premium was about 15 percentage points. As in 
Australia, the explanation in terms of the specialisation hypothesis could be that 
married couples undertook less specialisation in 1994 and/or received less return 
on that specialisation. Although couples including wives, who did not work, still 
took advantage of the added opportunity to specialise in 1994 their extra 
specialisation was less marked.
The US marriage premium was much the same size in the 1979 and 1994 data 
sets. I had expected to see a fall in its size, but this effect might have been 
obscured by the fact that the wage measure used in estimation was not consistent, 
and that men in de-facto relationships were included in the unmarried category. 
However, the component premiums for men aged 45 did vary in size. Men with 
working wives received a slightly larger premium in 1994. It is possible that 
married men have increased their intensity of specialisation. However we also 
know that the US return to observed human capital increased over much the same 
time period (Juhn, et al., 1993; Card and Lemieux 1996). Furthermore Gray 
(1997) claims that the return to specialisation related human capital increased over 
the 1980s. In contrast, apart from managers, men whose wives were not working 
received significantly larger premiums in 1979 than they did in 1994. In line with 
the Canadian and Australian conclusions, I argue that couples including non­
working wives were less inclined to specialise.
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Figure 4.4: Marriage premiums over the working life: Australia 1981 and 
1994
Premiums (%)
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Figure 4.5: Marriage premiums over the working life: Canada 1981
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Figure 4.6: Marriage premiums over the working life: Canada 1994
Premiums (%)
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Figure 4.7: Marriage premiums over the working life: USA 1979
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Figure 4.8: Marriage premiums over the working life: USA 1994
Premiums (%)
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented empirical evidence that confirmed the existence of the 
male marriage premium in Australian, Canadian and US cross-section data sets 
ranging from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s. In log hourly wage equations, 
estimated by OLS, currently married men earned more than unmarried men did 
after controlling for age, education, ethnicity and location. Empirical analysis 
reported here suggested that, in general, married men who worked part-time in the 
reference week or full-time in the reference week, but for only part of the year, 
earned a significantly smaller premium than did married men working full-time 
full-year. This finding is inconsistent with the selection into marriage and 
discrimination explanations for the marriage premium.
The bulk of the analysis discussed in this chapter relates to men working full-time 
full-year. However the samples used for Australia 1981 and 1994 include all men 
who worked full-time in the reference week.
Between country comparison was made with the Australia 1989, Canada 1991 and 
US 1979 data sets. These three data sets allowed the most consistent comparison. 
In section 4.3 I reported that the marriage premiums for men working full-time 
full-year in Australia, Canada and the USA were 8.5 per cent, 15.3 per cent and
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17.1 per cent respectively. In specifications which replaced marital status 
dummies with separate age variables for married men and an indicator variable for 
men with working wives I found that, consistent with the specialisation 
hypothesis, human capital appeared to accrue over the course of the marriages. 
The age increment to wage for married men exceeded that of never married men 
in all countries. Furthermore, men with wives who worked in the paid labour 
market received lower premiums than did men with wives who did not work at 
all.
However, when an indicator variable for managers with working wives was added 
to the set of explanatory variables, the US working wife penalty was restricted to 
men who worked as managers. In contrast, Canadian men suffered the same 
working wife penalty regardless of whether they worked as managers. The results 
for Australian men were inconclusive. The estimated coefficient on the indicator 
variable for men with working wives became insignificant at the ten per cent 
level, but the estimated coefficient for managers with working wives was also 
insignificant.
US married men received the same size premium regardless of the presence of 
dependent children. In contrast all Canadian married men with children and 
Australian married men with children aged six or more received a higher 
premium. Couples with children might be more motivated to specialise, 
depending on the ease with which couples can combine paid work with child-care 
and the couples’ preferences regarding the time and effort they spend in their own 
child-care pursuits.
Section 4.4 reported on over-time changes in the marriage premium and its 
components. These comparisons were somewhat thwarted by data comparison 
limitations. My estimations suggest that the size of the Canadian and Australian 
premiums fell over the 1980s by 6 percentage points and 8.4 percentage points 
respectively. However the estimated US premium was much the same size in the 
1979 and 1994 data sets. This finding conflicts with Blackburn and Korenman 
(1994) and Gray (1997) who concluded that the size of the US premium fell over 
a similar period. I put my incongruous findings down to the data limitations,
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although the studies that claim to find a fall in the size of the US premium over 
time are not clear about their own data limitations.
In terms of the specialisation hypothesis, consideration of the component 
premiums led me to conclude that that Canadian and Australian married men were 
in general less specialised in the mid-1990s than they were in the early 1980s 
and/or received a lower return to specialisation related human capital. In all 
countries married men without working wives took less advantage of the 
opportunity to specialise in the 1990s. In the US this could have been 
counterbalanced to some extent by the increased return to specialisation related 
human capital.
But this analysis is based on OLS estimation of cross-section data. Such a 
methodology ignores the potential problems of endogeneity. This problem is 
tackled in Chapters Five and Six, which consider the specialisation hypothesis in 
more detail, focussing on the relationship between the wages of married men and 
the labour force attachment of their wives. Chapter Five also attempts to isolate 
the effects of the amount of specialisation from the return to that specialisation.
It was disappointing that, because of data limitations, I was unable to empirically 
observe over-time changes in the effect of children on men’s earnings. However, 
the analysis presented in Chapter Six analyses separately couples with dependent 
children and couples without.
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Appendix 4A: Variable Definitions
Australia Canada USA
1981 1994 1981 1994 1979 1994
Hourly Wage Current weekly earnings Current Annual Current Annual
from wages and salaries / weekly earnings weekly earnings
current weekly hours earnings from earnings from
from wages and from wages and
wages salaries / wages and salaries /
and annual salaries / annual
salaries / hours current hours
current weekly
weekly hours
hours
Binary
variables = 1
if-11.
Wife working Worked in reference Worked in reference Worked in reference
week week week
Education
Tertiary Bachelors Bachelors Bachelors degree at 15 + years Bachelors
degree at degree at least of degree at
least. least schooling least
Certificate/ Certificate, Diploma Trade certificate, N/A Associate
Diploma diploma diploma degree
Post- Trade Vocational Some post-secondary 13-14 Some
Secondary certificate qualification years of college
schooling
Secondary Higher N/A 11-13 years of 12 years High
school schooling of school
certificate schooling diploma
Location
NSW New South Wales
Vic Victoria
Qld Queensland
WA West Australia
SA South Australia
Tas Tasmania
Urban Large Urban Central city/ City of 2.5
urban area of metropolitan million +
area 100 000+ population
population
Ethnicity N/A N/A Black Americans
Kid <6 Dependent children aged Dependent children Dependent children
less than 6 aged less than 6 aged less than 6
Kid 6+ Dependent children aged Dependent children Dependent children
6 or more aged 6 or more aged 6 or more
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A u str a lia  1 9 8 9 C a n a d a  1991 U S A  1991
H ourly  w age A nnual earn ings from A nnual earn ings from A nnual earnings from
w ages and salaries / w ages and salaries / w ages and salaries /
annual hours annual hours annual hours
E ducation
T ertia ry B achelo rs degree at B achelo rs degree at B achelors degree at
least least least
C ertifica te/D ip lom a C ertifica te/ d ip lom a T rade certificate, 
d ip lom a
A ssociate  degree
P ost-secondary T rade certificate Som e post-secondary Som e college
S econdary H igher School 
C ertificate
11-13 years o f  
S chooling
H igh  school d ip lom a
L ocation C apital city C ity  o f  100 000+ C ity o f  2.5 + m illion
E thn ic ity M igran t, no t from  
U K
Spoken  language is 
no t F rench  or E nglish
B lacks
Part-tim e W orked  part-tim e in W orked  part-tim e in W orked  part-tim e in
reference w eek reference w eek reference w eek
Fu ll-tim e p art-yea r W orked  fu ll-tim e in W orking  fu ll-tim e in W orking  fu ll-tim e in
reference  w eek, but reference w eek, bu t reference w eek, but
no t fo r entire year no t for entire year no t fo r entire year
W ife w ork ing W orked  in reference W orked  in reference W orked  in reference
w eek w eek w eek
K id <6 D ependen t children D ependen t ch ild ren D ependen t children
aged  less than  6 aged  less th an  6 aged  less than  6
K id 6+ D ependen t ch ild ren D ependen t ch ild ren D ependen t children
aged 6-16 aged 6-16 aged 6-16
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Appendix 4B: Characteristics of currently married and never married 
employed men -  Australia 1989, Canada 1991, USA 1991
i) All who worked in reference week
A ustra lia  1989 C anad a 1991 U SA  1991
P ropo rtion  o f P ropo rtion  o f P rop o rtio n  o f
sam ple (% ) sam ple (% ) sam ple (% )
M arried 86.4 88.1 85.5
W ork ing  part-tim e 3.0 4.5 3.5
W ork ing  fu ll-tim e part year 4.8 8.4 15.0
A ge 38.8 39.7 39.2
(10.6) (10.3) (10 .9)
E thn ic ity 17.8 14.9 7.2
L ocation 69.5 41 .4 31.8
E ducation
T ertiary 16.2 16.1 26.1
C ertifica te/D ip lom a 15.9 31.7 7.4
Post-secondary 27.2 7.3 18.6
Secondary 11.5 26.8 34.4
W ork ing  part-tim e 4.0 5.8 5.5
W ork ing  fu ll-tim e part year 7.0 10.2 18.4
L og w age 2.59 2.71 2.47
(0 .44) (0 .61) (0 .68)
N u m b er o f  observations 5294 7480 6118
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ii) Those w orking full-tim e in reference w eek and full-tim e for at least 48 
w eeks o f  preceding year
A u str a lia  1 9 8 9 C a n a d a  1991 U S A  1991
P ropo rtion  o f P roportion  o f P roportion  o f
sam ple (% ) sam ple (% ) sam ple (%)
M arried 88.3 89.7 88.0
A ge 35.4 36.8 35.8
(16.0) (15.5) (16.4)
W ife w ork ing 55.3 61.1 65.6
M anager 11.1 17.5 10.2
W ife  w ork ing  and m anager 7.2 12.4 7.4
K id  <6 26.6 24.5 26.3
K id  6+ 28.7 30.7 27.2
B lack 5.6
A ge 39.0 40.2 39.8
(10.4) (9.9) (10.5)
E thn ic ity 17.3 14.8 7.0
L ocation 69.7 42.2 32.8
E duca tion
T ertia ry 16.2 17.1 28.6
C ertifica te /D ip lom a 16.3 31.9 8.0
P ost-secondary 20.0 7.1 18.2
1 1 8 11.4 27.0 34.2
S econdary
M anager 11.9 19.1 11.2
K id  <6 26.6 24.6 26.5
K id  6+ 28.8 30.7 27.4
L og w age 2.62 2.78 2.56
(0 .39) (0.54) (0.56)
N u m b er o f  observations 4712 6284 4656
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Appendix 4.C: The coefficients from OLS estimation of the hourly wages of 
currently married and never married men with t-statistics in 
brackets -  Australia 1989, Canada 1991, USA 1991
Australia 1989 Menworking Men working full-time full-year
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Constant 1.466 1.570 1.627 1.739
(19.072) (21.307) (21.725) (21.890)
Married 0.073 0.082
(3.815) (4.758)
Working part-time in -0.212
reference week (-3.237)
Working full-time in 0.116
reference week, but not for (2.381)
entire year
Age 3.256E-03 2.580E-03
(5.908) (4.122)
Wife working -0.022 -0.019
(-1.953) (-1.485)
Kid <6 0.001
(0.067)
Kid 6+ 0.028
(1.902)
Manager 0.116
(1.732)
Manager and wife working -0.053
(-1.554)
Age 0.044 0.039 0.037 0.032
(11.112) (10.141) (9.647) (7.522)
Age squared -4.789E-04 -4.197 -4.401E-04 -3.719E-04
(-10.047) (-9.140) (-9.649) (-7.285)
Migrant -0.071 -0.082 -0.083 -0.070
(-4.789) (-5.866) (-5.943) (-5.031)
Education
Tertiary 0.360 0.369 0.371 0.353
(20.655) (22.306) (22.428) (21.500)
Certificate/Diploma 0.203 0.199 0.200 0.190
(11.729) (12.285) (12.350) (11.854)
Trade 0.106 0.108 0.108 0.116
(7.122) (7.774) (7.771) (8.422)
Secondary 0.116 0.110 0.111 0.098
(5.909) (5.906) (5.996) (5.354)
Capital 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.032
(3.332) (3.447) (3.534) (2.775)
Working part-time in -0.024
reference week (-0.414)
Working full-time in -0.243
reference week, but not for
entire year
Manager
(-5.888)
0.106
(1.738)
Adjusted R squared 0.1510 0.1495 0.1516 0.1744
N° of observations 5294 4712 4712 4712
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Canada 1991 Menworking Men working full-time full-year 
Spec. 1______ Spec. 2_______Spec. 3
Constant
Married
Working part-time
Working full-time in 
reference week, but not for 
entire year 
Age
Age squared 
Wife working
Kid <6
Kid 6 +
Manager
Manager and wife working 
Age
Age squared
Migrant
Education
Tertiary
Certificate/Diploma
Post-secondary
Secondary
Urban
Working part-time
Working full-time in 
reference week, but not for 
entire year 
Manager
Adjusted R squared 
N° of observations
1.233 1.264
(12.680) (12.477)
0.137 0.142
(5 .688 ) (6 .33 6 )
0.027
(0.404)
-0.118
(-2.052)
0.054 0.051
(11.111) (10.032)
-5.573E-04 -5.197E-04
(-9.614) (-8.582)
-0.070 -0.087
(-3.756) (-4.628)
0.406 0.436
(17.879) (19.146)
0.216 0.225
(11.143) (11.336)
0.134 0.169
(4.644) (5.761)
0.132 0.141
(6.571) (6.846)
0.068 0.080
(4.990) (5.885)
-0.644
(-10.819)
-0.013
(-0.252)
0.1622 0.1093
7480 6284
1.327 1.415
(12.934) (12.900)
5.594E-03 4.158E-03
(8.100) (5.241)
-0.077 -0.070
(-5.223) (-4.308)
0.032
(1.692)
0.037
(2.115)
0.174
(2.742)
-0.034
(-0.901)
0.052 0.047
(9.996) (8.427)
-5.886E-04 -5.168E-04
(-9.745) (-7.733)
-0.091 -0.090
(-4.847) (-4.779)
0.444 0.422
(19.513) (18.156)
0.231 0.220
(11.650) (11.009)
0.177 0.163
(6.025) (5.534)
0.147 0.137
(7.173) (6.654)
0.083 0.081
(6.086) (5.988)
-0.066
(-1.186)
0.1134 0.1170
6284 6284
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U S A  1991
M en
w orking M en  w ork ing  fu ll-tim e fu ll-year
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
C onstan t 0.455 0.298 0.323 0.291
(4.504) (2 .926) (3 .058) (2 .655)
M arried 0.162 0.158
(6.045) (6 .890)
W ork ing  part-tim e -0.159
(-2.277)
W ork ing  fu ll-tim e in 0.007
reference  w eek, b u t no t for (0 .131)
en tire year
A ge -3 .985E -03 -6 .731E -03
(-1 .540) (-2 .394)
A ge squared 2 .66E -04 3 .001E -04
(4 .330) (4 .732)
W ife w ork ing -0 .055 -0 .027
(-3 .149) (-1 .442)
K id < 6 0 .019
(0 .913)
K id 6+ -0 .006
(-0 .297)
M anager 0 .212
(2 .427)
M anager and w ife  w orking -0 .180
(-3 .424)
B lack 0.093
(1 .328)
A ge 0.066 0.074 0.085 0.088
(12.976) (14 .224) (13 .660) (13 .572)
A ge squared -6 .463E -04 -7 .371E -04 -1 .077 -1 .1 10E-03
(-10.647) (-11 .954) (-11 .618) (-11 .670)
B lack -0 .170 -0 .154 -0 .148 -0 .219
(-5 .953) (-5 .532) (-5 .325) (-3 .443)
E ducation
T ertiary 0.640 0.652 0.651 0 .614
(25.361) (25 .601) (25 .675) (23 .963)
C ertifica te /D ip lom a 0.445 0.462 0 .462 0 .448
(13.096) (13 .942) (13 .996) (13 .653)
P ost-secondary 0.379 0.413 0 .414 0 .399
(14.270) (15 .194) (15 .286) (14 .735)
S econdary 0.303 0.305 0.305 0 .299
(12.708) (12 .384) (12 .435) (12 .214)
U rban 0.170 0.162 0.159 0 .155
(10.618) (10 .651) (10 .500) (10 .248)
W ork ing  part-tim e -0.694
(-12.152)
W ork ing  fu ll-tim e in -0.035
reference  w eek , b u t no t for (-0.746)
en tire  year 
M anager 0 .092
(1 .256)
A djusted  R  squared 0.2893 0.2627 0.2711 0 .2807
N° o f  observations 6118 4656 4656 4656
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Appendix 4.D: Characteristics of currently married and unmarried
employed men -  Australia (1981,1994), Canada (1982, 1994), 
USA (1979,1991)
A u str a lia C a n a d a U S A
P ropo rtion  o f  sam ple P ropo rtion  o f  sam ple P roportion  o f  sam ple
(% ) (% ) (% )
1994 1981 1994 1981 1994 1979
M arried 78.8 82.8 84.8 85.8 74.6 82.8
W ife 48.9 40.0 59.5 54.1 56.6 53.2
w ork ing
W ife N /A N /A 12.1 7.4 6.6 9.9
w ork ing  and
m anager
K id < 6 23.0 25.2 23.5 29.8 23.1 22.5
K id 6+ 24.4 30.1 28.4 27.0 23.9 31.4
M anager N /A N /A 16.5 11.7 9.2 15.2
B lack N /A N /A N /A N /A 4.8 4.9
A m erican
A ge 32.5 33.1 34.8 34.7 30.8 33.6
(18.9) (18.1) (17.1) (17.6) (19.9) (18.5)
A ge 39.8 38.9 41 .6 39.6 40.1 39.7
(10.1) (11.4) (9.6) (11.5) (10.3) (11.5)
E thn ic ity N /A N /A N /A N /A 7.4 6.7
L ocation 58.3 42.6 34.9 22.0
N SW 24.4
V ic 21.1 20.8
Q ld 18.2 16.8
W A 10.5 14.6
SA 14.3 13.0
T as 6.8 6.7
E ducation
T ertiary 18.3 10.9 20 .0 14.1 30.6 41.4
C ertifica te/ 10.9 15.3 33.7 11.7 8.3 N /A
D ip lom a
Post- 28.9 28.8 7.2 8.7 18.5 40.8
secondary
S econdary N /A 11.6 25.7 22.0 31.1 3.8
K ids < 6 23.1 25.4 23.7 30.1 24.1 22.8
K ids 6+ 25.1 30.8 29.5 27.9 25.5 32.5
M anager N /A N /A 19.1 13.2 11.5 17.6
L og w age 2.72 2.05 2.87 2.33 2.64 2.03
(0.44) (0.46) (0 .51) (0.48) (0.61) (0.50)
N u m b er o f  
observa tions
2688 6726 11 062 5390 20 353 5420
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Appendix 4.E.: The coefficients from OLS estimation of the hourly wages of 
currently married and never married men with t-statistics in 
brackets -Australia (1981, 1994), Canada (1981, 1994), USA 
(1979, 1994)
A ustra lia  1981
Spec. 1
W ork ing  fu ll-tim e 
Spec. 2 Spec. 3
C onstan t 0.937 1.061 1.108
M arried
(13 .066)
0.139
(9 .631)
(14 .389) (14 .263)
A ge 1.012E-02
(7 .129)
1.092
(6 .651)
A ge squared -1 .354E -04
(-4 .430)
-1 .513E -04
(-4 .550)
W ife w ork ing  
K id  <6 
K id  6+
-0 .070
(-6 .059)
-0 .076
(-6 .279)
0.061
(0 .502)
-0 .002
(-0 .037)
A ge 0.046 0.038 0 .036
(13 .182) (9 .861) (8 .635)
A ge squared -4 .985E -04 -4 .02E -04 -3 .697E -04
E ducation
(-11 .964) (-7 .633) (-8 .678)
T ertiary 0.385 0.392 0.394
(20 .818) (21 .204) (21 .292)
C ertifica te/D ip lom a 0.238 0.240 0.241
(14 .676) (14 .820) (14 .866)
T rade 0.058 0 .059 0.059
(4 .401) (4 .426) (4 .436)
Secondary 0 .116 0 .120 0.123
(6 .392) (6 .622) (6 .728)
N SW -0.022 -0 .026 -0.025
(-0 .741) (-0 .880) (-0 .858)
V ic -0 .080 -0 .084 -0 .084
(-2 .716) (-2 .846) (-2 .854)
Q ld -0 .104 -0 .110 - 0.111
(-3 .453) (-3 .676) (-3 .698)
W A -0.043 -0.048 -0.048
(-1 .411) (-1 .584) (-1 .577)
SA -0.123 -0 .126 -0 .126
(-4 .004) (-4 .103) (-4 .103)
T as -0 .046 -0 .054 -0 .054
K id  < 6  
K id  6+
(-1 .352) (-1 .598) (-1 .584)
-0.081
(-0 .682)
0 .019
(0 .300)
A djusted  R squared 0 .1397 0.1437 0 .1440
N° o f  observa tions 6726 6726 6726
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Australia 1994 Working full-time in reference week
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Constant 1.911 1.906 1.957
(15.433) (15.387) (14.850)
Married 0.063 0.075 0.056
(2.966) (3.114) (1.926)
Wife working -0.020 -0.014
(-1.065) (-0.735)
Kid <6 0.031
(1.244)
Kid 6+ -0.015
(-0.150)
Age 0.036 0.036 0.033
(5.667) (5.714) (4.853)
Age squared -4.048E-04 -4.092E-04 -3.673E-04
(-5.299) (-5.348) (-4.424)
Education
Tertiary 0.340 0.341 0.340
(15.013) (15.035) (14.936)
Certificate/Diploma 0.150 0.151 0.150
(5.477) (5.492) (5.489)
Post-secondary 0.020 0.021 0.021
(1.045) (1.065) (1.069)
NSW -0.023 -0.025 -0.025
(-0.672) (-0.733) (-0.729)
Vic -0.064 -0.066 -0.067
(-1.856) (-1.916) (-1.940)
Qld -0.100 -0.102 -0.102
(-2.854) (-2.909) (-2.905)
WA -0.089 -0.091 -0.090
(-2.306) (-2.342) (-2.316)
SA -0.082 -0.084 -0.084
(-2.245) (-2.300) (-2.289)
Tas -0.080 -0.082 -0.081
(-1.864) (-1.915) (-1.888)
Kid 6+ 0.040
(0.402)
Adjusted R squared 0.1170 0.1171 0.1167
N° of observations 2688 2688 2688
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C anada 1981 W ork ing  fu ll-tim e full year
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
C onstan t 1.172 1.310 1.467
(14 .373) (15 .649) (16 .301)
M arried 0.134
(7 .360)
A ge 9.447E -03 1.023E-02
(5 .065) (4 .796)
A ge squared -9 .37E -05 -1 .11E -04
(-2 .355) (-2 .592)
W ife w ork ing -0 .108 -0 .106
(-7 .735) (-6 .963)
K id  <6 -0.101
(-0 .850)
K id  6+ -0.122
(-1 .727)
M anager 0.032
(0 .502)
m anager and  w ife  w orking -0.031
(-0 .774)
A ge 0.042 0.036 0 .027
(10 .023) (7 .446) (5 .232)
A ge squared -4 .493E -04 -3 .987E -04 -2 .993E -04
(-9 .065) (-6 .083) (-4 .310)
E duca tion
T ertiary 0.391 0.398 0 .367
(20 .117) (20 .696) (18 .659)
C ertifica te/D ip lom a 0.181 0.183 0.168
(8 .792) (8 .957) (8 .175)
P ost secondary 0.153 0.160 0 .142
(6 .562) (6 .912) (6 .090)
S econdary 0.144 0.148 0.135
(8 .755) (8 .986) (8 .205)
U rban 0.077
(6 .073)
M anager 0.139
(2 .546)
K id  < 6 0 .090
(0 .766)
K id  6 + 0.159
(2 .299)
A djusted  R squared 0 .1167 0.1265 0.1378
N° o f  observations 5390 5390 5390
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C anad a 1994 W orking  fu ll-tim e full year 
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
C o n s tan t 0.866 0 .937 1.007
M arried
(11.653)
0.080
(6 .350)
(12 .480) (12 .671)
A ge 6 .1 16E-03 5.172E-03
(3 .119)
A ge squared (-8 .14E -05
(-2 .485)
-6 .78E -05
(-1 .965)
W ife w ork ing  
K id  < 6  
K id  6+ 
M anager
M an ag er and w ife w ork ing
-0 .037
(-3 .470)
-0 .030
(-2 .531)
-0.153
(-1 .396)
-0 .036
(-0 .753)
0.040
(1 .036)
-0.037
(-1 .360)
A ge 0.075 0.070 0.067
(20.418) (17 .456) (15 .685)
A ge squared -7 .603E -04 -7 .037E -04 -6 .645E -04
E duca tion
(-17.515) (-12.909) (-11.695)
T ertia ry 0.412 0.415 0.389
(25.464) (25 .623) (23 .470)
C ertifica te/D ip lom a 0.221 0.223 0.211
(14 .937) (15 .056) (14 .232)
P ost secondary 0.179 0.183 0.166
(8 .499) (8 .656) (7 .808)
S econdary 0 .120 0.122 0.112
(7.762) (7 .893) (7 .234)
U rban 0.058 0.059 0.058
M an ag e r 
K id  <6 
K id  6+
(6.270) (6 .442) (6 .328)
0.074
(2.437)
0.168
(1 .548)
0.062
(1 .361)
A d ju sted  R squared 0.1434 0.1443 0.1486
N ° o f  observa tions 11 062 11 062 11 062
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U SA  1979 W ork ing  fu ll-tim e fu ll-year 
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
C onstan t 0.363 0 .510 0.610
(4 .394) (6 .082) (6 .729)
M arried 0.123
(7 .293)
A ge 9.860E -03 9.237E -03
(5 .516) (4 .399)
A ge squared -1 .106E -04 -1 .025E -04
(-2 .883) (-2 .445)
W ife w ork ing -0 .112 -0 .102
(-7 .886) (-6 .407)
K id  <6 0.073
(0 .632)
K id  6+ -0.098
(-1 .557)
M anager 0.052
(0 .997)
M anager and w ife w orking -0 .069
(-1 .888)
B lack -0 .014
(-0 .253)
A ge 0.056 0.049 0 .044
(13 .584) (10 .499) (8 .703)
A ge squared -5 .583E -04 -4 .839E -04 -4 .293E -04
(-11.297) (-7 .588) (-6 .348)
B lack -0.158 -0.149 -0 .133
(-6 .236) (-5 .904) (-2 .750)
E ducation
T ertiary 0.461 0.465 0.445
(23 .449) (23 .754) (22 .416)
Post-secondary 0.292 0.298 0 .286
(14 .938) (15 .309) (14 .697)
Secondary 0.117 0.113 0 .109
(3 .245) (3 .165) (3 .070)
U rban -0 .034 -0 .034 -0.031
(-2 .247) (-2 .242) (-2 .038)
M anager 0.091
(2 .123)
K id  <6 -0.073
(-0 .641)
K id 6+ 0.132
(2 .153)
A djusted  R  squared 0.1781 0 .1874 0.1933
N° o f  observa tions 5420 5420 5420
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U SA  1994 W orking  fu ll-tim e fu ll-year
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
C o nstan t 0.350 0 .430 0.434
(6.511) (7 .779) (7.609)
M arried 0.132
(15.343)
A ge 7.695E-03 6.369E-03
(7 .486) (5.305)
A ge squared -6 .97E -05 -5.57E -05
(-3 .218) (-2.353)
W ife w ork ing -0.071 -0.044
(-7 .135) (-4.156)
K id <6 -0.013
(-0.349)
K id 6+ -0.063
(-1 .999)
M anager 0.226
(6.500)
W ife  w ork ing  and m anager -0.154
(-5.380)
B lack 0.002
(0.061)
A ge 0.075 0.071 0.071
(27.700) (23 .907) (23.907)
A ge squared -7 .321E -04 -7 .129E -04 -7 .194E -04
(-22.826) (-18 .090) (-17.771)
B lack -0.152 -0 .149 -0.143
(-10.881) (-10 .699) (-6 .059)
E d u ca tio n
T ertiary 0.705 0.711 0.675
(54.067) (54 .414) (51.123)
C ertifica te/D ip lom a 0.473 0.481 0.464
(27.877) (28 .307) (27.427)
P ost-secondary 0.386 0.393 0.377
(27.416) (27 .889) (26.837)
S econdary 0.292 0.298 0.288
(22.563) (23 .016) (23.330)
U rban 0.135 0.132 0.128
(17.524) (17 .103) (16.712)
M an ag e r 0.095
(3.848)
K id  <6 0.015
(0.414)
K id  6+ 0.056
(1.872)
A d ju s ted  R squared 0.2668 0.2688 0.2793
N ° o f  observa tions 20 353 20 353 20 353
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Decomposing the Dynamics of Cross-country 
Differences in the Size of the Male Marriage
Premium
5.1 Introduction
The empirical analysis discussed in this chapter further examines the 
appropriateness of specialisation as an explanation of the male marriage premium 
by decomposing the dynamics of cross-country and over-time differences in the 
size of the male marriage premium. The decomposition technique allows me to 
differentiate the holdings of specialisation related human capital from the return to 
that human capital. This chapter uses test of consistency as I use cross-section 
data from Australia (1990 and 1994), Canada (1991 and 1994) and the USA (1991 
and 1994). Specialisation is proxied by the wife’s degree of attachment to the paid 
labour market.
Schoeni (1990) estimated that the US male marriage premium was significantly 
larger than both the Canadian and Australian premiums. Analysis presented in 
Chapter Four supports his findings. Subsequently Blackburn and Korenman 
(1994) and Gray (1997) established that the size of the US premium has been 
decreasing since the late 1960s. In this chapter I determine the cross-country 
differences in the sizes of the marriage premium around 1990 and in 1994, rather 
than differences between the early 1980s and 1994, for two main reasons. The 
two most recent waves of data are more comparable. Furthermore cross-section 
analysis cannot control for changes in the selection into marriage process. Gray 
(1997) claims to have found that the selection process changed dramatically 
between the late 1970s and the early 1990s.
Firstly I estimated disaggregated marriage premiums for each country and year, 
depending on the employment status of the wife (not working, working part-time, 
working full-time) to see whether the marriage premium varied with the perceived 
degree of specialisation. A finding that the premiums varied statistically in size
129
Chapter Five
and that the size of the premiums increased with the degree of specialisation 
supports the specialisation hypothesis. In so doing I acknowledged the 
possibilities that the wife’s employment status might be correlated with 
characteristics of her husband, unrelated to specialisation, that were negatively 
correlated with his wage and that as the husband’s wage increased his wife might 
spend less time working in the paid labour market. Estimation using the 
instrumental variables technique enabled me to disentangle these influences from 
the effect of specialisation on men’s earnings.
Secondly, for each country and time period, I decomposed the variation in average 
wages amongst married men using never married men as the point of comparison. 
Married were grouped according to the degree of specialisation - wife working 
full-time; wife working part-time; and wife not working. Based on the Juhn et al. 
(1991; 1993) decomposition technique, I used the estimated coefficients from a 
human capital wage equation for never married males to construct a set of errors 
in estimation for each group of married men. If specialisation was the key to 
differences in the wage outcomes between married and unmarried males, the 
extent of specialisation should be captured in those error terms. The 
decomposition technique allowed me to apportion differences in the groups’ 
errors to differences in the groups’ holdings of unobserved (or specialisation 
related) human capital and differences in the return to specialisation1. Using this 
technique cross country comparison of the errors for, married men with wives 
working full-time, for example, shows us how much of the cross-country 
difference is attributable to specialisation and how much to the return to that 
specialisation. This technique allowed me to compare movements over time in 
the cross-national gaps in the size of the disaggregated premiums with movements 
in the relative holdings of, and return to, specialisation related human capital.
The next section (section 5.2) explains the methodological approach. In section
5.3 I detail the data used in my analysis and describe the variables used. Section
5.4 outlines the empirical findings regarding cross-country and over time 
variations in the sizes of the male marriage premium (between currently married
1 In contrast Gray (1997) assumed that the extent of specialisation at any hour of wives’ labour 
supply remained constant over time. He measured the change in the return to specialisation over 
time by the change in the return to wives’ labour supply.
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and never-married males). It then reports estimates of the disaggregated male 
marriage premiums (wife not working, wife working part-time and wife working 
full-time). It also presents the results of Juhn et al. decompositions of the wage 
gaps between unmarried men and married men (grouped by the exogenous labour 
supply of the wives) and discusses their implications for specialisation. 
Conclusions are offered in section 5.5. It is suggested that specialisation can 
satisfactorily explain the dynamics of the US marriage premiums and partly 
explain the Australian-US dynamics. However it has little to say about the 
Canadian-US dynamics.
5.2 Empirical Methodology
A number of studies have documented the falling size of the US male marriage 
premium between the late 1970s and early 1990s (Blackburn and Korenman, 
1994; Gray, 1997; Loh 1996). But, as I discussed in Chapter Two, there has been 
no agreement amongst these researchers as to the cause of the fall. Blackburn and 
Korenman (1994) claimed that neither specialisation nor selection played 
significant roles in the fall. As Gray (1997) argued, it is easy to be critical of their 
analysis because they did not attempt to correct for potential changes over time in 
the patterns of correlation between unobservable characteristics related to men’s 
wages and the propensity to marry, years married and the degree of specialisation. 
However the results of analyses of longitudinal data, which claim to be better 
placed to control for the unobservable characteristics, have not been in agreement. 
Gray (1997) claims to have found that declining specialisation caused the falling 
premium2. In fact he argued that, while there was evidence that specialisation 
related human capital was a part of the wages of married men in the late 1970s, it 
was not in the early 1990s. Both Blackburn and Korenman (1994) and Gray
2 Gray (1997) concluded that between the late 1970s and early 1990s years married became 
positively correlated with unobserved characteristics affecting men’s wages. In the space of a little 
over a decade years of marriage switched from being a proxy for men’s specialisation related 
human capital to men’s fixed unobserved wage earning ability. He did not offer any explanation 
as to why this remarkable change occurred. In fact he also claimed that the returns to specialisation 
increased over the same period.
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(1997) argued that that the return to specialisation increased, at least over the 
1970s, because they found that the return to each year of marriage increased3.
My cross-section analysis, that accounts for endogeneity of the wives’ labour 
supply, is able to estimate the effect of wives’ hours on husbands’ wages 
excluding the following influence - the direct effect of husbands’ wages on wives’ 
hours and any correlation between unobserved factors and wives’ hours and 
husbands’ wages4. However, as Gray (1997) argues, IV estimation of cross- 
section data at different points in time will be contaminated by any changes in the 
process of selection into marriage. In my analysis I do not think it is a problem, 
since I compare cross-section data with four to five years difference. Gray (1997) 
compared longitudinal data from the late 1970s with the early 1990s.
The wives’ labour supply may be endogenous in the husbands’ wage equation. If 
it is endogenous the OLS estimates of the effect of the wives’ degree of 
attachment to the paid labour market on husband’s earnings are biased and 
inconsistent. For example, as the husbands’ wages increase there is less financial 
incentive, from a household perspective, for the wives to work. If the wives 
respond to this financial incentive, unexplained movements in the husband’s wage 
feed through to the wife’s labour supply. The OLS procedure assigns in error, 
some of the disturbance-generated variation in the dependent variable to the 
wives’ employment status. In this instance any observed negative relationship 
between the wives’ employment status and the husband’s wage would be 
overstated. There may also be something unobserved that is related to both the 
husbands’ wage and the wives’ employment status, for example unobserved. It is 
possible that people couple on the basis of unobserved ability or desire for a 
career. Positive assortative mating would show up as a positive relationship 
between the unexplained portion of the husband’s wage and the wife’s labour
3 Blackburn and Korenman (1994) appeared keen to find an increase in the return to specialisation 
related human capital, since the returns to other forms of human capital investments increased over 
the same period (Juhn, et a i, 1993; Card and Lemieux 1996). This could also reflect increased 
specialisation per year of marriage or changes in the marriage partner selection process.
4Gray (1997) claims that instrumenting wives’ hours will also wash out the effect of any 
measurement (of specialisation) error so that the effect of wives’ hours on husbands’ wage reflects 
the return to specialisation. I disagree. I think that the return to wives’ hours reflects the amount of 
specialisation undertaken, and the extent to which the husband turns specialisation into 
specialisation related human capital, at a given labour supply and the return to specialisation 
related human capital.
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supply, so the negative relationship between wife’s employment status and the 
husband’s wage would be understated. Equally men with more unobserved wage- 
earning ability might couple with women who prefer not to work in the paid 
labour market. These factors can be controlled for by estimation through the 
Instrumental Variables technique.
5.2.1 Estimating the male marriage premium
Male marriage premiums were estimated for each country in both time periods 
(Australia 1989 and 1994, Canada 1991 and 1994, the USA 1991 and 1994). The 
marriage premium is the percentage increment to wages accruing to married men, 
after controlling for observed human capital. In all the data sets de-facto couples 
are also recorded as married. Theoretically there is no reason for de-jure and non- 
dejure marriages to produce different marriage premiums.
I used the following wage equation as a basis for this analysis:
hwvj = a + gMarriedi + JX\ + u j (5.1)
where lnwj is the log of the hourly wage of male i, Married is a zero/one dummy 
set to one for currently married men, Xj is a vector of measurable characteristics 
expected to affect wages such as age5 and education, and Uj is the error term. The 
terms b, q and f are coefficients to be estimated. This equation is estimated by 
OLS.
5 The data surveys do not contain measures of work experience. In this analysis I prefer not to use 
the conventional proxy of years of work experience - current age less years of education less age 
when began education. The data sets do not contain measures of years of education. Instead they 
contain measures of the highest level o f educational attained. Since inter-country comparisons are 
an important part of the analysis I consider it more appropriate to use age as a proxy than to use 
potential experience, given the difficulties associated with allocating appropriate years of 
education to qualification in each country. However I have run regressions that allow the return to 
age to vary with education qualification. There was no significant change in the size and 
significance of the coefficients on the marital status dummies.
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5.2.2 Disaggregating the male marriage premium by degree of 
specialisation
The first test of specialisation is to see whether the size of the disaggregated 
marriage premiums increase as the wives’ attachment to the paid labour market 
decreases. The test of specialisation assumes that specialisation can be proxied by 
the wives’ degree of attachment to the paid labour market. Equation 5.2 
represents the equation to be estimated for each country in both time periods.
lnwj =  bi +  <//wnWj +  ^wph + ^wfti 4- + ut (5.2)
where wnw, wpt and wft are dummy variables, set to one for married men whose 
wives are: not working, working part-time and working full-time respectively. 
The bs and qs are coefficients to be estimated. The qs are used to calculate the 
disaggregated marriage premiums.
Equation 5.2 was estimated by OLS. It was also estimated by the instrumental 
variables (IV) technique because the wives’ degree of attachment to the paid 
labour market may be endogenous.
So there is potentially another equation in the model, equation 5.3.
workj = cj + s/lnwj + ^lnwWi + C2 Z\ + 8j (5.3)
where work is an indicator variable showing whether the wife is working full­
time, working part-time or not working, lnwwj is the wives’ wage, Z is the set of 
exogenous regressors and c and s are the coefficients to be estimated. Equation 
5.3 is estimated in its reduced form with respect to the husbands’ wages and the 
wives’ wages. So a third equation for wives’ wages is assumed, but not specified.
Once the reduced form of equation 5.3 has been estimated the instrument for work 
is constructed as the predicted value of the wives’ labour supply given the 
estimated coefficients and values of the explanatory variables. The instrument is 
the component of wives’ labour supply that is; unrelated to unobserved 
characteristics that are correlated with the husbands’ wage, and not directly 
affected by the husbands’ wage.
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The reduced form of the wives’ employment status is estimated by the 
multinomial logit technique. This assumes no intrinsic order among the response 
categories.
5.2.3 Decomposing changes over time in the sizes of the US disaggregated 
premiums and cross-country differences in the sizes of the 
disaggregated premiums
The next test is to consider whether cross-country differences in the premiums, 
and changes over time in those differences, are consistent with specialisation. 
Juhn, et al. (1991, 1993) developed an innovative decomposition method designed 
for comparing the wage gaps between two groups of people across countries. The 
traditional Blinder-Oaxaca (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) approach to 
decomposing wage differences focuses on the difference in predicted wages. It 
identifies that part of the wage gap attributable to differences in holdings of 
observed wage related characteristics and that part attributable to the difference in 
the estimated return to those characteristics. In contrast Juhn et al. also 
decomposed the residual (from estimation) differential based on percentile 
rankings, into differences in holdings of unmeasured, or unobserved, labour 
market skills and the return to those unobserved skills.
For each country this approach uses the estimated returns to human capital of the 
designated base group to assign a percentile rank to each member of the other 
group in the residual wage distribution of the non-designated group. Cross country 
differences in the residual gap between the two groups are separated into 
differences in the mean percentile ranks of the second (non-designated) group and 
differences in the dispersion of the base group’s residual wage distribution. 
Analogous to the Blinder-Oaxaca approach the former is interpreted as the change 
in relative holdings of unmeasured labour market skills and the latter reflects the 
return to those skills.
This decomposition technique has resonance for an analysis of specialisation 
related human capital since such human capital is unobserved. In this analysis the
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holdings of and return to unobserved labour market skills are interpreted as the 
holdings of specialisation related human capital and the return to that human 
capital. For each group of married men I calculate the portions of their wage 
advantage over never married men, attributable to their holdings of specialisation 
related human capital and the returns to that human capital. Cross-country 
differences in these portions are compared with cross-country differences in the 
size of the relevant marriage premiums in the two time periods, to see whether 
specialisation can explain the disaggregated marriage premium. By comparing 
the results of decomposition over time I also test whether specialisation can 
explain changes over time in cross-country differences in the size of the 
disaggregated marriage premiums.
To describe the Juhn et al.. decomposition I followed Blau and Kahn’s (1992) 
notation and present a wage equation for a never married male in Australia;
InWnmA = knmA ^nmA + 9nmAC»nmA (5.4)
where önmA standardised residual from the log wage equation for never
married Australian males; and a nmA is the standard deviation of the same 
residual.
The log wage gap between Australian never married males and males with wives 
who do not work is expressed as
InWnmA " *nwwnwA = ^nmA (^nmA " ^wnwA) + anmA(^nmA “ 
®wnwA) (5*5)
The wage gap comprises differences in measured characteristics and differences 
in the standardized residual between never married males and males with wives 
who do not work. Note that the first term following the equals sign corresponds 
to the difference in return to coefficients term of the standard Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition, when the characteristics gap is valued with the never married male 
set of returns.
Equation 5.6 describes the difference in the Australian and the US wage gaps. The 
first row after the equals sign shows the contribution of the cross-country
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differences in the between group gap in observed wage related characteristics. 
The second row measures the effect of cross-country differences in estimated 
returns to observed human capital. These terms are calculated from the mean 
characteristics of the men and the estimated coefficients on those characteristics 
from log wage equations.
(InWnniA - lnwwnwA )" ('nwnmU " *nwwnwU ) = 
knmU K^nmA " ^wnwA) " (^nmU " ^wnwU)l +
(^nmA “ ^wnwA ) (^nmA " ^nmlj) +
a nmUl(^nmA “ ^wnwA ) ” (®nmU " ^wnwU )1 +
(GnmA " a nmU)(^nmA " ^wnwA) (5*6)
where OwnwA *s t îe standardised residual for married males, with wives not 
working, using the estimated coefficients from the log wage regression for never 
married Australian males.
As Suen (1997) shows, the interpretation of the third and fourth terms depends 
crucially on the interpretation of the error in estimation. If unexplained 
differences in wage rates between married and unmarried males are due only to 
differences in unobservable skills then 0 represents some unidimensional measure 
of labour market ability and a  represents the price of such ability. If, on the other 
hand, the wage rate gap is due to discrimination there is no difference in
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unmeasured ability between the groups6.
Under the specialisation theory 0 is assumed to represent differential holdings of 
unobserved labour market ability related to the degree of specialisation and a  
represents the return to specialisation related human capital. The size of the 
fourth term relative to the second term reflects the cross-country difference in the 
return to specialisation related human capital relative to the return to observed 
human capital, such as education and work experience.
The third term measures the effect of cross-country differences in residual wage 
positions of the males in each group (wnw and nm). In other words it considers 
whether the US wnw males rank higher in the US nm males residual distribution 
than do the Australian wnw males in the Australian nm males’ distribution. This 
term picks up whether there are cross-country differences in the between group 
holdings of unobserved human capital.
To construct the third term I calculated two sets of residuals, for both Australia 
and the USA. One set comprised the residuals from the estimation of a log wage 
equation for nm males - the nm residuals. The other was made up of the residuals 
calculated by subtracting from the log wage of each wnw male, a constructed 
wage, which was the combination of his human capital characteristics and the 
estimated coefficients specific to never married males in his country - the wnw 
residuals. I calculate the mean of the wnw residuals for both countries - the mean 
wnw residual. I then determined, for Australia, the rank of the Australian mean 
wnw residual within the Australian nm residuals - the Australian wnw rank. Then
6 Juhn et al.'s decomposition assumes that 9 and a  are independent. They will only be 
independent if there is no discrimination. If the wage gap is due to discrimination against never 
married males a rise in the price of skills will automatically be associated with an increase in the 
average rank of the never married males. Consider a never married male and a married male with 
the same wage. Assuming there is no discrimination both males should have the same overall level 
of skill. A rise in the price of the skill will cause wages to rise and the ranking of both males in the 
wage distribution will remain the same. However, the average wage gap between all married males 
and never married males will increase since on average never married males have less 
specialisation-related skills.
If, on the other hand there is discrimination a never married male and a married male with the 
same wage will have different levels of skill. The never married male will have more of the skill. 
When the price of the skill rises we would expect the wage of the never married male to increase 
by more than that of the married male. Hence the never married male will now have a higher rank. 
So the return to the skill is related directly to the ranking, which is used to measure the quantity of 
the skill.
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I determined the value of the US nm residual corresponding to the Australian 
wnw rank - the US mean wnw residual for Australia. The third term is the 
difference between the US mean wnw residual and the US mean wnw residual for 
Australia.
The fourth term reflects cross-country differences in residual inequality as 
described in the residuals of nm males. It is obtained analogously to the third 
term and calculated as the difference between the US mean wnw residual for 
Australia and the Australian mean wnw residual.
The relevant terms for specialisation are the third and fourth terms. The third term 
represents cross-country differences in the amount of specialisation related human 
capital held by married men. The fourth term represents the effect of cross­
country differences in the wage structures. In other words it shows the difference 
in how the countries value specialisation related unobserved human capital.
The size of the fourth terms relative to the second terms may also have 
implications for specialisation. The return to unobserved specialisation related 
human capital relative to the return to observed human capital could affect the 
motivations of a couple to specialise.
I base the formulation of the decomposition on the nm male wage equation, rather 
than on a pooled equation for all men. Blau and Kahn (1996a), in their analysis of 
gender pay gaps, use the male wage equation. Their rationale was that 
international differences in the coefficients from a male wage regression would be 
less affected by international differences in the extent of discrimination against 
women than would coefficients from a female or pooled male-female equation. 
Analogously we should not include married men in the base-line wage equation 
because our goal is to consider cross-country differences in the extent of marital 
specialisation and the effect that specialisation has on the husband’s wage.
5.3 Data, Specification of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
The cross-sectional data sets used in the analysis are Australia 1989, 1994, 
Canada 1991, 1994, and the USA 1991, 1994. The samples used for estimation
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include all currently married7 and never married males aged 20 to 65 years. For 
the Canadian, US and Australia 1989 samples the men had worked at least 35 
hours per week in the reference week and worked full-time for at least 48 weeks 
in the previous year. Self-employed men were excluded, as were men working in 
agriculture, men whose wives worked in agriculture and men with self-employed 
wives.
The Australia 1994 data set does not contain information on the number of weeks 
worked full-time in the last year so some of the men would not have worked full­
time for the entire year. I use two samples of the Australia 1989 data set for 
estimation; one that matches the Canadian and US samples and one matching the 
Australia 1994 sample.
The dependent variable in the husbands’ wage equation is the log of his hourly 
wage. In the samples of males working full-time full-year, it was calculated as 
annual earnings divided by the multiple of weeks worked full-time and the hours 
worked in the reference week. The dependent variable in the Australian samples 
where the males may not have worked full-time for the full year, was earnings in 
the reference week divided by the hours worked in the reference week.
Appendix 5.A outlines the characteristics used to describe the human capital 
attached to each man and Appendix 5.B lists the means of these characteristics. 
Appendix 5.A also lists the factors used to estimate the instrument of the wives’ 
degree of attachment to the paid labour market. Their means are available on 
request from the author. The variable describing the wives’ labour force 
attachment was set to: two if the wife worked 35 or more hours in the reference 
week (regardless of whether they reported any labour market earnings in the 
previous year); one if the wife worked less than 35 hours per week (regardless of 
earnings), and zero if the wife did not work in the reference week.
7 Married men were part of a de-jure married couple or de-facto couple. Never married men are 
those, not in a de-facto relationship, who had never been part of a de-jure couple. Ideally they 
would not have been part of a de-facto relationship. However the data did not allow this 
distinction.
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Married men did have higher wages, on average, than never married men. Married 
men tended to be older. On average they were in their early 40s compared with 
never married men who were in the early 30s.
The average wage of married men did not vary systematically with the labour 
force attachment of wives. In terms of age, men with wives working full-time 
tended to be younger than other married men were. In terms of education there 
were some patterns, suggestive of assortative mating. Canadian and Australian 
men with wives who worked full-time were most likely to be tertiary educated 
and men with wives who did not work the least likely. Tertiary educated women 
would be the most likely to work full-time. In the USA, however men with wives 
who worked part-time were most likely to be tertiary educated and there was little 
difference in the propensity to have tertiary education between men with wives 
who did not work and those with wives working full-time.
5.4 Empirical Results
5.4.1 Estimates of the male marriage premium
The results from OLS estimation of equation 5.1 for currently married and never 
married men are reported in Appendix 5.C. The estimated coefficients on the 
standard wage equation variables were consistent with those typically found in the 
literature. Wages increased with education and the age-wage relationships were 
concave. Residents of large cities earned significantly more on average, and 
members of minority groups earned less.
The primary concern was the impact that marriage had on male wages. Cross­
country comparison of the estimated marriage premiums for males in both time 
periods, reported in Table 5.1, confirmed that marriage was related positively with 
male wages in Australia, Canada and the USA in the early 1990s8. Furthermore,
8 The estimated marriage premiums for the 1994 samples differed in size from those reported in 
chapter four because the samples of men were different.
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consistent with Schoeni’s (1990) estimates for the 1980’s, the US premium was 
the largest, followed by the Canadian and Australian premiums. Gray’s (1997) 
estimated premium for US white men aged 24 to 31 in cross-section US data for 
1989 to 1993 was 5.8 per cent. Loh (1996) found a US premium of 9.1 per cent 
for 1990. Whilst the Canadian and US premiums were smaller in size in the more 
recent time period, the size of the Australian premium appears to have increased 
over time. The observed reduction in the size of the US marriage premium was 
consistent with the prevailing US trend documented by Blackburn and Korenman 
(1994) and Gray (1997). For example Blackburn and Korenman found a ten 
percentage point drop in the male marriage premium between 1967 and 1988. 
However my estimates of the US marriage premium, presented in Chapter Four, 
suggested that it increased in size between 1979 and 1994.
Table 5.1: Male marriage premiums (percentage increment to hourly wage 
attributable to marriage) (c)
A u s t r a l ia  1 9 8 9 A u s t r a l ia  1 9 8 9 C a n a d a  1 9 9 1 U S A  1 9 9 1
(a) (b) (a) (a)
8.2 9.2 14.3 15.7
A u s t r a l ia  1 9 9 4 C a n a d a  1 9 9 4 U S A  1 9 9 4
(b) (a) (a)
9.6 9.6 14.2
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings. These 
samples may still not be strictly comparable since the 1991 survey excluded those who 
commenced their first job in the survey year and many of those who worked full-time part year.
( c } ( e coefficient on marr*age dummy
It is possible that the cross-country differences in the sizes of the marriage 
premiums can be explained by differences in the average degree of specialisation 
within each country. In this analysis the degree of specialisation within a couple is 
proxied by the wife’s degree of attachment to the paid labour market. Table 5.2 
reports married men grouped by their wife’s degree of labour force attachment. 
About 75 percent of US wives worked in the labour market in both periods, 
compared with 70 percent of Canadian wives and 65 percent of Australian wives. 
In each country the majority worked full-time, but those working part-time 
accounted for about 20 per cent of jobs in the USA, close to 25 per cent in Canada 
and 30 per cent in Australia.
142
Decomposing Dynamics
If, internationally couples had the same propensity and/or ability to specialise, 
given the wife’s degree of attachment to the paid labour market, and the same 
return from specialisation prevailed in all countries then the US marriage 
premium should have been the smallest and the Australian premium the largest. 
Australian wives were the least likely to work and US wives the most likely. 
However the reverse was the case. The increased proportion of working wives 
over time in all countries is consistent with the decreased size of the marriage 
premiums.
Table 5.2: Married men grouped by the employment status of their wives
(%) (c)
A u s t r a l ia  1 9 8 9 A u s t r a l ia  1 9 8 9 C a n a d a  1 9 9 1 U S A  1 9 9 1
(a) (b) (a) (a)
Wife is wage and 
salary earner (c)
Full-time 33.8 33.5 44.1 54.6
Part-time 28.9 28.5 24.0 20.0
Wife not working 
in the labour market
37.3 38.0 31.9 25.5
N° of observations 4 161 4 449 5 634 4 098
A u s t r a l ia  1 9 9 4 C a n a d a  1 9 9 4 U S A  1 9 9 4
(b) (a) (a)
Wife is wage and 
salary earner (c)
Full-time 34.1 46.8 56.3
Part-time 30.0 23.4 20.2
Wife not working 
in the labour market
35.9 29.8 23.4
N° of observations 2 047 9 243 15 977
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
(c) These categories are calculated on the reported hours worked. Wives who reported that they 
earned nothing for those hours are included in the analysis. Their exclusion does not change the 
results.
5.4.2 Estimates of disaggregated male marriage premiums
As a first step in determining the extent to which the specialisation hypothesis can 
explain the marriage premium this section considers the question of whether, 
within each country, the marriage premium varied with the degree of 
specialisation, as described by the wife’s attachment to the paid labour market.
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Ordinary least squares estimation
Equation 5.2 was firstly estimated by OLS. It included the same set of explanatory 
variables as equation 5.1, except that the currently married indicator variable was 
replaced with a set of three indicator variables for currently married males with; 
wives not working (wnw), wives working part-time (wpt) and wives working full­
time (wft) respectively.
Estimates of the disaggregated marriage premiums are reported in Table 5.3 (see 
Appendix 5.D for the underlying estimated regression results). In both time 
periods the estimated Canadian and US premiums followed the pattern suggested 
by the specialisation hypothesis, that is the more hours the wife worked in the 
labour market, the smaller is her husband’s marriage premium. Similarly, the 
Australian premiums behaved consistently with the specialisation hypothesis for 
the 1989 sample of men who worked full-time full-year. For example, in 1991 the 
US husband of a woman who did not work received an hourly wage 22.5 percent 
higher than a similar never married male. The wage gap for men with wives who 
worked part time was 19.8 percent and the gap for men with wives who worked 
full-time was 11.7 percent. Gray (1997) found that the marriage premium in 1990 
for US men whose wives did not work was nearly 17 per cent compared with nine 
per cent for men with wives who worked 40 hours per week.
In both time periods the disaggregated US marriage premiums were the largest in 
size while the Australians were the smallest. Over time the Canadian 
disaggregated premiums decreased in size. Only the wft premium fell 
substantially in size for Australia and the USA. The US wpt and wnw premiums 
remained much the same size, while the corresponding Australian premiums 
increased in size. However, the over time Australian comparisons are based on 
samples of men working full-time at the time of the survey, so men who worked 
full-time only part of the year were also included.
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Table 5.3: Male marriage premiums disaggregated by wife’s degree of 
attachment to the paid labour market (percentage increment to 
hourly wages) (c)
A ustra lia  1989 A ustra lia  1989 C anad a 1991 U SA  1991
(a) (b) (a) (a)
Wife working
Full-time 6.3* 8.5* 11.0* 11.7*
Part-time 9.7* 9.5* 13.0* 19.8*
Wife not working 
in the labour market
10.1* 9.2* 19.5* 22.5*
A ustra lia  1994 C anad a 1994 U SA  1994
(b) (a) (a)
Wife working
Full-time 6.6* 7.3* 9.7*
Part-time 11.4* 10.6* 19.5*
Wife not working 
in the labour market
11.4* 12.4* 21.9*
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
( c )  g^coe '̂lc'ent on re*evant dummy) j
* estimated coefficient significant at 5% level of significance.
These findings were consistent with the argument that US couples are more 
specialised, or that US husbands take the most opportunity to specialise, and/or 
receive more for their specialisation related human capital. Using this line of 
argument there may have been a reduction in the tendency for both US and 
Australian couples, in which the wife works full-time, to specialise. In Canada 
this tendency may have been across the board.
Hypotheses set out in Chapter Three considered changes between the early 1980s 
and mid 1990s that might have impinged on the tendency to specialise. 
Discrimination against women in the paid labour market is a motivation to 
specialise. Although I could not find analyses of pay discrimination over the early 
1990s, the 1980s trend in Australia and the USA was for a reduction in 
discrimination. The Canadian trend was for no change. Since the trend is for 
women to take less breaks from the paid labour market to care for children it is 
likely that the wives’ labour supply at a point in time is more representative of the 
couples’ specialisation commitment. This might explain why the sizes of the US 
and Australian premiums for men whose wives worked full-time fell the most.
Equally, the explanation could be that the labour supply of US wives was more 
responsive to the husbands’ wages, in both periods. Or, US couples might match 
in a more systematic fashion in terms of the husband’s wage earning ability and
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wife’s desire for a career, selecting into marriage on the basis that wives who 
preferred not to work found husbands with the largest income earning potential.
Table 5.4 records F-statistics that indicate whether the sizes of the disaggregated 
marriage premiums were significantly different within each sample. In the first 
period samples of men working full year there was a significant difference, at the 
five per cent level, between the wft and wnw marriage premiums in all three 
countries. However the difference in size between the wft and wpt premiums was 
only significant in USA and Australia, while the size gap between the wpt and 
wnw premiums was only significant in Canada.
There was no significant difference in the size of the Australian premiums for the 
samples including men who worked full-time part year. Included in these samples 
are men who tend to have marginal attachment to the paid labour market, and 
gains from specialisation can only occur when working.
In the second period the wft premium was significantly smaller than the wpt and 
wnw premiums in Canada and the USA. However there was no significant 
difference between the wpt and wnw premiums in either country.
Table 5.4: F-statistics for difference between estimated coefficients
A u str a lia  198 9 A u str a lia  198 9 C a n a d a  1991 U S A  1991
(a) (b) (a) (a)
Full-time -  part-time 5.32* 1.22 1.10 12.23**
Full-time - 5.57** 0.27 24.59** 24.83**
not-working
Part-time - 0.01 0.41 10.98** 0.94
not-working
A u str a lia  199 4 C a n a d a  1994 U S A  1994
(b) (a) (a)
Full-time -  part-time 3.54 5.95** 62.81**
Full-time - 3.83 16.76** 105.65**
not-working
Part-time - 0.00 1.60 2.53
not-working
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
* difference significant at five per cent level
** difference significant at ten per cent level
It is possible that the ranges of hours used to construct the three indicator 
variables for wives’ labour supply were inappropriate, in terms of their ability to 
describe the degree of specialisation. Chapter Six considers the relationship
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between husband’s wage and wives’ continuous hours. Wives’ hours enters as a 
quadratic, thus enabling a more flexible relationship between hours and 
specialisation.
Instrumental variables estimates
As discussed earlier, the degree of the wife’s attachment to the paid labour market 
may be endogenous in terms of the husband’s wage determination process. To 
control for possible simultaneity bias, I re-estimated equation 5.2 using the IV 
approach. Using the multinomial logit technique I estimated a reduced form 
equation explaining whether the wife worked full-time, worked part-time or did 
not work at all. The set of variables used as explanatory variables in this equation 
included the husband’s education, the wife’s education, location, ethnicity of both 
the husband and wife, the industry in which the husband worked, the wife’s age, 
the number of dependent children, the age of the youngest dependent child and the 
log of household property income. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in 
this analysis are available from the author, as are the estimated parameters of the 
multinomial logit.
To construct the instrument I calculated, for each husband, the estimated 
probabilities that his wife did not work, worked part-time and worked full-time. I 
allocated the predicted employment status on the basis of which of the three 
values was highest.
I used Hausman’s (1978) methodology to test for the exogeneity of the wives’ 
labour supply. If, according to this methodology, the estimated coefficients for the 
predicted wives’ labour supply (in the husband’s structural equation) are 
significant, when the actual values for the wives’ labour supply are also included 
as explanatory variables, wives’ labour supply is endogenous. I included predicted 
part-time and full-time dummies. The test statistics for the Hausman test are 
reported in Table 5.5.
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Table 5.5: Test statistics for exogeneity of wives’ labour supply in husbands’ 
wage equation
Year Test statistic
Australia 1989a 0.33
1989b 4.89**
1994 2.93
Canada 1991 4.63**
1994 4.21*
USA 1991 4.24*
1994 18.25**
* significant at the five per cent level 
** significant at the one per cent level
The test statistics are distributed F with critical values of 3.0 at the five per cent 
level of significance and 4.6 at the one per cent level of significance. The wives’ 
labour supply was endogenous in both US samples, at the five per cent level in 
1991 and at the one per cent level in 1994. Similarly wives’ labour supply was 
endogenous in both Canadian samples, at the one per cent level in 1991 and at the 
five per cent level in 1994. In the Australian samples wives’ labour supply proved 
to be exogenous, at the one per cent level, in 1989 when the sample is restricted to 
men working full-time full-year. If however, the sample included men who may 
not have worked full-time for the full year preceding the survey exogeneity is 
rejected at the one per cent level of significance in 1989. However, exogeneity is 
at the five per cent level of significance in 1994.
The estimated premiums relating to the endogenised wives’ labour supply are 
reported in Table 5.6. The estimated coefficients from the underlying men’s wage 
equations appear in Appendix 5.E. The estimated coefficients from which the 
premiums are constructed were all significant at the five per cent level. But their 
relative sizes do not match the predictions of the specialisation theory. In general 
men with wives who do not work have the smallest premiums and men with wives 
who work part-time have the largest premiums. The sizes of the wnw dummy 
generally decreased, while the sizes of the wpt and wft dummies increased, the 
former by more than the latter. In contrast Gray (1997) found that the relationship 
between wives’ continuous instrumented labour supply and the husbands’ wage 
remained negative and the difference between the premiums of wnw and wft 
increased in size. Gray’s instruments were the respondent’s attitude toward 
gender roles in household production and the presence of an infant in the 
household. He instrumented specialisation, rather than the wives’ labour supply.
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Table 5.6: Male marriage premiums disaggregated by IV estimates of wives’ 
degree of attachment to the paid labour market (percentage 
increment to hourly wages) (c)
A ustralia  1989 A ustra lia  1989 C anad a  1991 U SA  1991
(a) (b) (a) (a)
Wife working
Full-time 8.7* 9.3* 14.2* 15.8*
Part-time 9.6* 12.7* -9.2* 33.8*
Wife not working 7.4* 8.1* 15.0* 13.8*
in the labour market
A ustra lia  1994 C anad a  1994 U SA  1994
(b) (a) (a)
Wife working
Full-time 9.3* 10.1* 14.8*
Part-time 14.7* 15.3* 29.7*
Wife not working 
in the labour market
8.5* 8.1* 9.4*
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
(c) g(coe ~̂laent on re'evant dummy) j
* significant at 5% level of significance.
But IV estimates are not always robust. The instruments should satisfy two 
conditions. They should not be endogenous in the husbands’ wage equation, but 
they should be highly correlated with the wives’ labour supply. It is not possible 
to prove the first condition. I performed some sensitivity tests for the explanatory 
power of the instrument. I estimated the wives’ reduced form labour supply model 
with the following subset of explanatory variables - those that also appeared in the 
husband’s structural wage equation (husbands’ ethnicity, education and age), 
those that would appear in the wives’ wage equation (wives’ age and education) 
and those that could be related to the husbands’ wage (the husbands’ ethnicity, 
location and the industry in which he worked). I regarded the remaining 
exogenous variables (wives’ ethnicity, age of youngest dependent child and 
household property income) as the instruments. By comparing the explanatory 
power of the full model for wives’ hours with the model estimated without these 
instruments the explanatory power of the instruments was determined. Table 5.7 
compares the log-likelihoods from the two models, and lists the chi-squared test 
statistics for the null hypothesis that the explanatory power of the instruments is 
zero. The critical value for the chi-squared is 23.69 at the five per cent level of 
significance and 29.14 at the one per cent level of significance.
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Table 5.7: Log-likelihoods from multinomial logit estimates of the reduced 
form of wives’ labour supply
C ountry Y ear L og-L ikelihood  from  
estim ation  o f  w iv es’ 
hours w ithou t 
in strum ents
L og-L ikelihood  from  
estim ation  o f  w iv es’ 
hours w ith 
instrum ents
C h i-squared  (14) for 
exp lanato ry  pow er o f  
instrum ents
A ustralia 1989a -4304.72 -3830.15 756.26
1989b -4598.23 -4108.42 790.14
1994 -2162.09 -1962.53 321.46
C anada 1991 -5735.58 -5541.81 385.36
1994 -9373 .97 -9069 .24 561.71
U SA 1991 -3933.82 -3739.31 345.67
1994 -1523.38 -14609.56 1150.60
Another practical measure of the usefulness of the instruments is the proportion of 
correctly modelled events. They are reported in Table 5.8. The table records that 
the estimated model has difficulty predicting the employment status of the wives 
working part-time in the Canadian and US samples. The instruments did a 
reasonable job of predicting wives’ labour supply in the Australian samples. 
There, wives’ labour supply tended to be exogenous. These findings led me to 
use the wives’ labour supply in its exogenous form for the remaining analysis of 
this chapter. In Chapter Six I estimated wives’ hours as a continuous variable, 
hoping that the instruments would perform better.
Table 5.8: Percent of correctly modelled events
Y ear N o t w orking W orking  part-tim e W orking  fu ll-tim e
A ustralia 1989a 65.0 34.8 62.7
1989b 66.7 33.6 61.9
1994 63.5 32.5 62.2
C anada 1991 53.1 1.0 81.1
1994 44.7 3.4 83.5
U SA 1991 37.1 1.6 89.3
1994 27.0 0.9 92.0
5.4.3 Results of the Juhn et al. decompositions
In this section I present the results of the Juhn et al. decompositions, the 
methodology of which was described in section 5.2. Recall that this 
decomposition technique should be able to unpack cross-country differences in 
the average wage gap between currently married men (grouped by the 
employment status of their wives) and never married men. The technique enabled 
me to identify cross-country differences in the extent of specialisation related
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human capital and the return to that human capital, and compare these with cross­
country differences in the size of the male marriage premium.
Table 5.9 compares the cross-country differences in log wage gaps with cross­
country variations in the marriage premiums9. The men were grouped by the 
exogenous employment status of their wives. The size of the premium and related 
gap in log wages need not be identical. While the premiums represent differential 
holdings of unobserved human capital and returns to that capital, the wage gaps 
also included differences in holding of observed human capital and returns to that 
capital. The wage gaps tended to be larger than the relevant premiums, which is 
consistent with the observation that never married men tended to be more 
educated than currently married men were.
While the sizes of the Canadian and US premiums were smaller in 1994 than in 
1991, the gap in the US wage gap was larger in 1994. Estimated coefficients, 
from log wage equations for never married men and married men grouped by the 
exogenous labour force status of their wives, are reported in Appendix 5.F. For 
never married US men, the sizes of the estimated coefficients on age and 
education were smaller in 1994 than in 1991. In contrast the estimated 
coefficients for married men were larger in size in 1994. In Canada and Australia, 
however, the same estimated coefficients increased in size over time for both 
never married and currently married men.
USA 1994 -  USA 1991
This sub-section contains results from the decomposition of the over-time 
differences in the average wage gaps between US never-married and currently 
married males. Recall from the previous section that there was a reduction in the 
size of the US male marriage premium in the early 1990’s, from 15.7 per cent to 
14.2 per cent. When disaggregated, this reduction was more marked for men with
9 The marriage premium represents the percentage contribution to the wage level, so the gap 
between two marriage premiums is the percentage point difference in contributions to the wage 
level. The difference between two log wages approximates the percentage difference between the 
tow underlying wage levels.
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wives working full-time, although the premiums of the remaining married men 
also fell slightly (see Table 5.3).
Table 5.10 compares the premium difference with the second, third and fourth 
terms of equation 5.5 {Appendix 5.G reports the components of the third and 
fourth terms). These terms reflect percentage point movements in the wage gap 
difference between currently married and never married men, between USA 1994 
and USA 1991. The second term represents that part of the ‘over-time’ difference 
in the wages gap attributable to differences (over time) in the return to observable 
human capital received by never married men. So, for example, the wage gap 
between wnw men and nm men increased by 10.8 percentage points between 
1991 and 1994, due to the decrease over the same period in the return to observed 
human capital received by never married men. In contrast, the third term, 
representing over time differences in the gaps in unobserved human capital, 
contributed a 10.1 percentage point decrease in the wage gap. The fourth term 
shows that changes over time in the valuation of unobserved human capital 
contributed 3.3 percentage points to the reduction in the wage gap.
The third and fourth terms were both negative for each decomposition suggesting 
that holdings of unobserved human capital resultant on specialisation fell over the 
period, as did the return to those holdings. Specialisation appears to have played a 
role in causing the US marriage premium to fall between 1991 and 1994. 
Similarly, Gray (1997) claimed that US holdings of specialisation related human 
capital decreased markedly between the late 1970s and early 1990s. However, 
both Gray (1997) and Blackburn and Korenamn (1994) argued that the return to 
specialisation related human capital increased over the same period, in line with 
the general upwards trend in the return to human capital observed by numerous 
researchers including Card and Lemieux (1996) and Juhn et al. (1991).
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The second term was positive, since the return to observed human capital 
increased over the 1990s. This may have encouraged men to focus on accruing 
observed human capital, rather than specialisation related human capital.
But there are still some unanswered questions. Why did the return to 
specialisation related human capital relative to other human capital fall over the 
early 1990s? And why did the premium of men with wives working full-time fall 
more than the other disaggregated premiums did? It is possible that the employer 
demands on women working full-time are increasing, making it more difficult for 
them to participate in specialisation. Furthermore, they might themselves feel less 
inclined to specialise as their wage-earning ability approaches men’s. Another 
possibility is that wives working full-time are increasingly attached to their 
careers, so that their labour supply at a point in time more closely resembles their 
longer term specialisation commitment.
Australia 1989-USA 1991 and Australia 1994-USA 1994
Recall that in 1994 the US premium was 4.5 percentage points larger than the 
Australian premium. In the early 1990s the US premium was 6.5-7.5 percentage 
points larger. The Australian wft marriage premium fell by roughly the same 
extent as did the US wft premium. The Australian wnw and wpt premiums 
actually increased in size while the corresponding US premiums fell slightly.
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 compare the cross-country premium gaps with the second, 
third and fourth terms of equation 5.6 (Appendix 5.H outlines the components of 
the third and fourth terms). Table 5.11 compares the comparisons for the first 
period and Table 5.12 compares the comparisons for the second term.
The analysis suggests that in both periods the third and fourth terms contributed to 
the cross-country premium gaps. In other words, the US premiums were larger 
than the Australian premiums because US males held more specialisation related 
human capital and the US return to specialisation related unobserved human 
capital was larger than the Australian return. These observations are consistent 
with Australian couples having less motivation to take advantage of specialisation 
opportunities, because women are less discriminated against in the paid labour
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market. Another possibility is that US couples were more skilled at taking 
advantage of specialisation opportunities.
Table 5.10: Juhn et al decomposition of the difference in the log wage gaps 
between males grouped by the supposed intensity of 
specialisation: USA 1994-USA 1991 (Percentage point movement 
in wage)
Percen tage
po in t
d iffe rence  in
p rem ium
gap
com pared  
w ith  U SA  
1991
D ue to 2nd 
term  -  return  
to observed  
hum an  
cap ita l
D ue to 3rd 
term  -  
am oun t o f  
unobserved  
hum an  
cap ita l
D ue to 4 th 
term  -  re tu rn  
to
unobserved
hum an
capita l
S um  3rd and 
4 th term s
W ife  no t 
w ork ing  -  
n ev e r m arried  
U S A  1994 -0.6 10.8 -10.1 -3.3 -13 .4
W ife  w ork ing  
p art-tim e -  
n ev e r m arried  
U SA  1994 -0.3 6.3 -5 .4 -3 .0 -8 .4
W ife  w ork ing  
fu ll-tim e -  
n eve r m arried  
U SA  1994 -1.9 5.9 -4.2 -5.6 -9.8
The gap in the return to unobserved human capital was much the same in 1994 as 
in the earlier period (fourth term). Analysis presented in the previous sub-section 
indicated that the US return to specialisation related human capital fell over the 
early 1990s. It appeared that Australia experienced much the same reduction.
There was a reduction in the cross-country gap in the amount of unobserved 
human capital held by married men, a movement that is consistent with the fall in 
the premium gap. Analysis of the falling US premium over the early 1990s 
suggested that the amount of unobservable human capital held by married 
American men fell between 1991 and 1994. This is consistent with decreases in 
the sizes of the US -  Australia gaps in premiums over a similar period.
Both the US and Australian wft premiums fell by much the same extent over the 
period. While it seems that both countries experienced a reduction in the return to 
specialisation related human capital, the US advantage in the holdings of 
specialisation related human capital advantage decreased. So, the US wft premium 
should have fallen by more than the corresponding Australian premium.
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Similarly I found inconsistencies with the wnw and wpt dynamics. Over the early 
1990s the US advantage in the holdings of specialisation related human capital 
decreased. Consistent with this, over the same period the Australian wnw and wpt 
premiums increased in size while the size of the corresponding US premiums 
decreased. But, the increase in the size of the Australian premiums could have 
only come about if these increased their degree of specialisation, and/or the extent 
to which husbands took advantage of the specialisation, relatively more than the 
fall in the return to specialisation. Why would specialisation have increased over 
the early 1990s in Australia?
Table 5.11: Juhn et al decomposition of the difference in the log wage gaps 
between males grouped by the supposed intensity of 
specialisation: Australia 1989/Canada 1991 - USA 1991
Percentage Due to 2nd Due to 3rd Due to 4th Sum of 3rd
point term - return term - term -  return and 4th terms
difference in to observed amount of to
premium human unobserved unobserved
gap capital human human
compared 
with USA
capital capital
1991
Wife not 
working - 
never married
Australia (a) -11.9 0.2 -15.2 -9.7 -24.9
Australia (b) -13.3 -1.1 -17.7 -9.9 -27.6
Canada -3.0 12.2 -18.1 -0.1 -18.2
Wife working 
part-time - 
never married
Australia (a) -10.1 -5.9 -6.8 -9.8 -16.6
Australia (b) -10.3 -7.6 -4.9 -13.4 -18.3
Canada -6.8 4.8 -15.3 -1.6 -16.9
Wife working 
full-time - 
never married
Australia (a) -4.9 -5.2 -5.4 -7.7 -13.1
Australia (b) -3.2 -6.6 -2.1 -10.2 -12.3
Canada -0.7 3.0 -11.0 0.1 -10.9
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
Canada 1991 -  USA 1991 and Canada 1994 -  USA 1994.
Over the early 1990’s the positive gap between the US and Canadian premium 
increased in size, from 1.4 to 5.6 percentage points. Similarly the premium gaps
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for men with wives of varying degrees of attachment to the paid labour market 
increased over time. All of the disaggregated Canadian premiums fell 
substantially between 1991 and 1994. Only the US wft premium fell significantly.
Table 5.12: Juhn et al. decomposition of the difference in the log wage gaps 
between males grouped by the supposed intensity of 
specialisation: Australia 1994/Canada 1994 - USA 1994
Percen tage
po in t
d ifference in 
p rem ium
gap
com pared  
w ith  U SA  
1994
D ue to 2nd 
term  - return  
to observed  
hum an 
capital
D ue to 3rd 
term  -  
am oun t o f  
unobserved  
hum an  
cap ita l
D ue to 4 th 
term  -  re tu rn  
to
unobserved
hum an
capita l
Sum  o f  3rd 
and  4 th term s
W ife not 
w ork ing  - 
never m arried
A ustralia -10.5 -9.4 -6 .0 -10.2 -16.2
C anada -9.5 3.9 -14.9 0.0 -14.9
W ife w ork ing  
part-tim e - never 
m arried
A ustralia -8.1 -11.8 -4.1 -10 .4 -14.1
C anada -8.9 1.4 -14 .4 1.0 -13 .4
W ife w ork ing  
fu ll-tim e - never 
m arried
A ustra lia -3.1 -9.9 -1 .4 -8 .0 -9.4
C anada -2.4 1.3 -7 .0 1.5 -5.5
Results from the comparison of Canadian and US wages, reported in Tables 5.11 
and 5.12, suggested that in both 1991 and 1994 the US premiums were larger than 
the Canadian premiums primarily because US married men had more unobserved 
human capital relative to never married men than Canadian married men did. The 
US return to that human capital was much the same as the Canadian return in both 
periods.
Between 1991 and 1994 the positive gap between the US and Canadian premiums 
increased. But the increased gap in the premiums appears to be inconsistent with 
movements in the relative amounts of unobserved human capital held by married 
men. The US advantage in the holdings of specialisation related human capital fell 
substantially.
Consideration of the cross-country gap between the returns to observed and 
unobserved human capital suggest that in both 1991 and 1994 US couples
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received more financial inducement to take advantage of the opportunity to 
specialise than Canadian couples did. But, between 1991 and 1994 the size of the 
Canadian advantage in the return to observed human capital fell. This suggests 
that Canadian couples should have been more motivated to take advantage of 
specialisation opportunities, relative to US couples, in 1994. In fact the reverse 
appears to be true.
In conclusion, specialisation proves not to be a useful explanator of the dynamics 
in the differences between the US and Canadian premiums in the early 1990s.
5.5 Conclusion
In Australia, Canada and the USA married males enjoyed a wage premium over 
never married males during the early 1990s. When the samples were restricted to 
men who worked full-time full-year the size of the marriage premium varied with 
the wife’s degree of attachment to the paid labour market in line with the 
predictions of the specialisation hypothesis. Amongst married men those with 
wives who did not work had the largest premiums, followed by men with wives 
working part-time. Men with wives who worked full-time had the smallest 
premium. However the differences in the size of the marriage premiums were not 
always statistically significant. In the Australian, US and Canadian 1994 samples 
the wpt and wnw premiums were not significantly different. In the Canadian 1991 
sample the wpt and wft premiums were not significantly different.
The analysis presented here considered the possibility that the wives’ degree of 
attachment to the labour market was endogenous in the husband’s wage equation. 
I could not find an adequate instrument for the wives degree of attachment to the 
labour market for the US and Canada. The Australian instrument was more 
effective and analysis of the Australian samples suggests that the labour supply of 
wives was exogenous in the husbands' wage equation. In the rest of the analysis I 
assumed that the wives’ labour supply was exogenous. In other words I assumed 
away the possibilities that husbands’ wages impacted negatively on wives’ labour
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supply, and that there was a relationship between unobserved factors that 
impacted on husbands’ wages and wives’ hours.
Cross-country comparison of the sizes of the disaggregated marriage premiums 
revealed that they were largest in the USA and smallest in Australia in both time 
periods. According to Juhn et al. decompositions of the relevant wage differences 
US married men held more specialisation related human capital than Canadian 
and Australian married men in both periods. The US return (relative to unmarried 
men) to that human capital was larger than the Australian return and much the 
same size as the Canadian return. A possible explanation for why US married 
men held more specialisation related human capital is that US couples take the 
most advantage of the opportunity to increase the husband’s holding of 
unobserved human capital afforded by the degree of the wife’s attachment to the 
paid labour market. A motivation for this, at least in comparison to Australia, is 
that the US return to unobserved human capital appears to have been higher. 
Another motivation could be that the extent of sex based pay discrimination is 
greater in the US.
Over the early 1990s there was a reduction in the size of the male marriage 
premium in all examined countries. The sizes of the disaggregated premiums 
tended also to decrease over this period. A Juhn et al. decomposition of the 
change in the wage gaps between US never married and married men (grouped by 
the employment status of their wives) reveals that specialisation could explain this 
phenomenon. Over the early 1990s the amount of unobserved human capital held 
by American married men fell, as did the return to that human capital. Since the 
return to observed human capital for married men increased over the same period, 
it is possible that US couples were less motivated to take advantage of the 
specialisation opportunities in the later period.
In the early 1990’s the US premium advantage over Canada increased in size, 
from 1.4 to 5.6 percentage points, while the US premium advantage over 
Australian fell from a maximum of 7.5 to 4.6 percentage points. These trends 
were consistent across all married males irrespective of the degree of their wives’ 
labour force attachment.
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Specialisation can explain some of the Australia-US dynamics, since there was a 
marked reduction in the cross-country gap in specialisation related human capital 
held by married men. Over the early 1990s the Australian and US returns to 
specialisation fell by much the same extent. Combined with the finding that over 
the same time the US return to observed human capital increased relative to the 
Australian return, this suggests that the motivation for US couples, relative to 
Australian couples, to take advantage of specialisation opportunities may have 
decreased. However did Australian couples in which the wives were not working 
full-time increase their extent of specialisation, or was there an increase in the 
propensity for husbands to take advantage of that specialisation?
However, the Canada-US dynamics were inconsistent with changes in the relative 
quantity and return to specialisation. Whilst the US premiums increased in size 
relative to the Canadian premiums, US holdings of specialisation related human 
capital fell, relative to Canadian holdings. Also, US and Canadian returns to 
specialisation were much the same in both periods, relative to the return to 
observed human capital.
In total this analysis provided some support for the specialisation hypothesis as an 
explanation for the male marriage premium, although specialisation was not able 
to explain changes over time in the US-Canadian relative premiums. An 
interesting question arising from this analysis is why the return to unobserved 
specialisation related human capital fell by much the same extent in all the 
countries over the early 1990s.
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Appendix 5.B: Summary of Main Characteristics Used in the Analysis 
Currently Married and Never Married Males aged 20-65 
Working Full-time for Wages and Salaries: Means (%) with 
standard deviations in brackets
A u stra lia  1989 A ustra lia  1989 C anad a  1991 U SA  1991
(a ) (b) (a) ( a)
Currently married 88.3 86.8 89.7
Log hourly wage 2.62 2.59 2.78 2.56
(in home currency) ( 0 .3 9 ) ( 0 .36 ) (0 .54 ) (0 .56 )
Age 39 .02 38.61 40 .16 39.78
( 10 .4 1 ) ( 10 .4 7 ) (9 .93 ) ( 10 .45 )
Location 69.7 69.4 42.2 32.8
Ethnicity 17.3 17.7 14.8 7.0
Education
Bachelor 16.2 16.3 17.1 28.6
Certificate/Diploma 16.3 16.0 31.9 8.0
Post-secondary 28.0 27.7 7.1 18.2
Secondary 11.4 11.3 27.0 34.1
N° of observations 4 7 1 2 5 127 6 284 4  656
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
A u stra lia  1994 C anad a 1994 U SA  1994
(b) ( a) ( a)
Currently married 83.1 89.6
Log hourly wage 2.72 2.87 2.63
(in home currency) (0 .4 4 ) ( 0 .51 ) (0 .61 )
Age 39 .50 40 .38 39 .52
( 10 . 13) ( 9 .63 ) ( 10 .37 )
Location 63.2 58.7 35.4
Ethnicity
Education
28.4 12.8 7.2
Bachelor 18.5 20.3 31.3
Certificate/Diploma 10.8 34.0 8.3
Post-secondary 29.0 7.3 18.3
Secondary 41.8 25.6 31.7
N° of observations 2 462 1 0 3 1 6 18 864
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
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5.B.1 C urrently m arried men
A ustralia  1989 A ustralia  1989 C anad a 1991 U SA  1991
(a) (b) (a) (a)
L og hourly  w age (in 2.63 2.61 2.80 2.59
hom e currency) (0.38) (0.35) (0.54) (0 .55)
A ge 40.04 39.83 40 .99 40 .70
(10.14) (10.15) (9.68) (10 .30)
L ocation 68.9 68.5 41.0 31.4
E thn ic ity 17.9 18.1 15.0 6.4
E ducation
B ache lo r 15.4 15.3 16.1 27.4
C ertifica te/D ip lom a 16.4 16.1 32.3 8.0
P ost-secondary 28.7 28.6 6.9 18.4
S econdary 10.6 10.3 26.7 34.7
N° o f  observations 4 161 4 449 5 634 4 098
A ustra lia  1994 C anada 1994 U SA  1994
(b) (a) (a)
Log hourly  w age (in 2.74 2.87 2.68
hom e currency) (0.45) (0.51) (0 .60)
A ge 41.25 40.38 40.83
(9.50) (9.63) (10 .12)
L ocation 62.8 58.2 34.0
E thn ic ity
E duca tion
29.9 13.0 6.6
B achelo r 18.0 20.3 30.5
C ertifica te /D ip lom a 11.0 34.0 8.4
P ost-secondary 30.5 7.3 18.5
S econdary 40.5 25.6 32.2
N ° o f  observations 2 047 9 243 15 977
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5.B.2 Never married men
A u str a lia  198 9 A u str a lia  1 9 8 9 C a n a d a  1991 U S A  1991
(a) (b) (a) (a)
Log hourly wage 2.51 2.51 2.60 2.36
(in home currency) (0.45) (0.38) (0.54) (0.60)
Age 31.29 30.61 32.95 33.04
(9.08) (8.89) (9.15) (9.04)
Location 75.9 75.2 52.5 42.8
Ethnicity
Education
13.4 14.9 13.2 11.7
Bachelor 22.1 22.9 25.7 36.9
Certificate/Diploma 16.2 15.2 28.3 8.1
Post-secondary 22.7 22.4 8.6 17.2
Secondary 17.6 17.9 27.5 30.1
N° of observations 551 678 650 558
A u str a lia  1994 C a n a d a  199 4 U S A  1994
(b) (a) (a)
Log hourly wage 2.60 2.71 2.40
(in home currency) (0.38) (0.51) (0.61)
Age 30.86 34.54 32.24
(8.48) (8.95) (8.55)
Location 64.4 63.1 43.0
Ethnicity 20.4 10.9 10.4
Education
Bachelor 21.0 24.0 36.0
Certificate/Diploma 9.6 32.8 7.8
Post-secondary 21.2 9.6 17.6
Secondary 48.2 23.8 28.9
N° of observations 415 1 073 2 887
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
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5.B.3 Currently married men with wives not working in the paid labour 
market
A ustralia  1989 A ustra lia  1989 C anad a  1991 U SA  1991
(a) (b) (a) (a)
L og hourly  w age 2.63 2.59 2.83 2.64
(in hom e currency) (0.38) (0 .37) (0 .55) (0 .59)
A ge 41.20 40.89 42.51 42 .6
(10.88) (10 .92) (10 .66) (10 .69)
L ocation 66.1 65.5 38.1 37.1
E thn ic ity
E ducation
19.7 20.2 17.4 5.7
B ache lo r 12.5 12.6 13.9 26.4
C ertifica te /D ip lom a 14.5 14.6 31.6 7.0
P ost-secondary 30.6 30.2 5.8 15.9
S econdary 9.0 8.6 25.0 35.1
N° o f  observations 1 554 1 690 1 797 1 044
A ustra lia  1994 C anada 1994 U SA  1994
(b) (a) (a)
L og hou rly  w age 2.75 2.91 2.72
(in  hom e currency) (0.43) (0.52) (0 .67)
A ge 41.46 42.38 42 .37
(10.02) (10 .25) (10 .73)
L ocation 62.2 54.0 39.4
E thn ic ity 30.1 14.9 5.7
E ducation
B achelo r 15.9 17.1 29.7
C ertifica te /D ip lom a 10.8 34.6 6.7
P ost-secondary 30.3 5.8 16.0
S econdary 43.1 25.1 31.2
N° o f  observations 734 2 750 3 764
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5.B.4 Currently married men with wives working part-time in the paid 
labour market
A u str a lia  1989 A u str a lia  198 9 C a n a d a  1991 U S A  1991
(a) (b) (a) (a)
Log hourly wage 2.66 2.62 2.79 2.62
(in home currency) (0.38) (0.36) (0.53) (0.55)
Age 40.86 40.69 40.87 40.25
(9.02) (8.99) (9.11) (10.06)
Location 68.9 67.8 39.3 28.9
Ethnicity
Education
15.0 14.9 14.3 4.5
Bachelor 15.2 15.0 16.6 29.2
Certificate/Diploma 17.7 17.2 32.2 7.7
Post-secondary 28.5 28.5 6.8 17.9
Secondary 10.2 10.0 28.0 33.6
N° of observations 1 201 1 269 1 350 818
A u str a lia  1994 C a n a d a  1994 U S A  1994
(b) (a) (a)
Log hourly wage 2.77 2.91 2.74
(in home currency) (0.45) (0.51) (0.61)
Age 41.71 40.63 40.78
(8.62) (9.11) (9.83)
Location 60.8 57.2 31.8
Ethnicity
Education
25.3 11.0 4.0
Bachelor 18.4 20.0 33.1
Certificate/Diploma 12.5 36.6 8.7
Post-secondary 31.2 7.4 19.0
Secondary 37.9 25.4 31.5
N° of observations 615 2 166 3 220
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
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5.B.5: Currently married men with wives working full-time in the paid 
labour market
A ustra lia  1989 A ustra lia  1989 C anad a 1991 U SA  1991
(a) (b) (a) (a)
Log hourly wage 2.62 2.61 2.77 2.55
(in home currency) (0.37) (0.33) (0.54) (0.53)
Age 38.06 37.91 39.96 39.96
(9.92) (9.89) (9.08) (10.08)
Location 72.1 72.4 44.0 29.7
Ethnicity 18.3 18.5 13.7 7.4
Education
Bachelor 18.7 18.6 17.5 27.2
Certificate/Diploma 17.3 16.9 33.0 8.5
Post-secondary 26.9 26.8 7.7 19.7
Secondary 12.7 12.5 27.6 34.9
N° of observations 1 406 1 490 2 487 2 236
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
A ustra lia  1994 C anada 1994 U SA  1994
(b) (a) (a)
Log hourly wage 2.72 2.88 2.63
(in home currency) (0.47) (0.49) (0.56)
Age 40.62 40.44 40.21
(9.62) (9.04) (9.89)
Location 65.2 61.4 32.5
Ethnicity
Education
33.6 12.9 8.0
Bachelor 19.8 21.6 29.8
Certificate/Diploma 10.0 32.7 9.0
Post-secondary 30.2 7.5 19.3
Secondary 40.0 26.4 32.8
N° of observations 698 4 327 8 993
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
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Appendix 5.C: Estimating the male marriage premium
(The coefficients from OLS estimation of the log hourly wages of currently married and 
never married men working full-time with t-statistics in parentheses: Australia 1989 & 1994, 
Canada 1991 & 1994 and the USA 1991 & 1994)
Australia 1989 Australia 1989 Canada 1991 USA 1991
(a ) (b) (a ) (a )
Constant 1.610 1.789 1.281 0.335
(21.895) (28.614) (12.623) (3.247)
Currently married 0.079 0.088 0.134 0.146
(4.574) (6.050) (5.968) (6.338)
Age 0.038 0.286 0.051 0.074
(9.850) (8.675) (10.037) (14.135)
Age squared -4.11E-04 -3.26E-04 -5.24E-04 -7.40E-04
(-8.925) (-8.171) (-8.620) -(11.830)
Education
Bachelor 0.372 0.409 0.455 0.663
(22.559) (28.518) (20.145) (25.763)
Certificate/Diploma 0.203 0.212 0.232 0.461
(12.454) (14.859) (11.661) (13.731)
Post-secondary 0.109 0.111 0.184 0.403
(7.792) (9.083) (6.261) (14.656)
Secondary 0.109 0.134 0.153 0.294
(5.870) (8.226) (7.446) (11.797)
Adjusted R squared 0.1425 0.1717 0.1030 0.2423
N° of observations 4 712 5 127 6 284 4 656
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
Australia 1994 Canada 1994 USA 1994
(b) (a ) (a )
Constant 1.929 0.886 0.326
(15.272) (11.630) (5.952)
Currently Married 0.092 0.092 0.133
(3.609) (5.869) (11.816)
Age 0.030 0.075 0.077
(4.502) (19.738) (27.561)
Age squared -3.39E-04 -7.64E-04 -7.60E-04
(-4.181) (-16.977) (-22.707)
Education
Bachelor 0.340 0.424 0.713
(14.381) (25.336) (52.083)
Certificate/Diploma 0.164 0.224 0.455
(5.698) (14.449) (25.616)
Post-secondary 0.020 0.185 0.372
(0.990) (8.480) (25.172)
Secondary 0.126 0.274
(7.765) (20.111)
Adjusted R squared 0.1135 0.1428 0.2622
N° of observations 2 462 10316 18 864
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
168
Decomposing Dynamics
Appendix 5.D: Estimating the disaggregated male marriage premium with 
wives’ labour supply exogenous
(The coefficients from OLS estimation of the log hourly wages of currently married and 
never married men working full-time with t-statistics in parentheses: Australia 1989 & 1994, 
Canada 1991 & 1994 and the USA 1991 & 1994)
Australia 1989 Australia 1989 Canada 1991 USA 1991
(a) (b) (a) (a)
Constant 1.621 1.796 1.233 0.328
(21.884) (28.498) (12.114) (3.180)
Wife not working 0.092 0.089 0.185 0.203
(4.862) (5.567) (7.505) (7.592)
Wife working 0.093 0.097 0.123 0.181
part-time (4.716) (5.735) (4.821) (6.566)
Wife working 0.060 0.083 0.105 0.111
full-time (3.220) (5.212) (4.454) (4.642)
Age 0.037 0.028 0.054 0.074
(9.634) (8.491) (10.478) (14.226)
Age squared -4.07E-04 -3.22E-04 -5.56E-04 -7.47E-04
(-8.764) (-8.008) (-9.120) (-11.972)
Education
Bachelor 0.375 0.409 0.463 0.670
(22.701) (28.483) (20.486) (26.070)
Certificate/Diploma 0.205 0.213 0.238 0.470
(12.557) (14.855) (11.948) (14.028)
Post-secondary 0.109 0.111 0.193 0.413
(7.832) (9.087) (6.545) (15.026)
Secondary 0.111 0.134 0.160 0.301
(5.987) (8.236) (7.773) (12.094)
Adjusted R squared 0.1435 0.1716 0.1064 0.2456
N° of observations 4 712 5 127 6 284 4 656
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
169
Chapter Five
A u str a lia  1994
(b)
U S A  199 4
(a)
C a n a d a  1994
(a)
Constant 1.937 0.308 0.897
(15.279) (5.627) (11.356)
Wife not working 0.108 0.198 0.119
(3.826) (14.572) (6.800)
Wife working 0.108 0.178 0.101
part-time (3.657) (12.784) (5.647)
Wife working 0.064 0.093 0.071
full-time (2.281) (7.916) (4.327)
Age 0.030 0.078 0.076
(4.429) (27.924) (19.962)
Age squared -3.36E-04 -7.74E-04 -7.77E-04
(-4.123) (-23.157) (-17.232)
Education
Bachelor 0.342 0.719 0.428
(14.444) (52.573) (25.517)
Certificate/Diploma 0.163 0.465 0.225
(5.669) (26.229) (14.517)
Post-secondary 0.020 0.382 0.189
(0.989) (25.799) (8.630)
Secondary 0.282 0.128
(20.714) (7.895)
Adjusted R squared 0.1145 0.2673 0.1441
N° of observations 2 462 18 864 10316
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
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Appendix 5.E: Estimating the disaggregated male marriage premium with 
wives’ labour supply endogenous
(The coefficients from OLS estimation of the log hourly wages of currently married and 
never married men working full-time with t-statistics in parentheses: Australia 1989 & 1994, 
Canada 1991 & 1994 and the USA 1991 & 1994)
Australia 1989 Australia 1989 Canada 1991 USA 1991
(a) (b) (a) (a)
Constant 1.630 1.843 1.256 0.352
(21.296) (28.403) (12.007) (3.397)
Wife not working 0.083 0.078 0.140 0.129
(4.455) (4.960) (5.688) (4.509)
Wife working 0.092 0.120 -0.097 0.291
part-time (4.381) (6.584) (-1.168) (3.933)
Wife working 0.071 0.089 0.133 0.147
full-time (3.850) (5.694) (5.764) (6.319)
Age 0.037 0.026 0.053 0.073
(9.193) (7.509) (9.987) (13.899)
Age squared -4.00E-04 -2.90E-04 -5.39E-04 -7.27E-04
(-8.322) (-7.016) (-8.585) (-11.558)
Education
Bachelor 0.374 0.408 0.460 0.660
(22.510) (28.296) (20.104) (25.468)
Certificate/Diploma 0.203 0.210 0.235 0.459
(12.428) (14.637) (11.671) (13.579)
Post-secondary 0.109 0.110 0.186 0.400
(7.798) (9.003) (6.261) (14.351)
Secondary 0.110 0.131 0.156 0.293
(5.889) (8.023) (7.516) (11.637)
Adjusted R squared 0.1425 0.1730 0.1039 0.2417
N° of observations 4 712 5 127 6 284 4 656
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
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A ustra lia  1994 U SA  1994 C anada 1994
(b) (a) (a)
Constant 1.995 0.362 0.918
(15.392) (6.518) (11.746)
Wife not working 0.082 0.093 0.078
(2.986) (5.844) (4.348)
Wife working 0.137 0.260 0.142
part-tim e (4.233) (4.580) (3.672)
Wife working 0.089 0.138 0.096
fu ll-tim e (3.195) (12.128) (5.989)
Age 0.021 0.076 0.073
(3.891) (26.759) (18.838)
Age squared -2.99E-04 -7.40E-04 -7.43E-04
(-3.592) (-21.840) (-16.060)
Education
Bachelor 0.338 0.702 0.420
(14.268) (50.400) (24.806)
Certificate/Diploma 0.159 0.444 0.221
(5.506) (24.650) (14.184)
Post-secondary 0.018 0.362 0.181
(0.858) (23.944) (8.223)
Secondary 0.264 0.123
(19.049) (7.528)
Adjusted R squared 0.1146 0.2628 0.1430
N° of observations 2 462 18 864 10316
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
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Appendix 5.F: The coefficients from OLS estimation of the log hourly wages 
of men working full-time grouped by their degree of 
specialisation with t-statistics in parentheses: Australia 1989 
& 1994, Canada 1991 & 1994 and the USA 1991 & 1994
A u str a lia  1 9 8 9  (a) Married Married Married
Never Married Wife working Wife working Wife not
full-time part-time working
Constant 1.875 1.613 1.707 1.468
(7.968) (12.573) (9.358) (10.285)
Age 0.027 0.039 0.036 0.050
(2.019) (5.875) (4.087) (7.160)
Age squared -3.38E-04 -0.30E-04 -3.825E-04 -5.467E-04
(-1.950) (-5.113) (-3.652) (-6.810)
Education
Bachelor 0.363 0.390 0.382 0.371
(6.486) (14.237) (11.739) (12.185)
Certificate/Diploma 0.246 0.238 0.190 0.170
(4.071) (8.530) (6.151) (5.943)
Post-secondary 0.138 0.133 0.112 0.081
(2.487) (5.351) (4.165) (3.569)
Secondary 0.082 0.150 0.121 0.085
(1.379) (4.820) (3.257) (2.452)
Adjusted R squared 0.0895 0.1749 0.1283 0.1292
N° of observations 551 1 406 1 201 1 554
A u str a lia  1 9 8 9  (b ) Married Married Married
Never Married Wife working Wife working Wife not
full-time part-time working
Constant 1.957 1.789 1.863 1.789
(11.257) (16.101) (11.353) (14.352)
Age 0.022 0.034 0.028 0.033
(2.195) (5.788) (3.460) (5.408)
Age squared -2.74E-04 -3.91E-04 -3.06E-04 -3.746E-04
(-2.084) (-5.331) (-3.232) (5.266)
Education
Bachelor 0.359 0.385 0.467 0.417
(8.585) (16.215) (15.883) (15.274)
Certificate/Diploma 0.203 0.193 0.239 0.209
(4.381) (7.926) (8.517) (8.170)
Post-secondary 0.143 0.098 0.132 0.942
(3.397) (4.538) (5.451) (4.592)
Secondary 0.129 0.126 0.176 0.101
(2.879) (4.646) (0.176) (3.206)
Adjusted R squared 0.1075 0.1868 0.1870 0.1538
N° of observations 678 1 490 1 269 1 690
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
173
Chapter Five
C anad a  1991
N ev er M arried
M arried  
W ife w ork ing  
fu ll-tim e
M arried  
W ife w ork ing  
part-tim e
M arried  
W ife no t 
w ork ing
C onstan t 1.329 1.344 0.864 1.473
(4 .764) (7.410) (3 .541) (7 .368)
A ge 0 .052 0.055 0.078 0.050
(3 .490) (6 .083) (6 .510) (5 .223)
A ge squared -5 .58E -04 -5 .82E -04 -8 .24E -04 -4 .94E -04
(-2 .901) (-5 .325) (-5 .851) (-4 .557)
E ducation
B achelo r 0 .326 0.490 0.449 0.498
(4 .239) (13 .170) (9 .439) (11 .852)
C ertifica te /D ip lom a 0 .240 0.220 0.223 0.264
(3 .145) (6 .591) (5.349) (7 .723)
P ost-secondary 0 .214 0.167 0.281 0.124
(2 .229) (3.584) (4 .514) (2 .158)
S econdary 0 .180 0.156 0.139 0.162
(2 .335) (4 .572) (3 .230) (4.496)
A djusted  R squared 0 .0616 0.0946 0.1139 0.0980
N° o f  observa tions 650 2 487 1 350 1 797
U SA  1991 M arried M arried M arried
N ev e r M arried W ife w ork ing W ife w ork ing W ife no t
fu ll-tim e part-tim e w ork ing
C onstan t -0 .422 0.570 0.265 0.187
(-1 .316) (3 .763) (1 .004) (0.809)
A ge 0 .120 0.069 0.087 0.087
(6 .873) (9 .044) (6 .696) (7 .857)
A ge squared -1 .52E -03 -6 .82E -04 -8 .6E -04 -8 .58E -04
(-6 .607) (-7 .402) (-5 .568) (-6 .841)
E duca tion
B achelo r 0 .765 0.623 0.552 0.801
(8 .403) (16.487) (9 .294) (16 .511)
C ertifica te /D ip lom a 0.625 0.445 0.347 0.517
(5 .389) (9.414) (4 .379) (7 .546)
P ost-secondary 0.611 0.362 0.354 0.453
(6 .123) (9 .175) (5 .526) (8.448)
S econdary 0.463 0.294 0.230 0.277
(4 .985) (8.031) (3 .973) (6 .071)
A djusted  R squared 0 .1994 0.2110 0.2297 0.3210
N° o f  observations 558 2 236 818 1 044
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A ustra lia  1994 M arried M arried M arried
N ever M arried W ife w ork ing W ife w ork ing W ife  n o t
fu ll-tim e part-tim e w ork ing
C onstan t 1.832 2.162 1.540 2 .389
(8.081) (7 .555) (4 .695) (9 .009)
A ge 0.034 0.023 0.056 0 .112
(6.657) (1 .578) (3 .540) (0 .860)
A ge squared -3 .83E -04 -2 .61E -04 -6 .55E -04 -1 .12E -04
(-2 .199) (-1 .468) (-1 .225) (-0 .738)
E ducation
B achelor 0.362 0.335 0.311 0 .359
(7.886) (7 .099) (6 .321) (7 .975)
C ertifica te/D ip lom a 0.179 0.099 0.184 0 .188
(2.956) (1 .649) (3 .252) (3 .599)
Post-secondary 0.068 0.005 -0.051 0 .074
(1.526) (0 .127) (-1 .225) (2 .035)
A djusted  R squared 0.1754 0.0789 0.1122 0 .0846
N° o f  observations 415 698 615 734
C anad a 1994 M arried M arried M arried
N ever M arried W ife w ork ing W ife w ork ing W ife  no t
fu ll-tim e part-tim e w ork ing
C onstan t 1.057 1.149 0.689 0 .996
(5.419) (9 .063) (3 .863) (6 .478)
A ge 0.070 0.071 0.095 0 .078
(6.351) (11.267) (10 .820) (10 .637)
A ge squared -7 .32E -04 -7 .38E -04 -9 .99E -04 -8 .09E -04
(-5 .125) (-9 .716) (-9 .608) (9 .617)
E duca tion
B achelo r 0.228 0 .347 0.308 0.413
(5.806) (18.344) (10 .873) (15 .562)
C ertifica te/D ip lom a 0.161 0.122 0.105 0.178
(4.478) (7 .286) (4 .387) (8 .352)
P ost-secondary 0.098 0.071 0.091 0 .156
(1.816) (2 .542) (2 .228) (3.811
A djusted  R squared 0.1155 0.1297 0.1318 0.135
N° o f  observations 1 073 4 327 2 166 2 750
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U SA  1994 M arried M arried M arried
N ev er M arried W ife w ork ing W ife w ork ing W ife not
fu ll-tim e part-tim e w orking
C onstan t 0.231 0.59 0.243 0.339
(1 .644) (9 .260) (1 .695) (2.348)
A ge 0.101 0.073 0.010 0.090
(12 .682) (17.884) (13.999) (12.890)
A ge squared -1 .16E -03 -7 .34E -04 -1.00E -03 -8 .79E -04
(-10.808) (-14.940) (-11.883) (-11.085)
E ducation
B ache lo r 0.413 0.469 0.461 0.697
(17 .365) (37 .425) (20.453) (32.042)
C ertifica te/D ip lom a 0.234 0.205 0.236 0.359
(6 .348) (10.709) (6.670) (9.446)
P ost-secondary 0.140 0.136 0.164 0.252
(4 .781) (9 .516) (6 .249) (9.483
A djusted  R  squared 0.1985 0.2104 0.2344 0.2925
N° o f  observations 2 887 8 993 3 220 3 764
U SA  1994 M arried M arried M arried
N ev er M arried W ife w ork ing W ife w ork ing W ife not
fu ll-tim e part-tim e w orking
C onstan t 0.107 0.590 0.085 0.187
(0 .759) (7 .168) (0.586) (1.321)
A ge 0.099 0.072 0.098 0.085
(12 .391) (17 .615) (13.843) (12.550)
A ge squared -1 .12E -03 -7 .09E -04 -9 .80E -04 8.30E-04
(-10.476) (-14.558) (-11.639) (-10.685)
E ducation
B achelor 0.581 0.664 0.639 0.931
(15 .857) (33 .804) (16.887) (33.295)
C ertifica te/D ip lom a 0.422 0.401 0.415 0.593
(8 .677) (16.470) (8.894) (14.336)
P ost-secondary 0.307 0.332 0.343 0.486
(7 .626) (15 .941) (8 .525) (15.330)
S econdary 0.224 0.250 0.221 0.355
(5 .999) (12 .840) (5 .844) (12.920)
A djusted  R  squared 0.2081 0.2246 0.2422 0.3224
N° o f  observations 2 887 8 993 3 220 3 764
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Appendix 5.G: Components of Juhn et al decomposition of the differences in 
the residual log wage gap between males grouped by supposed 
intensity of specialisation: USA 1994 - USA 1991
P ercen tage po in t M ean P ercen tile  o f C orrespond ing D u S A -1 9 9 4  ~
diffe rence  in log residual m ean  residual in m ean  residual D u S A -1991
w ages (Dj) o f  first ow n y e a r’s in U SA  1991
nam ed d istribu tion  o f d istribu tion  o f
group second  nam ed second  nam ed
group group
W ife no t w ork ing  
-  n eve r m arried
U SA  1994 0.32 0.2356 68.0 0.2691 0.03
U SA  1991 0.29 0.3702 78.3
W ife w ork ing  
part-tim e - never 
m arried
U SA  1994 0.34 0.2048 65.0 0.2352 0.07
U SA  1991 0.27 0.2895 69.0
W ife w ork ing  
fu ll-tim e -  never 
m arried
U SA  1994 0.23 0.1127 57.4 0.1687 0.03
U SA  1991 0.20 0.2102 61.1
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Appendix 5.H: Components of the Juhn et al. decomposition of the cross­
country differences in the residual log wage gaps between 
males grouped by supposed intensity of specialisation using 
USA as the base
5.H.1: First time period
Country Percentage point Mean Percentile of Corresponding Dj -  D u s a
difference in log residual mean residual in mean residual
wages (Dj) of first own country’s in USA 1991
named nm distribution distribution of
group of second second named
named group group
Wife not working 
- never married
Australia 0.11 0.1217 62.8 0.2184 -0.18
(a)
Australia 0.08 0.0952 60.4 0.1937 -0.21
(b)
Canada 0.23 0.1825 59.6 0.1888 -0.06
USA 0.29 0.3702 78.3
Wife working 
part-time -  never 
married
Australia 0.14 0.1239 63.4 0.2219 -0.13
(a)
Australia 0.12 0.1064 65.3 0.2405 -0.15
(b)
Canada 0.19 0.1204 53.9 0.1367 -0.08
USA 0.27 0.2895 69.0
Wife working 
full-time -  never
married
Australia 0.10 0.0785 55.2 0.1558 -0.10
(a)
Australia 0.11 0.0872 59.6 0.1888 -0.09
(b)
Canada 0.17 0.1015 51.7 0.1004 -0.03
USA 0.20 0.2102 61.1
(a) Males working full-time full-year with wage based on annual earnings.
(b) Males working full-time in reference week with wage based on reference week earnings.
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5.H.2: Second time period
C ountry Percen tage po in t M ean P ercen tile  o f C orrespond ing Di - D usa
diffe rence  in log residual m ean  residual m ean  residua l
w ages (Dj) o f  first in ow n in  U SA  1994
nam ed co u n try ’s nm d istribu tion  o f
group distribu tion  o f second  nam ed
second  nam ed group
group
W ife no t w orking 
-  never m arried
A ustralia 0.14 0.1071 65.3 0.2092 -0.18
C anada 0.16 0.1257 57.8 0.1208 -0 .16
U SA 0.32 0.2694 69.9
W ife w ork ing  
part-tim e -  never
m arried
A ustralia 0.17 0.1048 65.3 0.2092 -0 .17
C anada 0.19 0.1151 56.7 0.1071 -0.15
U SA 0.34 0.2506 68.2
W ife w ork ing  
fu ll-tim e -  never
m arried
A ustralia 0.11 0.0630 59.8 0.1425 -0.09
C anada 0.16 0.0868 53.0 0.0711 -0 .04
U SA 0.20 0.1567 61.2
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Unravelling the Relationship Between the Wages 
of Married Men and Their Wives’ Labour Supply
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with further unravelling the relationship between the 
wife’s labour supply and the husband’s wage in Australia 1994, Canada 1994 and 
the USA 1994. Here the waves’ labour supply appears as a continuous variable. 
Primarily, the analysis reported in this chapter was designed to answer the 
question of whether simultaneity bias exists in single equation estimates of the 
husband’s wage and the wife’s labour supply and secondly to establish the 
direction of causality between the two. In so doing it adds to the thematic analysis 
of this thesis. If the empirical analysis showed that there was some causality 
running from wives’ hours to husbands’ wage it provides more support for 
specialisation.
The analysis presented in Chapter Five investigated to what extent traditional 
gender based specialisation within marriage could explain the dynamics of cross­
country differences in the male marriage premium. The extent of specialisation 
was modelled by wives’ degree of attachment to the paid labour market - whether 
they worked full-time, part-time or not at all. I instrumented the wives’ labour 
supply to test for its endogeneity. However, the explanatory ability of the 
available instruments was inadequate. They proved poor predictors of wives who 
worked part-time, especially amongst Canadian and US women. I continued the 
analysis on the presumption that the wives’ labour supply was exogenous and 
found some empirical evidence to support the existence of a causal relationship 
between specialisation within marriage and the husband’s wage. It was 
anticipated that it would be easier to instrument continuous hours than the set of 
dummy variables used in Chapter Five.
I also investigated whether specialisation was more important to couples with, and 
without, dependent children. Analyses of household behaviour, such as Apps and
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Rees (1994), assume that the nature of the household decision making process 
depends on the presence of children. It is possible that the mechanics of the 
specialisation process also differs with the presence of children. Once couples 
have children their home production will tend to become more valuable and 
demanding. Becker (1985) claims that caring for children is one of the only 
activities undertaken in the home that demands more effort than the average 
man’s job. Having children increases the pressure to specialise. Similarly, in 
terms of labour supply, an increase in the husband’s wage may be more of an 
inducement for a wife with children to reduce her hours in the paid labour force 
than for a wife without children.
The analysis presented here suggests that wives’ hours were endogenous in the 
husbands’ wage equation, as was husbands’ wage in the wives’ hours equation. 
Having controlled for endogeneity the analysis suggested that specialisation was 
undertaken by couples with dependent children. However, amongst couples 
without dependent children there was no evidence of specialisation. The 
estimated marginal benefits of specialisation decreased as the wife worked longer 
hours.
A caveat is that the instrument for wives’ hours was still far from perfect, 
especially for Canadian and US couples with dependent children.
In the next section I briefly outline the model to be estimated, and follow up with 
a description of the estimation procedure in section 6.3. In section 6.4 I describe 
the data and present the results in section 6.5. Conclusions appear in section 6.6.
6.2 Modelling the Simultaneous Determination of the Wives’ Labour 
Supply and the Husbands’ Wage
Models of the labour market outcomes of married couples tend to focus on the 
interrelationship between the labour supply of the husband and wife. The 
husband’s wage is usually assumed to be exogenous and the wife’s wage 
endogenous, determined jointly with her labour supply. Since I am concerned
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with unravelling the relationship between the wife’s labour supply and the 
husband’s wage I endogenised the husband’s wage within the traditional 
framework of household labour supply. I also endogenised the husband’s labour 
supply. Moffit (1984), Lundberg (1985) and Hotchkiss (1991) demonstrate and 
discuss the importance of the simultaneous determination of wages and hours.
The inclusion of husbands’ hours in the husbands’ wage equation may provide 
more information about the link between specialisation and increased 
productivity. It could show whether extra time spent on the job directly affects 
productivity and earnings. However, an important component of the 
specialisation process is effort, and that is not necessarily depicted in hours 
worked.
Endogenising wives’ hours allows the effect of wives’ hours on husbands’ 
earnings to be viewed independently of the following effects:
• economic models of the labour supply of married women assume that they are 
less apt to work in the paid labour market the higher their husbands’ income; 
and
• wives’ hours may be correlated with, but not causally linked to, husbands’ 
wage. This correlation could be positive or negative. An explanation for 
negative correlation is that males and females select into marriage on the basis 
of unobservable male characteristics that are valued by the labour market and 
female characteristics which encourage the wife to spend less time in the 
labour market. Positive correlation would be evidenced if selection into 
marriage were made on the basis of characteristics valued by the paid labour 
market; men’s unobserved characteristics and women’s observed and 
unobserved characteristics.
I differentiated the couples on the basis of the presence of dependent children. 
The primary reason for the differentiation was that there is more need for 
specialisation when children are present. Child-care is one of the most time and 
energy intensive activities undertaken in the household. When couples have 
children the value of work undertaken in the home tends to increase. Apps and
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Rees (1994) also argued the household decision-making process depends on the 
presence of children. It is possible that the nature of the relationship between 
specialisation and wives’ labour supply differs depending on the presence of 
dependent children.
Cross-section analysis has found a higher marriage premium for men with 
dependent children (for example, Cornwell and Rupert, 1997; Korenman and 
Neumark, 1991). My findings, reported in Chapter Four, were mixed. In 
regressions, where married men included men living in de-facto relationships, I 
found that Canadian men with dependent children did receive a higher premium, 
regardless of the age of their children. Australian men with children older than 
six also received a higher premium. But the size of the estimated American 
premium did not vary with parenthood.
However, at least in terms of the wives’ labour market outcomes, research by 
Shapiro and Mott (1994) suggests that the presence of children may be a 
deceptive point of differentiation. Research has shown that a mother’s proclivity 
to work depends, less on the age and number of her children, than on her labour 
supply history. Her labour supply history depends crucially on her level of desire 
to have a career before marriage and parenthood (Shapiro and Mott, 1994, 
Rexroat and Shehan, 1984 and Desai and Waite, 1992). Shapiro and Mott (1994) 
concluded that a married woman’s proclivity to work around the time of having 
her first child is a good indication of career intentions. Desai and Waite’s (1992) 
findings confirmed this. They found that planned homemakers return to work 
more slowly in the baby’s first year than those with career/employment 
aspirations. When planned home-makers made a decision on whether to return to 
work family finances had a stronger effect than it did in the similar decision 
making process of other women. Morgan (1994) finds that women who plan on 
remaining employed after childbirth, tend to delay the birth of their first child.
Not having information as to work intentions of the wives at the time of their first 
child, I opted to split the sample into two: couples with and without dependent 
children. However, when analysing each sub-sample I am aware that I am not 
dealing with homogeneous women in terms of the responsiveness of their
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proclivity to work given the explanatory variables, such as education. Amongst 
couples with dependent children there may be women who will work 
continuously regardless of the age and number of their children. There will be 
those who will only take small breaks and go back to their old job. Others will 
return to work but in a downgraded position with the same number of hours. 
Others will return to their old job but work part-time in a job sharing arrangement. 
And there will be those that leave the work force altogether. Although we 
describe the wife’s ability to help her husband’s career on the basis of the hours 
she works we can see that the number of hours she works could have very 
different impacts on her husband’s career.
Regardless of the differing desires to work, couples without dependent children 
can be thought of as comprising three types; those who plan to never have 
children, those who plan to have children and those with children older than 18. 
Unfortunately I am unable to identify these women.
I assumed a single family-utility model. This model assumes that the labour 
market outcomes of the husband and wife are the result of the maximisation of the 
husband’s utility function1. The household head maximises a twice differentiable 
and strictly quasi-concave utility function, the arguments of which are 
consumption of a composite good, the result of combining goods and services 
purchased from the market and home production, and the leisure time of both 
husband and wife. Utility is maximised subject to a budget constraint in which all 
earnings are pooled.
The utility function is of the form:
U = U(cf, l w, lH,e) (6.1)
where c represents the family’s consumption of the composite good (a 
combination of home production and goods and services purchased in the market), 
lw and 1h are the leisure hours of the wife and husband respectively and e is an
model that assumes a single family-utility function has an important limitation. It fails to 
incorporate the process by which resources are distributed within households. I assumed that the 
resources are shared in a way that rewards the wife accordingly if she provides wage-enhancing 
support to her husband’s career through specialisation.
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unobservable error term varying from one couple to another. The error term 
represents differences between couples in terms of tastes for leisure and goods 
consumption.
The following equations represent constraints on the family’s utility 
maximisation:
Cf = W w H w + W hH h + Y (6.2)
£II£ (6.3)
K h = 1 - H h - 1 h (6.4)
W h =  g (K w , H h, X h) (6.5)
W \\ =  g (K \v , Hw, Xw) (6.6)
where Hw and Hm are the hours worked in the paid labour market by the wife and 
husband respectively; kw is the hours the wife devotes to activities at home and kn 
is the hours the husband devotes to home production; X is a vector of exogenous 
determinants of the wage, such as education and work experience; and Y is non­
labour income.
The time constraints are
T — l\y + H\y + kw (6.7)
T = 1h + Hh + kn (6.8)
where T is total time available.
The utility maximisation process yields demand curves for the goods and services 
purchased in the market, market labour supply functions, leisure functions for the 
husband and wife, home production functions for the husband and wife and wage 
functions for the husband and wife. I discarded the demand curves because they 
are outside the scope of my interest. Since the data sets only contain information 
on time spent in the labour market I also discarded the equations for supply of 
time to leisure and home production.
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Amongst couples, with and without dependent children, I assumed that the degree 
of specialisation in the household was represented by wives’ labour supply. The 
hours worked by the husband do not necessarily reflect the degree of 
specialisation. All husbands work full-time but, as Becker (1985) argued, the 
effort applied to each hour of work is very important. Hence two men working 
the same hours might expend different levels of effort, because they undertake 
different sorts of home production in terms of effort intensity. This, I hope, will 
be approximated by the wives’ labour supply. She makes the decision about how 
much energy she has left over for work in the paid labour market, based on how 
much time and effort she is required to use in home production. The inverse of 
her effort level in home production is that of her husband.
My motivation is to unravel the relationship between the wife’s hours, 
representing specialisation within the home, and the husband’s wage. Thus, it is 
important to isolate linkages within that relationship. The two structural equations 
to be estimated are as follows:
W h =  cco+  ociEdn +  o^Agen +  o^Ethn +  CX4L 0 C +  ßHp +  p H n  +  enw (6.9)
H\y = ((>0 + (jqEdw d" 2̂ Agew + (j^Ethw “b ^L oc + (jisWw + <̂6^  + (J^Kids + y'Wm
+ XHh + v\vh (6.10)
where Ed represents dummies for highest education received; Age reflects years of 
work experience and this variable squared, Eth is an ethnicity dummy, Loc is a 
location dummy, Kids are dummies for the age and number of children2 and e^w 
and vfh are errors in husbands’ wage equation and wives’ labour supply equation 
respectively. The specification of the male wage equation is a standard human 
capital based one.
The equation for wives’ hours is a common specification of the type that 
Killingsworth (1983) has coined the second-generation labour supply function. 
Second generation models of labour supply are based on the presumption that the 
labour supply function is composed of two functions, rather than one continuous
2 These variables are defined in Appendix 4.A.
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function. If the wife’s wage exceeds her reservation wage she works, and her 
labour supply (in hours) is assumed to be a continuous function of the explanatory 
variables described in equation 6.10. If her wage is less than or equal to her 
reservation wage she does not work, so her labour supply equals zero. The same 
observable variables and parameters affect both the decision to work and the 
amount of hours worked conditional on working.
6.3 Estimating the Model
Estimation of the structural form of the wives’ hours equation is a complex 
process. The following description of the complications involved (leading to 
biased and/or inefficient parameter estimates), and procedures designed to deal 
with the complications, is informed primarily by Killingsworth (1983), Bemdt 
(1991) and Maddala (1983). The complications are that:
• the wife’s wage is not observable when she is not working;
• there could be sample selection bias in the estimated parameters of the wage 
equation for working wives;
• the wife’s wage may be endogenous in her hours equation;
• the wife’s labour market experience may be endogenous in her hours equation;
• the wife’s labour supply includes positive hours and zero hours; and
• identification may not be assured.
Below I describe each of the complications and outline the approaches I have 
taken to deal with them.
The wife’s wage is an explanatory variable in her labour supply equation 
(equation 6.10). However a wage is not observable for the wife if she is not 
working. The standard procedure is to estimate a wage equation for working 
wives and use the estimated coefficients to impute a wage for the non-workers.
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W \y- cpo + cpiEdw + (p2Expw (p3Eth\y + (P4L0C + eww (6*11)
where eww is the error in the wife’s wage equation. Estimation of a combined 
wage equation for wives who work full- and part-time is by no means 
unprecedented, although it could be argued that full-time and part-time workers 
are drawn from different segments of the labour market in terms of return to 
human capital. Few studies have considered this question, although we do know 
that US and Canadian women working full-time earn more per hour than their 
part-time counterparts and the reverse is true for Australian women. The majority 
of Australian women working part-time are employed in casual jobs, as opposed 
to pennanent jobs. In Australia, casual workers should receive salary ‘loadings’ 
to compensate for the foregone benefits of permanent employment, so gross 
hourly earnings are likely to overstate the wage rates of casual workers3. Many 
women working part-time are employed in casual jobs.
Estimation of the structure of wages for wives using only wives who work is 
problematic if wives select into work on the basis of a characteristic(s) which also 
affect(s) their wage. For example a career minded woman might be more likely to 
work and also receive a higher wage in recognition of that career-mindedness. 
However career-mindedness is regarded as an unobservable variable in the sense 
that it is not included in the usual set of exogenous variables used to describe 
female wages, such as work experience, education and husbands’ earnings. 
Hence the parameter estimates in 6.11 are inconsistent because the conditional 
expectation of the disturbance term is non zero and the disturbance term is 
correlated with the regressors.
3 US evidence suggests that a dichotomy exists between part-time and full time work. Miller 
(1993) finds that part-time employment is concentrated within unskilled occupations providing 
limited access to training and advancement. Indeed Mincer and Ofek (1982) showed that part-time 
work experience in the USA did not lead to an increase in wages. They also found little evidence 
that continuing part-time employment led to higher wage rates than those received by people who 
had withdrawn entirely from the labour market for the same period. It appears that women do not 
move easily between part-time and full-time work in the USA. Furthermore the return to years of 
work experience could differ markedly between the two groups since the provision of training is 
more likely to be associated with full rather than part-time work. Hawke (1993) showed that a 
great deal of the US part-time/full-time wage differential could be explained by the woman’s 
human capital characteristics if work experience was designated as part- or full- time. She did not 
find this to be the case for Australia however.
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To correct for possible sample selection bias in the wives’ wage equation I used 
Heckman’s (1979) approach. I estimated the labour force participation equation 
for all women, whether working or not, by probit and calculated the inverse Mill’s 
ratio from the resultant parameter estimates. The inverse Mill’s ratio was 
included as a regressor in the wage equation for working wives. It acts as an 
instrument for the wife’s unobserved career mindedness. Hence the wife’s wage 
equation was estimated in its reduced form.
Ww =  (po + (piEdw + cp2E x p w  + (p3Ethw + (p4Kids + cps Loc + ^Inverse
Mill’s Ratio + u (6.12: working wives)
Partw = f(Edw, Agew, Ethw, Loc, Kids, Wagen, Wagew, Property
Income) (6.13: all wives)
where Partw is an indicator function set to one if the wife works in the labour 
market and 0 otherwise. The inverse Mill’s ratio is calculated from (|)(fPred)/(i _ 
0(fpred)) where (fpred) is the predicted participation/indicator function, (j> is the 
standard normal density function and O is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function.
The wife’s wage may be endogenous in her hours equation, for much the same 
reason that there could be sample selection bias in the wife’s wage equation. For 
example there may be correlation between unmeasured factors, such as her taste 
for work, which affect labour supply and unmeasured factors which affect her 
wage such as her career motivation. So the wife’s wage is instrumented in the 
wife’s hours equation. The instrument is a combination variable constructed from 
the predicted values from the estimation of the reduced form wage equation for 
working wives, and the imputed value of wages for non-working wives.
Mroz (1987) concluded empirically that the wife’s labour market experience can 
also be endogenous in her hours equation. A solution is to instrument experience 
with a variable such as age. Proxying labour market experience for women with 
age is problematic because many have interrupted careers, as they take time off 
work to care for children. Therefore, for wives with dependent children I have 
included variables based on the age and number of dependent children to provide
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a more accurate measure of their years of work experience. On average the 
number of years a woman is absent from the work force is dependent on the 
number of children she has. Hence the number of dependent children is also 
included as an explanatory variable4.
The wives’ hours equation cannot be estimated by ordinary least squares because 
the dependent variable is censored at zero. It is a combination of positive hours 
and unobserved hours, which are given a zero value. Hence it is estimated by the 
Tobit procedure. In a sense, Tobit combines regression and probit frameworks, 
since Tobit not only predicts the number of hours worked for each worker but also 
produces the estimated probability that an individual works and thereby helps 
explain why a number of observations are clustered at zero hours.
Equations 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11 are identified because there are enough exogenous 
variables excluded from each equation to act as instrumental variables for the 
endogenous variables appearing as regressors in each equation. For example the 
husband’s education, work experience and ethnicity are exogenous variables 
appearing in equation 6.9 which are excluded from equations 6.10 and 6.11. 
Similarly the wife’s education, experience, ethnicity, household non-labour 
income and the ages and number of children appear as regressors in equations 
6.10 and 6.11, but not in equation 6.9. Equation 6.8 is also identified with respect 
to equation 6.9. For the couples with dependent children there are children 
variables in the participation equation used to calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio, 
and hence equation 6.9, that do not appear as regressors in the wife’s hours 
equation. For couples without children age identification is achieved via 
functional form differences. In the wife’s participation and wage equations her 
age and age squared enter as regressors. In the wife’s hours equation age appears 
as a categorical dummy.
4 The first year consequent on having a baby most women who have been working reduce their 
hours. In general this will result in a reduction in their wage, although in Australia it may well 
result in a wage increase if the woman moves from a permanent to a casual job. Consequently a 
dummy set to one is included in the wife’s wage equation if the age o f the youngest child is less 
than or equal to one.
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In summary, the system of equations 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 are estimated thus. Firstly a 
reduced form wage equation is estimated by OLS for wives who work (equation 
6.11), correcting for sample selection bias as previously explained. Reduced form 
equations for husband’s log wage and log hours are estimated by OLS. Then a 
reduced form wife’s labour supply equation is estimated by tobit. In the second 
step, predicted values of the wives’ log hours and log wages and the husband’s 
log wage and log hours are used as instruments (replacing the observed values of 
the endogenous regressors) in single-equation estimations in order to obtain 
structural parameter estimates for the two equations of interest.
6.4 The Data
The selected samples from the Australia 1994, Canada 1994 and USA 1994 
surveys, comprised couples in which the male partner was aged from 20 to 64 and 
a wage and salary earner, working full-time, full-year. He was not employed in 
the agricultural sector. The female partner, if working, was a wage and salary 
earner not working in the agriculture sector.
The country samples are split into two sub-samples, those with and without 
dependent children. Figures 6.1 through 6.3 describe the distribution of hours 
worked by the wives in the paid labour market. The hours worked by wives 
proxied the couples’ degree of specialisation. Wives were classified as working if 
they reported positive hours in the reference week. Note that when making 
comparisons across countries, Australian hours were top-coded so that all those 
who work more than 50 hours were classified as working 50 hours. Canadian 
hours were top-coded at 65.
In all countries wives without children were more likely to work. They were 
more likely to work full-time and less likely to work part-time than their 
counterparts with children. The difference in the propensity to be in full- time 
employment for wives with and without children was most marked in Australia.
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In all countries a minority of wives worked part-time. Most of those part-time 
jobs were between 10 and 24 hours per week. Nonetheless one could not describe 
the distribution as bi-modal (not working or working full-time) since a substantial 
proportion of wives worked part-time. The proportion of part-time workers was 
highest in Australia and lowest in the USA. Dependent children appeared to have 
little effect on the US and Canadian tendencies to work part-time. In contrast 
Australian wives with dependents were far more likely to work part-time than 
those without. Conelly (1992) concluded that US women working full-time might 
be unwilling or unable to take the significant cut in income and benefits 
associated with part-time work. Furthermore, she suggests that part-time child­
care can be more expensive and difficult to find.
For those working full-time, most Australian and Canadian wives worked from 35 
to 44 hours per week, although a substantial proportion worked more than 44 
hours per week. US wives worked longer weeks with most working from 40 to 44 
hours per week. Amongst wives who worked full-time, the distribution of hours 
did not seem to vary substantially with the presence of children.
Table 6.1 lists the variables used in this study, with their sample means and 
standard deviations, by country. Gross hourly earnings measure the hourly wage. 
Women were regarded as wage earners for the purpose of estimating wages if they 
worked at least ten hours in the reference week and had positive annual earnings. 
The hourly wage was reported in the Australian data set. For the other countries I 
constructed the hourly wage as annual earnings divided by annual hours5.
5 Annual hours for husbands were calculated as hours worked in the reference week multiplied by 
weeks worked full-time in the last year. For females the calculation of annual hours is more 
complex. For those who worked at least 35 hours in the reference week annual hours are 
calculated as reference week hours multiplied by the number of weeks worked full-time. For those 
working less than 35 hours in the reference week but who have also reported working at least one 
week full-time in the previous year annual hours are 35 multiplied by weeks worked full-time plus 
(52 - weeks worked full-time) multiplied by hours worked in the reference week. For all others 
annual hours are reference week hours multiplied by 52.
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Figure 6.1: Wives’ Hours: Australia 1994
Percentage 
of wives (%)
1-9 10-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50+
Wives' hours ■ With dependent children 
ED Without dependent children
Figure 6.2: Wives’ Hours: Canada 1994
Percentage 
of wives (%)
1-9 10-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50+
Wives' hours ■  With dependent children 
E3 Without dependent children
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Figure 6.3: Wives’ Hours: USA 1994
Percentage 
of wives (%)
1-9 10-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50+ 
Wives' hours ■ With dependent children 
□ Without dependent children
As Table 6.1 shows, wives with dependent children worked fewer hours on 
average than those without. As the previous discussion of Figures 6.1 through 6.3 
revealed, this difference in average hours was primarily due to differing 
participation rates, although wives with children working part-time tend to work 
less hours per week than similar wives without children.
In Australia and Canada the average wage was higher for husbands with 
dependents than for those without. This could be due to differences in observed 
human capital, and not specialisation. Males with dependents were on average 
younger than those without in all countries. Only in Canada and Australia were 
fathers more educated than men without dependents.
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6.5 Empirical Results
Firstly, I reported on whether or the size of the estimated premium differed with 
the presence of dependent children. I also tested whether the inclusion of men’s 
hours in their wage equation affected the premium. Then I reported the results of 
estimating the model outlined in section 6.2. The first stage was to estimate the 
reduced form versions of the hours and wages equations for both husbands and 
wives. The second stage was to estimate the structural form of the equations of 
interest, wives’ hours and husbands’ wage.
6.5.1 Was the premium larger for men with dependent children?
The estimated coefficients from the OLS regressions for currently married and 
never married men are reported in Appendix 6.B. These equations included a 
separate marriage dummy for men with dependent children6. The estimated 
coefficient on the marriage dummy for men with dependent children was positive 
in all countries, but only significant (at the ten per cent level) in Canada. The 
marriage premium for Canadian men with dependent children was 11 per cent 
while the premium for men without dependent children was around 7.5 per cent. 
The US findings are inconsistent with Korenman and Neumark (1991) and 
Cornwell and Rupert (1997), who found that the US premium for men with 
dependent children was significantly higher. However, the data they used was 
from the late 1970s.
The inclusion of the log of husband’s hours, and its square, as regressors had little 
effect on the size and significance of the estimated coefficients on the other 
regressors, including marital status. However it increased the explanatory power 
of the model in each of the countries under investigation. In Canada and the USA 
the relationship between the men’s log wage and log of hours was concave, while
6 Chapter Four also contains estimates of the marriage dummy for men with dependent children 
for these surveys. However the samples used for the Chapter Four estimations were different from 
those used in this chapter.
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in Australia the relationship was convex7. The turning point for Australia was 44 
hours, Canada was 26 hours, and the USA was 45 hours. So the estimated 
relationship between hours and wages was negative for all Canadian men working 
full-time, positive for Australian men working more than 44 hours per week and 
positive for US men working less than 46 hours per week.
It appears that the wage of Canadian husbands working full-time did not increase 
with hours worked. If specialisation played a role it would have to feed through 
the unobservable effort expended by husbands on the job. The productivity of 
Australian and US husbands does appear to increase with hours worked over some 
ranges.
6.5.2 The estimated reduced form equations 
Female wages
The first stage was to estimate reduced form wage equations for working wives 
(equation 6.12) so as to instrument wages in the structural wives’ hours equation. 
Instrumented wages were imputed for wives who were not working. The set of 
explanatory variables used for wives without dependent children was wife’s 
education, husband’s education, wife’s age and age squared, wife’s ethnicity, 
husband’s ethnicity, the location and the inverse Mill’s ratio8. The set of 
explanatory variables for wives with dependent children also included the number 
of dependent children and whether the couple had a baby. Estimation results for 
the wife’s wage were in line with other comparable studies. The estimated
7 The hours of Australian men are top-coded at 50 and the hours of Canadian men are top-coded at 
65. I re-estimated the Canadian and US equations top-coding hours 50, but the estimated 
coefficients did not change substantially.
8 The inverse Mill’s ratio was constructed from the estimated coefficients of a probit regression of
whether the wife was working. The set of explanatory variables included the wife’s age and age 
squared, wife’s education, log household property income, wife’s ethnicity, husband’s education, 
husband’s ethnicity and location. For couples with dependent children the set also included the 
number of children and dummy variables describing the age of the youngest child._______________
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coefficient on the inverse Mill’s ratio was significant at the ten per cent level for 
US and Australian wives without children and Canadian and Australian couples 
with children; the signs were negative for those without children and positive for 
those with children9.
Husbands’ wages and husbands’ hours
The husband’s reduced form equations, for log hourly wage and hours, were 
estimated by OLS. The set of explanatory variables included education, ethnicity 
and age for the husband and wife, log of household property income, husband’s 
industry of employment, log of household property income and whether the 
couple owned their home. The set for couples with dependent children also 
included the number of dependent children and the age of the youngest child.
While the estimated log wage models had good explanatory power, the estimated 
hours models had poor explanatory power in all countries. The adjusted R- 
squareds, in each country and sample, were less than 0.08.
Wives ’ Hours
The reduced form equation for wives’ hours were estimated by tobit. They 
included as regressors all the variables listed for husbands’ hours and wage 
equations.
One of the concerns of Chapter Five was that the explanatory power of the 
reduced form model for wives’ hours was not strong enough. Table 6.2 reports 
the correlation coefficients between predicted and actual log hours from each 
estimated equation. Instrument one is the linear combination of the estimated 
coefficients and the regressors. Instrument two is the model’s predicted hours and 
instrument three is predicted hours assuming that the wife works.
9 Until recently finding a negative coefficient was considered problematic. However Ermisch and 
Wright (1994) show that the coefficient can be negative if, given the observed characteristics of 
women (used to explain wage offers and reservation wages), the variance of wage offers is less 
than the covariance between wage offers and reservation wages. In other words unobserved
attributes of women that raise their reservation wage also appear to raise their wage offers._______
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Table 6.2: Pearson’s correlation coefficient for relationship between wives’ 
actual and predicted log hours
Australia Canada USA
Predicted hours With Without With Without With Without
dependent dependent dependent dependent dependent dependent
_________________ children children children children children children
Instrument 1 0.40810 0.41958 0.29561 0.40723 0.30082 0.36885
Instrument 2 0.39947 0.41942 0.29802 0.40764 0.30074 0.36885
Instrument 3 0.39727 0.41928 0.29802 0.40783 0.30074 0,36885
Nowhere does the correlation coefficient exceed 0.45. As in Chapter Five the 
model seems better equipped to explain the hours worked of Australian women. 
In all countries the model works better for wives without dependent children, the 
difference in the explanatory power of equations for couples with and without 
dependents being least marked in Australia.
6.5.3 The estimated structural equations 
Wives ’ Hours
The structural form equation for wives’ hours was estimated by tobit. The 
estimated coefficients are reported in Appendix 6.B. Table 6.3 summarises the 
estimated effects of husbands’ hours and wages on wives’ desired hours, listing 
the estimated coefficients and their significance10.
Couples with dependents
The estimated relationship between exogenous husbands’ wages and wives’ hours 
was significant and negative, at the ten per cent level at least, in all countries.
10 Estimated coefficients from Tobit estimation do not measure the effect on hours worked, given 
a change in the exogenous variable, for individuals who are working. McDonald and Moffitt 
(1980) show that the coefficient is the expected change in desired hours due to a unit change in the 
explanatory variable. To calculate the expected change in actual hours one must take account of 
the probability of having positive hours._______________________________________________
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Table 6.3: The effect of husbands’ wage and husbands’ hours on wives’ 
desired hours
Australia Canada USA
W ith W ithou t W ith W ith ou t W ith W ith o u t
d ep en d en ts d ep en d en ts d ep en d en ts d ep en d en ts d ep en d en ts d ep en d en ts
E xogenous 
L og h u sband’s 
hours
0.100 0.384 0.017 -0.713** -0.998* 0.092
L og h u sband’s 
w age
-0.281** 0.031 -0.184* -0.410* -0.732* -0.424*
R esidual -  log 
h u sb an d ’s
1.073 -2.078* -0.808* -0.899 -4.369* -4.739*
hours
R esidual -  log
h u sb an d ’s
w age
0.379** -2.078* 1.167* 1.252* 2.612* 1.524*
E ndogenous 
L og  h u sband’s 
hours-
N /A 2.974* 0.882* N /A 3.635* 4.571*
instrum ented  
L og h u sband’s -0.675* 1.004* -1.190* -1.507* -3.041* -1.748*
w age -  
instrum ented
L og w iv es’ 
w age -  
instrum ented
6.355* -3.212* 3.327* 2.708* 7.413* 2.236*
Sam ple size 1226 821 5646 3597 9815 6162
* 5 per cent level of significance 
**10 per cent level of significance
This finding is consistent with the conventional view within economics of the 
wife as subsidiary earner. For example, amongst couples with dependents, a ten 
per cent increase in the wage of Australian husbands was accompanied by a 2.81 
per cent decrease in desired hours of their wives. For wives working 25 hours per 
week this translates to about 40 minutes per week.
I tested for endogeneity by considering the significance of the residual, from 
reduced form estimation of the husbands’ wage, when it was included as a 
regressor in the wives’ structural hours equation. In all countries the residual was 
related significantly and positively to wives’ hours. This implies that there were 
unobserved factors related positively to both husbands’ productivity in the paid
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labour market and the length of the wives’ working week11. This suggests that 
couples may sort into marriage on the basis of similar desires for a career, or some 
unobserved career enhancing quality. The negative effect of the endogenised 
husbands’ wage on wives’ labour supply is larger than the exogenous effect. The 
10 per cent Australian wage increase causes a reduction of one hour and 40 
minutes in wives’ desired weekly labour supply from 25 hours.
My estimates suggested that husbands’ hours were endogenous in the wives’ 
hours equation in Canada and the USA, although recall that the reduced form 
model for hours did not have much explanatory power. It appears that in Canada 
and the USA unobserved factors associated with the husband working longer full­
time hours were also associated with the wives’ desire to work a shorter week. 
This finding appears incongruous alongside the finding that there could be a 
positive correlation between unobserved factors, that enhance the husbands’ 
productivity, and wives’ desired hours. One explanation is that husbands and 
wives sort into marriage on the basis of unobserved career enhancing factors. 
Husbands believe that working longer full-time hours can make up for their lack 
of these unobserved career-enhancing factors.
The estimated effect of instrumented husbands’ hours on wives’ desired hours 
was positive for Canadian and US couples. Exogenous husbands’ hours also had 
a positive impact on wives’ desired hours amongst Australian couples. This could 
be a sign of couples sorting into marriage on the basis of education, for example. 
More educated couples would tend to be more focused on careers.
Couples without dependents
When exogenous the husbands’ wage was related significantly and negatively to 
wives’ desired hours in Canada and the USA. The relationship was positive but 
insignificant for Australian couples. The reduced form residual, from the
11 Since there is no appreciable change in the sign and size of the coefficients on the other 
regressors from the regression in which the husband’s wage was assumed exogenous the 
relationship appears to be between unobservable characteristics of the husband and unobservable, 
rather than observable, characteristics of the wife._______________________________________
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husbands’ wage equation, proved to be related significantly to wives’ hours in 
each of the countries. Amongst Canadian and US couples, the relationship was 
positive, as for couples with dependent children. However the Australian 
relationship was negative.
Following re-estimation allowing for endogeneity I found that the size of the 
negative relationship between husbands’ wage and wives’ desired hours increased 
in Canada and the USA. This was also the case amongst couples with dependents. 
However, amongst Australian couples wives responded to their husbands’ 
increased earnings by wanting to work more hours.
Husbands’ hours proved to be endogenous in the USA and Australia. The 
relationship between the reduced form residual and wives’ hours was negative, as 
it was for US and Canadian couples with dependent children. Husbands’ 
instrumented hours had a positive effect on wives’ desired hours amongst 
Australian and US couples. In Canada the exogenous effect was negative and 
significant.
In terms of the estimated effects of husbands’ hours and wages on wives’ desired 
hours, it appears that the behaviour of couples was remarkably similar across 
countries and regardless of whether the couple had dependent children. Sorting 
into marriage appears to have been undertaken on the basis of complementarity in 
career intention and/or ability.
The Husband’s Wage
Results of the estimation of the structural form of husbands’ wage equation 
(equation 6.9), including wives’ hours and husbands’ hours as regressors appear 
in Appendix 6.C. The estimated coefficients, excluding both hours variables from 
the set of explanatory variables are reported in the first column. The estimated 
equations performed as expected. The wages of married men rose with education. 
The estimated relationship between age and the wage of married men was 
quadratic and concave. The coefficients on dummies set to one for those 
classified as migrants in Australia and non-French, non-English speakers in 
Canada were statistically significant and negative. Similarly the estimated
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coefficients on the dummy set to one for non-whites in the US equations was 
significant and negative. Those living in capital cities in Australia and in heavily 
populated areas in Canada and the USA experienced wage premiums.
Adding the hours variables to the set of explanatory variables improved the 
explanatory power of the model, according to the adjusted R-squareds. The 
estimated coefficients are listed in the second columns of Appendix 6.C. The 
inclusion of the hours’ variables did not affect the signs of the other coefficient 
estimates. Nor did it substantially affect the sizes of the other coefficient 
estimates. This suggests that the hours’ variables were not related to the other 
explanatory variables.
Effect of wives’ hours
Table 6.4 summarises the estimated effect of wives’ hours on husbands’ wage for 
each country depending on the presence of dependent children.
Couples with dependents
When exogenous the preferred estimated relationship between wives’ hours and 
husbands’ wages was significant and negatively linear for Canadian and US 
couples. In contrast, the preferred relationship for Australian couples was 
significant and concave downward. However the Australian relationship was 
negative amongst couples in which the wives worked more than five hours per 
week. The US findings were in line with the findings of Jacobsen and Rayack 
(1996) and Hotchkiss and Moore (1999).
I tested for the endogeneity of wives’ hours in the husbands’ wage equation by 
adding the residuals from estimation of wives’ hours in its reduced form to the set 
of regressors. I followed Hotchkiss’ and Moores’ approach (1999: 413) and used 
three options to instrument the wives’ labour supply, and hence three 
corresponding errors. The first option was the linear combination of the estimated 
coefficients from the tobit and the regressors. The second was expected hours 
given the coefficients and the regressors, and the third was expected hours 
conditional on a positive labour supply. I took most notice of the second option
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and the residual calculated from its combination with actual hours worked appears 
in Table 6.3. Wives’ hours proved to be endogenous for Canadian and US 
couples. For Australian couples the second and third option residuals were 
exogenous at the ten per cent level, but the first option was significant at the ten 
per cent level. I proceeded as if hours were exogenous.
Recall that the reduced form model was the best predictor of Australian wives’ 
labour supply, as it was in the analysis presented in Chapter Five. The labour 
supply of Australian wives was also exogenous in Chapter Five’s analysis. In 
Chapter Five I proceeded as if wives’ hours were exogenous in all countries.
The observed negative relationship between the residual and husbands’ wage 
could be evidence of a number of things. For example, wives might reduce their 
hours in response to increases in their husbands’ earnings. Also, it is possible that 
a wife’s unobservable desire for a career could impinge on her husband’s 
productivity. Perhaps more career-oriented wives were less likely to move with 
their husbands for his promotional transfer (Jacobsen and Rayack, 1996).
These explanations are not necessarily in conflict with the conclusions of the 
previous section. It is likely that husbands and wives select into marriage on the 
basis of complementary desires for careers and/or education levels. But once 
married concessions may be made for the other partner’s career.
The preferred specification for instrumented hours in Canada and the USA was 
the quadratic form. Like the findings for exogenous hours in Australia the 
relationships proved significant and concave. Amongst Canadian couples the 
relationship was negative once wives worked 11 hours, and amongst US couples 
the relationship was negative once wives worked 12 hours. Recall that the 
Australian relationship became negative once wives worked five hours. These 
findings provide support for the effects of specialisation on husbands’ earnings.
Table 6.4 also shows the effect on husbands’ wage of a ten per cent increase in 
wives’ hours from two points, 35 hours and 15 hours. The negative impact of the 
increase from 35 hours on husbands’ wage was remarkably similar in all countries 
in local currencies, ranging from eight Australian cents an hour to 13 Canadian
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cents an hour. In Australia, for example, this translated to $166.40 over a full 
year. For wives working 15 hours the negative impact was somewhat smaller. 
Perhaps husbands are more likely to respond, or respond more markedly, to the 
increased demands on them to undertake work within the home when their wives 
are working full-time. Wives working full-time would be more time constrained 
themselves. It may also be the case that wives’ attachment to the paid labour 
market is less indicative of the degree of specialisation because they are more 
easily able to combine work in the home with part-time work.
Couples without dependents
Among couples without dependents exogenous hours exhibited a negative 
relationship with husbands’ wage in all countries, although that relationship was 
only significant in Canada and the USA. In all countries wives’ hours proved to 
be endogenous. The relationship between the reduced form residual and 
husbands’ wages was negative, as it was for couples with dependent children.
The estimated effect of the wives’ instrumented hours on husbands’ wage was 
significant, linear and positive in Australia and Canada. Although significant and 
concave downward in the USA it was positive for wives who worked less than 
104 hours per week. These findings are the reverse of the findings for couples 
with dependent children. When wives currently working 35 hours per week 
increased their desired hours of work by ten per cent, the estimated increase in 
husbands’ annual earnings ranged from $US104 in the USA to $Aus300 in 
Australia.
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996), Hotchkiss and Moore (1999) and Blackaby et al 
(1998) undertook similar analysis but split the samples on the basis of occupation 
rather than the presence of dependent children. Both Hotchkiss and Moore and 
Blackaby et al reported finding the wives’ labour supply endogenous for men in 
some occupations. Furthermore, the wages of some men were detrimentally 
affected by their wives’ attachment to the paid labour market.
207
Chapter Six
Table 6.4: The estimated effect of wives’ hours on husbands’ wage
Australia Canada USA
With Without With Without With Without
dependents dependents dependents dependents dependents dependents
Exogenous 
Log wives’ hours 0.107* -0.011 -0.018* -0.011* -0.028* -0.018*
Log wives’ hours -0.032*
squared
Turning point-  
wives’ hours
5.3
ResidualR -0.026 -0.095* -0.025* -0.074* -0.061* -0.109*
Endogenous 
Log wives’ hours 
-  instrumented1
0.079* 0.152* 0.062* 0.216* 0.195*
Log wives’ hours 
squared-  
instrumented
-0.039* -0.043* -0.021
Turning point-  
wives’ hours
10.8 12.3 103.8
Mean of 
husbands’ hourly 
wage in own- 
country $
14.32 15.07 18.23 17.82 15.86 14.88
Effect, in $, on 
husband’s hourly 
wage of 10% 
increase in wife’s 
hours from 35
-0.08 0.12 -0.13 0.11 -0.09 0.05
Effect, in $, on 
husband’s annual 
earnings of above 
increase if 
husband working 
40 hour week, 52 
weeks per year
-166.40 299.60 -270.40 228.80 -187.20 104.00
Effect, in $, on 
husband’s hourly 
wage of 10% 
increase in wife’s 
hours from 15
-0.03 0.12 -0.06 0.11 -0.02 0.05
Sample size 1226 821 5646 3597 9815 6162
I Instrumented hours are the predicted hours from the reduced form tobit for wives’ hours.
R The residual from instrumented hours set to expected hours conditional on a positive labour 
supply was also insignificant at the 10 per cent level. However the residual from instrumented 
hours set to the linear combination of the estimated coefficients and the regressors was significant 
at the 10 per cent level.
* 5 per cent level of significance
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Effect of husbands’ hours
As Table 6.5 illustrates the relationship between husbands’ hours and wages 
differed markedly from country to country. There was a significant relationship 
between exogenous hours and wages in both groups of couples in all countries. 
The relationship was linear and negative in Canada, regardless of the presence of 
dependent children. It was convex in Australia and concave in the USA. For both 
countries the turning points were around 45 hours. The hours worked by 
husbands proved to be endogenous for both sets of US couples and Australian and 
Canadian couples without children.
The preferred relationship between husbands’ hours and wage rate was negative 
for at least a range of hours worked, in each country regardless of the presence of 
dependent children. The wage rate of Canadian husbands, regardless of the 
presence of dependent children, decreased as they worked more hours. The wage 
rate of Australian husbands without dependent children also decreased over all 
ranges of hours worked. But the wage rate of Australian husbands with dependent 
children varied inversely with the time spent working only up to 46 hours per 
week. Similarly, as US husbands increased their hours of work up to 39 hours per 
week for those with dependents and 46 hours per week for those without, their 
wage rate fell.
These results suggest that specialisation increased the wages of married men 
working full-time with dependent children in each of the countries. It appeared 
that specialisation did not operate through the time allocated to the paid labour 
market for Canadian husbands. If it operated this way for Australian and US 
husbands, it only did for Australian husbands working more than 46 hours per 
week and US husbands working more than 39 hours per week.
209
Chapter Six
Table 6.5: The estimated effect of husbands’ hours on husbands’ wage*
Australia Canada USA
W ith W ithou t W ith W ith ou t W ith W ith ou t
d ep en d en ts d ep en d en ts d ep en d en ts d ep en d en ts d ep en d en ts d ep en d en ts
Exogenous 
Log husband’s 
hours
-19.384* -23.896* -0.729* -0.785* 8.817* 10.576*
Log husband’s 
hours squared
2.572* 3.153* -1.170* -1.370*
Turning point 
-  husband’s
46 44 43 47
hours
Residual 0.052 1.295* 0.168 1.525* -2.940* -1.071*
Endogenous 
Log husband’s 
hours -
-1.473* -2.291* -67.390* 93.077*
instrumented 
Log husband’s 
hours squared 
-  instrumented
9.209* -12.141*
Turning point 
-  husband’s 
hours
39 46
* Significant at the five per cent level.
6.6 Conclusion
Recent analyses of the labour supply of married women have assumed that the 
female’s labour supply decision is inextricably linked to that of her husbands. His 
wage, an important determinant of female labour supply, however is presumed 
exogenous. I show that the male wage was endogenous for Australian, US and 
Canadian couples. In general it appears that these couples exhibit assortative 
mating in terms of unobservable factor(s) which jointly increase the husband’s 
wage and the wife’s degree of attachment to the paid labour market, as measured 
by her hours of paid work. Estimates of the effect of husbands’ wage on wives’ 
hours, that ignore this endogeneity, underestimate the size of the effect.
In estimating wage equations for married men I found that the number of hours 
worked in the labour market by their wives was endogenous for both sets of US
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and Canadian couples and Australian couples without dependants. It is possible 
that unobserved factors that increase the female labour supply also generally 
decrease the male wage. Perhaps career mindedness in the female impinges on 
her husband’s career. Also wives reduce their labour supply in response to 
increases in their husbands’ earnings.
Once the male wage was endogenised I found evidence of specialisation amongst 
couples with dependents. However amongst couples without dependents 
increases in the wives' hours are actually associated with increases in their 
husbands’ earnings.
The presence of children provides couples with the impetus to specialise. But 
once the children are old enough to live outside the parental home, my analysis 
suggests that specialisation ceases.
211
Chapter Six
Appendix 6.A: Estimated coefficients from OLS regression of men’s log
wages (t-statistics in brackets): Australia 1994, Canada 1994, 
USA 1994
Australia 1994 Canada 1994 USA 1994
Constant 1.959 32.292 0.924 -5.667 0.324 -16.380
(14.747) (2.752) (11.667) (-1.961) (5.791) (-10.469)
Married 0.072 0.071 0.076 0.081 0.133 0.135
(2.560) (2.507) (4.454) (4.864) (10.466) (10.636)
Married with 0.034 0.034 0.030 0.030 0.011 0.012
children (1.605) (1.648) (2.716) (2.776) (1.162) (1.308)
Log husband’s -16.038 4.164 8.807
hours (-2.571) (2.776) (10.993)
Log husband’s 2.118 -0.638 -1.159
hours squared (2.557) (-3.281) (-11.331)
Age 0.028 0.028 0.071 0.069 0.075 0.075
(3.928) (3.913) (17.873) (17.870) (25.781) (25.972)
Age squared -3.00E-04 -3.00E-04 -7.13E-04 -6.97E-04 -7.30E-04 -7.33E-04
(-3.450) (-3.448) (-14.845) (-14.862) (-20.796) (-20.991)
Education
dummies:
Bachelor 0.341 0.342 0.405 0.430 0.707 0.719
(14.396) (14.340) (24.118) (26.221) (52.031) (52.574)
Certificate/ 0.164 0.164 0.212 0.206 0.471 0.471
diploma (5.709) (5.679) (13.713) (13.689) (26.690) (26.852)
Post­ 0.022 0.023 0.163 0.164 0.387 0.394
secondary (1.100) (1.136) (7.484) (7.722) (26.334) (26.924)
Secondary N/A N/A 0.113 0.110 0.288 0.290
(7.003) (6.991) (21.278) (21.565)
Location 0.022 0.021 0.075 0.066 0.136 0.134
(1.239) (1.174) (7.755) (7.001) (17.057) (16.989)
Ethnicity -0.071 -0.071 -0.130 -0.131 -0.152 -0.154
(-3.709) (-3.714) (-9.211) (-9.527) (-10.367) (-10.561)
Adjusted R 0.1184 0.1206 0.1529 0.1959 0.2766 0.2862
squared
Number of 2462 2462 10316 10316 18 864 18 864
records
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Appendix 6.B: Estimated coefficients from tobit regression of wives’ hours - 
(chi statistics in brackets): Australia 1994, Canada 1994, USA 1994
A. Australia
With dependents Without dependents
Independent Simultaneous Independent Simultaneous
Constant -12.093 -11.151 9.683 -2.479
(197.507) (132.416) (144.637) (0.580)
Education dummies:
Tertiary -2.142 -2.075 1.305 1.055
(560.651) (473.863) (271.675) (159.436)
Certificate/Diploma* -1.087 -1.061 1.151 0.988
(148.875) (137.261) (136.965) (102.248)
Secondary -0.378 -0.339 0.447 0.441
(26.528) (19.955) (45.444) (47.139)
Urban -0.263 -0.244 0.204 0.177
(22.549) (18.554) (15.079) (12.104)
Log property income 0.038 0.456 0.004 -0.023
(17.910) (22.228) (0.264) (6.697)
Log wives’ wage 6.363 1 6.355 1 -3.205 1 -3.212 1
(3308.181) (3280.327) (3153.983) (3344.894)
Log husband’s wage -0.281 -0.675 1 0.031 1.004 1
(22.477) (12.586) (0.309) (38.303
Log husband’s hours 0.100 0.130 0.384 2.974 1
(0.218) (0.364) (3.410) (11.749)
Ethnicity 0.456 0.456 -0.197 -0.132
(51.741) (51.313) (11.462) (5.279)
Number of children -0.076 -0.074
(5.623) (5.341)
Youngest child aged to one -0.592 -0.590
(72.367) (71.427)
Youngest child aged 2-4 -0.401 -0.420
(31.797) (33.964)
Number of records 1226 1226 821 821
Log Likelihood -1059.460 -1064.392 -707.820 -684.701
* This includes post-secondary. 
1 Instrumented
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B. Canada
With dependents Without dependents
Independent Simultaneous Independent Simultaneous
Constant -3.315 -3.882 0.841 0.593
(99.787) (5.987) (0.582) (0.300)
Education dummies:
Tertiary -1.749 -1.464 1.428 1.107
(1036.972) (630.675) (69.267) (38.254)
Certificate/Diploma* -0.752 -0.588 1.388 1.257
(271.256) (166.166) (137.234) (109.905)
Secondary -0.249 -0.142 1.210 1.195
(29.927) (9.902) (111.903) (109.970)
Urban -0.495 -0.380 -0.012 -0.029
(441.414) (257.550) (0.024) (0.141)
Log property income -0.014 0.007 -0.017 0.011
(13.743) (3.478) (2.495) (0.966)
Log wives’ wage 3.315 1 3.327 1 1.731 1 2.708 1
(17111.07) (18240.12) (49.516) (83.045)
Log husband’s wage -0.184 -1.190 1 -0.410 -1.507 1
(59.855) (355.866) (32.514) (56.982)
Log husband’s hours 0.017 0.882 1 -0.713 -0.427
(0.0446) (4.472) (7.636) (2.878)
Ethnicity 0.249 0.116 -0.190 -0.222
(52.165) (11.636) (3.190) (4.371)
Number of children 0.081 0.107
(35.116) (61.266)
Youngest child aged to one 0.039 -0.069
(1.835) (5.746)
Youngest child aged 2-4 0.446 0.293
(219.544) (93.458)
Number of records 5646 5646 3597 3597
Log Likelihood -5231.207 -5078.307 -6550.767 -6538.545
*This includes post secondary. 
1 Instrumented
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C. USA
With dependents Without dependents
Independent Simultaneous Independent Simultaneous
Constant -2.032 -16.839 1.278 -15.110
(15.502) (33.954) (4.478) (17.919)
Education dummies:
Tertiary -4.438 -4.988 0.742 -0.096
(750.111) (886.170) (20.378) (0.301)
Certificate/Diploma* -1.812 -2.005 0.772 0.355
(309.978) (356.727) (43.800) (8.798)
Secondary -1.055 -1.100 0.423 0.141
(152.893) (164.289) (16.563) (1.800)
Urban -1.360 -1.188 -0.317 -0.288
(765.612 (576.073) (30.718) (25.248)
Log property income 0.017 0.134 -0.012 0.050
(5.632) (209.018) (2.325) (20.294)
Log wives’ wage 6.017 1 7.413 1 1.151 1 2.236 1
(1667.21) (2206.356) (44.590) (124.734) 
-1.748 1Log husband’s wage -0.732 -3.041 1 -0.424
(380.005) (788.536) (100.536) (219.453)
Log husband’s hours -0.998 3.635 1 -0.092 4.571 1
(71.908) (21.724) (0.412) (22.801)
Ethnicity 0.453 0.269 -0.151 -0.150
(34.815) (11.363) (2.515) (2.170)
Number of children -0.015 0.108
(0.482) (24.670)
Youngest child aged to one 0.211 0.156
(18.114) (10.165)
Youngest child aged 2-4 0.023 -0.201
(0.193) (14.184)
Number of records 9815 9815 6162 6162
Log Likelihood -17146.486 -16960.421 -11197.447 -11120.404
*This includes post secondary. 
1 Instrumented
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion
This thesis considers whether married men earn more than unmarried men do because 
of the productivity enhancement of traditional sex-based specialisation within 
marriage, wherein married women are responsible for work within the home and 
married men focus their energy on work in the paid labour market. Empirical 
analysis of three waves of cross-sectional Australian, Canadian and US data spanning 
the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s forms the basis of the thesis. The brunt of 
the analysis rests on the assumption that a couple’s degree of specialisation varies 
inversely with the extent of the wife’s attachment to the paid labour market.
The analysis commences with a survey of the literature relevant to an economics 
based discussion of the male marriage premium. Included in the discussion is a brief 
review of the economic theory underpinning the relationship between specialisation 
within marriage and male wages, Gary Becker’s theory of the family (for example 
Becker, 1981, 1985). Becker’s depiction of the family as a locus of production made 
it easier for economists to study families and incorporate gender relations into 
economic theory. He suggested that the organisation of family life had repercussions 
for labour market outcomes. Also discussed is the validity of the assumption that 
couples are less likely to specialise as the wife spends more time in the paid labour 
market.
Claiming that married men are more productive than are never married men, recent 
economics based literature has focused on using US panel data to determine the 
relative importance of two competing explanations for the productivity differential; 
specialisation and selection into marriage. Selection supposes that marriage does not 
make men more productive, rather the factors that make them more productive, like 
reliability and commitment, also make men more marriageable. These factors are 
life-long attributes. Panel data is used to wash out the effect on men’s wages of these 
life-long productivity-enhancing attributes.
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This thesis’ comparison of cross-sectional data from Australia, Canada and the USA, 
three very similar countries, broadened the focus of the marriage premium literature. 
The analysis presented in this thesis used the fact that the size of the marriage 
premium varies between countries and that the relative sizes changed over time, to 
test the validity of specialisation as a cause of the marriage premium.
There are two parts to the empirical analysis. Chapters Three and Four served to 
describe the empirical relationships between the marriage premium and factors 
relevant to specialisation, such as the wives’ labour supply, the presence of dependent 
children and the length of the marriage. In the analysis, presented in Chapters Five 
and Six, specialisation was proxied only by the wives’ labour supply and attention 
was focused on the relationship between the wages of married men and the labour 
supply of their wives. In the earlier chapters the length of marriage was proxied by 
the age of the men. With the trend to delay marriage and the increasing likelihood of 
marital breakdown the link between a man’s age and the length of time he has spent 
in a stable relationship is more tenuous. And it proved difficult to establish a 
hypothesis about the effect of dependent children on the likelihood of specialisation. 
The analysis presented in Chapters Five and Six considered the possibility that the 
wife’s labour supply was endogenous in equations describing husband’s earnings. 
Chapter Six also estimated the relationship between husband’s earnings and wives’ 
labour supply separately for couples with and without dependent children, thus 
allowing for any effects parenthood and/or stage in life-course might have on the 
specialisation process.
Assuming that a married man’s age is a rough guide to the length of time he has spent 
married the age wage profiles presented in Chapter Three provide a simple, but 
effective, introduction to the effects of specialisation on men’s earnings. The chapter 
contains, for each country and time period, a figure of age-wage profiles for 
unmarried men and married men grouped by whether their wife worked or not. 
Cross-national comparison was undertaken with Australia 1989, Canada 1991 and the 
USA 1991. Over-time comparison was undertaken with Australia 1981 and 1994,
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Canada 1981 and 1994 and the USA 1979 and 1994. Hypotheses were made about 
cross-national and over-time differences in the extent of specialisation. These 
differences could have been borne out in the age-wage profiles.
However age-wage profiles do not control for differences between married and 
unmarried men in their holdings of observed human capital. Married men tend to be 
older and less educated than unmarried men are. There could have been cross­
national differences and over-time differences in the relative holdings of observed 
human capital and the returns to observed human capital. Estimated marriage 
premiums, derived from human capital theory based OLS regressions of male 
earnings that controlled for differences in observed human capital, were presented in 
Chapter Four. They gave some indication of the ability of specialisation to account 
for the marriage premium across countries and over time.
Chapter Five reported on the findings of Juhn et al. decompositions of the dynamics 
of cross-national differences in the wage gaps between married men (grouped by 
whether their wives worked full-time, part-time or not at all) and unmarried men. 
The Juhn et al. decomposition technique was used to identify the extent of and return 
to specialisation based human capital. The logic behind this test of specialisation was 
that the US marriage premium was larger in size than the Australiana and Canadian 
premiums in both the second and third waves of the data sets. However, between the 
second and third waves the US premium advantage over Canada increased in size, 
while the US advantage over Australia decreased in size. If specialisation was a 
useful explanator of the marriage premium, cross-national changes in the relative 
extent of and return to specialisation should have been able to explain the over-time 
movement in the size of the US premiums relative to the Australiana and Canadian 
premiums.
This test of specialisation was performed with the assumption that the wives’ labour 
supply was exogenous in the husbands’ earnings equation. In other words it was 
assumed that wives did not take into account their husbands’ earnings when 
determining their labour supply. The analysis also assumed that, for example,
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husbands and wives did not select into marriage on the basis of unobserved 
characteristics related to their labour market outcomes. I did test whether wives’ 
labour supply was endogenous. However the instruments were such poor predictors 
of the wives’ labour supply that I assumed the test of endogeneity was unreliable.
Using the third wave of data, the analysis presented in Chapter Six sets out to 
determine whether the wives’ labour supply was endogenous. Wives’ labour supply, 
in hours worked, appeared as a continuous variable and the couples were split into 
those with and without dependent children.
The Main Findings
This thesis is devoted to determining the worth of the claim that the male marriage 
premium has a base in theory, specifically specialisation within marriage.
The marriage premium exists in Australian, Canadian and US cross-section data
Analysis presented in Chapter Four suggested that, in log hourly wage equations, 
estimated by OLS, currently married men earned more than unmarried men after 
controlling for age, education, ethnicity and location, in all countries at three points in 
time from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s -  Australia (1981, 1989, 1994), Canada 
(1981, 1991, 1994), and USA (1979, 1991, 1994)
Cross-country comparison, with the most comparable data sets, in terms of samples 
and variables, revealed that the marriage premiums for men working full-time for the 
entire surveyed year were 8.5 per cent, 15.3 per cent and 17.1 per cent respectively in 
Australia 1989, Canada 1991 and the USA 1991.
I also presented over-time comparisons of the marriage premiums in Chapter Four. I 
found that the size of the Canadian and Australian marriage premiums fell over the 
1980s and early 1990s (between the first and third waves) by roughly 40 per cent and 
sixty per cent respectively. However the US premium was much the same size in the 
1994 and 1979 data sets. In contrast, other studies found that the size of the US
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premium had fallen over the same period (Blackburn and Korenman, 1994; Gray, 
1997). It is possible that data limitations, which affected the comparability of the 
wage data between the 1994 and 1979 data sets, and forced me to include men in de- 
facto relationships and divorced, widowed and separated men with never married 
men, could have caused this difference.
How important was specialisation to cross-national differences in the marriage 
premium and the dynamics o f those differences?
In Chapter Three I set out some hypotheses to explain cross-country and over-time 
differences in the extent of specialisation. In terms of the cross-country comparison 
these hypotheses suggested that the least amount of specialisation would be 
undertaken in Australia, and indeed analysis presented in Chapter Four showed that 
the Australian marriage premium was the smallest in size. Australian women face the 
least amount of sex-based pay discrimination In terms of this aspect of the 
opportunity cost associated with specialisation, Australian couples should have been 
the least motivated to specialise.
On the bases of these hypotheses I would have expected the Canadian and US 
premiums to be of much the same size, even though my estimates suggested that the 
US premium was larger.
The hypotheses suggested that the motivation for Australian and US couples to 
specialise should have decreased over the 1980s. Both countries experienced 
reductions in sex-based wage discrimination during the 1980s. Also the average 
length of time spent married decreased over the same time. Furthermore attitudes to 
gender roles continue to evolve. In line with this prediction the size of the Australian 
marriage premium, reported in Chapter Four, fell between 1981 and 1994. However 
the size of the US marriage premium was much the same in both periods. I have 
already mentioned that the US estimates may have been compromised by data 
comparability problems. However, it is possible that the return to the specialisation
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related human capital increased sufficiently over the same period to cancel out the fall 
in the amount of specialisation.
I hypothesised that there would be no change in the extent of specialisation in 
Canada. Over the 1980s there was no change to the extent of sex based pay 
discrimination. Nor did Canadian men seem to spend less time married. However 
the size of the Canadian premium fell.
The size o f  the male marriage premium increased with the coupled degree o f  
specialisation, measured by the labour supply o f the wives, in each o f the countries 
in the early to mid 1990s.
Analysis presented in Chapter Five showed that amongst men working full-time full- 
year the size of the male marriage premium varied with the wife’s degree of 
attachment to the paid labour market, acting as proxy for the degree of specialisation 
in the couple. Men with wives who did not work had the largest premiums, followed 
by men with wives who worked part-time. Men with wives who worked full-time 
received the smallest premiums. However the differences in the sizes of the 
premiums disaggregated by the wife’s employment status were not always 
statistically significant. In the 1994 US and Canadian samples'* I found no statistical 
difference (at the five per cent level) between the size of the premiums of men with 
wives who worked part-time and men with wives who did not work. In the 1991 
Canadian sample the difference between the premiums of men with wives who 
worked part-time and men with wives who worked full-time was not statistically 
significant.
These results were based on OLS estimation of human capital theory based equations 
explaining the log hourly wages of men. Wives’ labour supply entered the regression 
as an exogenous explanatory variable. However there are concerns that wives’ labour
1 I was not able to identify men who worked full-year in the Australian 1994 data set so the sample of 
men included all men who worked full-time in the reference week.
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supply is endogenous, and that the observed inverse relationship between wives’ 
labour supply and husband’s earnings might not reflect the effects of specialisation on 
husband’s productivity. Perhaps wives adjust their desired hours of work in response 
to their husband’s earnings. When he is seen as the primary income earner, as his 
earnings increase there is less need for the wife to work. Also couples might select 
into relationships on the basis of characteristics crucial to their labour market 
outcomes, but unobservable to the analyst.
Was the wife’s labour supply endogenous?
In the analysis undertaken for Chapters Five and Six I tested empirically for the 
possibility that the wives’ degree of attachment to the paid labour market was 
endogenous in the husband’s wage equation. I could not find adequate instruments to 
describe whether wives worked full-time, worked part-time or did not work in 
Canada and the USA. The Australian instruments were more effective, and I found 
that the labour supply of Australian wives was exogenous.
In the analysis undertaken for Chapter Six, I also instrumented wives’ continuous 
hours. Here I found that the available instrument was best able to explain the hours 
worked by Australian women, although even in Australia the degree of correlation 
between wives’ actual hours and instrumented hours was less than 0.5. In all 
countries the instrument was better able to explain wives’ hours if the couple did not 
have dependent children, although the instrument did contain information on the 
number and age of the dependent children. It is difficult to judge whether I was 
better able to instrument continuous hours than segmented hours. Nonetheless I 
concluded that wives’ hours were exogenous for Australian couples with dependents, 
but endogenous for other Australian couples and all Canadian and US couples, 
regardless of the presence of dependent children.
It seems that unobserved factors, which were positively related to the labour supply 
of married women, were also related negatively with the husband’s wage. This 
finding is consistent with a number of explanations. Estimation of the wives’ hours
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equation showed that wives did tend to withdraw their labour from the paid labour 
market the more their husband earned, regardless of whether they were parents. It is 
also possible that the wife’s unobserved taste for her career had a detrimental effect 
on her husband’s career. She may have been less able to move with her husband for 
his promotional transfer. Estimation of the wives’ hours equation suggested that men 
and women select into couples on the basis of career intentions. Unobserved factors 
that enhance husband’s earnings potential are also associated with the wife spending 
more hours in the paid labour market, again regardless of whether the couple has 
dependent children.
Was there evidence o f specialisation once the wife’s labour supply was 
endogenised?
I found evidence for specialisation amongst couples with dependent children only.
Amongst couples without dependents the estimated relationships between wives’ 
instrumented hours and the husband’s wage suggested that husband’s earnings 
increased with wives’ hours. It is possible this signals that husbands and wives tend 
to select into marriage on the basis of observed human capital, like education. There 
was some indication that the positive effect of wives’ instrumented hours on 
husband’s earnings absorbed some of the positive effect of his own education and 
work experience on his earnings, especially in Canada and the USA.
Wives’ hours proved to be endogenous amongst couples with dependent children 
from Canada and the USA. Once instrumented wives’ hours had a significant 
concave downward effect on husband’s wage. The Australian exogenous effect was 
similarly concave. In all countries the relationship proved to be negative for most of 
the working wives, the turning points were five hours, eleven hours and twelve hours 
for the Australian, Canadian and US couples respectively.
The negative effect on the husband’s annual earnings of wives increasing their hours
of work by ten per cent from 35 hours ranged from $166 in Australia to $270 in
Canada. For wives working fifteen hours the estimated impact was significantly
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smaller, implying, as one would imagine, that wives working full-time are more time 
constrained than wives working part-time.
Was specialisation able to explain the dynamics o f cross country differences in the 
size o f the male marriage premium between the second and third waves?
In analysis presented in Chapter Five, the Juhn et al. decomposition technique was 
used to decompose dynamics in the cross-country wage gaps between never married 
men and currently married men (grouped by whether their wives worked full-time, 
worked part-time, or did not work). Based on the assumption that all unobserved 
human capital was the result of specialisation this decomposition technique was used 
to identify holdings of specialisation related human capital and the return to that 
human capital. Once identified these values were compared to the dynamics of the 
cross-country differences in the size of the disaggregated marriage premiums.
The disaggregated marriage premiums were largest in the USA and smallest in 
Australia in both waves. US married men appeared to hold more specialisation 
related human capital than Canadian and Australian men in both waves. The US 
return to that human capital was larger than the Australian return and much the same 
size as the Canadian return. Over the early 1990s the size of the disaggregated US 
premiums fell, that fall being most marked for couples with dependent children. It 
seems that holdings of specialisation related human capital and the return to that 
human capital fell over the same time frame. Over the same time the return to 
observed human capital increased. Claims by other researchers that the return to 
specialisation related human capital also increased between the early 1970s and early 
1990s (Gray, 1997; Blackburn and Korenman, 1994) appear to be unfounded. 
Blackburn and Korenman based their claim on increases in the return to years 
married and Gray based his claim on an increased intensity in the inverse relationship 
between wives’ hours of paid work and husband’s earnings. Both ignored the 
possibilities that there had been changes over time in: the amount of specialisation 
undertaken per year of marriage, and the mapping from degree of specialisation to 
wives’ labour supply.
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Over the early 1990s the US premium advantage over Australian men decreased 
somewhat, a trend consistent over all married men regardless of their wives’ 
employment status. There was a marked reduction in the US advantage in the 
holdings of specialisation related human capital, although the Australian and US 
returns to specialisation related human capital both fell by much the same extent.
Over the early 1990s the fall in the size of the Canadian premiums was more extreme 
than the US fall. But US holdings of specialisation related human capital fell, relative 
to Canadian holdings, and there was little change in the relative returns to 
specialisation related human capital. So specialisation changes cannot be said to 
explain the relative movements in the Canadian and US marriage premium.
Practical Relevance and Suggestions for Future Research
That marital status appears as a regressor in men’s human capital based wage 
equations, without having an unambiguous theoretical source, is reason enough to 
undertake an analysis that helps to uncover that source. The identification of the 
source of the male marriage premium also matters for our understanding of marriage, 
for example. Marriage involves a complex web of interdependencies. Some social 
scientists argue that specialisation within marriage is a dying phenomenon as the 
roles of husbands and wives have become more similar since the 1950s and 1960s. 
Furthermore, the gains from marriage arise from comparable, rather than dissimilar, 
economic and household roles.
The analysis also has implications for how we think about sex discrimination in the 
paid labour market. In industrialised countries the push for equal pay for work of 
equal value has been largely successful. However, as Morris explains, the work force 
is not a friendly place for dual career couples especially those with children.
More and more, the business world seems to regard children not as a future generation of 
workers but as luxuries you're entitled to after you've won your stripes. It’s fine to have 
the kid’s picture on your desk -  just don’t let them cut into your billable hours (Morris, 
1997: 70).
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The family ‘un-friendly’ nature of the structure of paid work and the labour market 
plus the lack of institutional support for parents engaged in paid work make it 
difficult for women to meet their career goals. Hence institutional factors feed 
indirectly into discrimination. They also discourage men from contributing more 
equally to work within the home, an outcome that would alleviate the double-burden 
of women’s working lives. If, as Becker argues, our happiness depends on the 
consumption of goods and services produced within the home the most valuable 
institutional changes would enable both members of married couples to work more 
effectively in the paid labour market without being detrimental to household 
production.
The research presented in this thesis provides some support for the claim that sex- 
based specialisation within the family boosts men’s earnings. In Chapter Five I 
showed that changes in the relative amounts of specialisation and the return to that 
specialisation had implications for the dynamics of the US male marriage premium 
over the early 1990s. Specialisation was also able to explain much of the dynamics 
of the Australian premium relative to the US premium over that period.
The research underpinning Chapter Six suggested that the average married couple 
with children in Australia, Canada and the USA, was specialised to some extent. The 
effect of specialisation on husband’s earnings was most extreme in Canada and least 
extreme in Australia. The relative effects of specialisation did not match the relative 
sizes of the marriage premium perfectly. Recall that the US premium was the largest 
over the 1980s and early 90s, and the Australian the smallest. Similarly the finding 
was only partially consistent with hypotheses on the relative extent of specialisation, 
discussed in Chapter Three. For example, Australia exhibits the least amount of sex- 
based pay discrimination and the USA, probably the most. Sex-based pay 
discrimination encourages specialisation.
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Chapter Seven
Future Research
The specialisation hypothesis better described the experiences of Australian and US 
families, than it did Canadian families. In the analysis cross-country institutional 
differences were largely ignored. That Canada stood out from the other two countries 
provides a basis for introducing institutional factors into the analysis. They could 
have important implications for the couples’ desired trade-off between home 
production and market work and the ability of people to combine market work with 
home-production, for example.
Non-economists are far more likely to research how people use their time than 
economists. Time use is a critical element of Becker’s theory of the family. 
Economic research into marriage this area would benefit from combining time-use 
surveys with labour-market surveys. In the better time-use surveys, such as the 
Australian one (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1997), it is possible to approximate 
both the time spent in and the intensity of home production.
One of the most important legacies of Becker’s theory of the family is that it has 
allowed economists to pose questions, considered important by other social scientists. 
This facilitates cross-fertilisation of ideas. The economic literature surrounding the 
source of the male marriage premium is relatively young. It has the potential to be 
diverse in its theoretical content. Future research would benefit greatly from 
blending the strict economic picture of the interface between the family and the 
labour market with views of other social scientists.
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